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What inventions are eligible for utility patent protection in the 
United States? The question, as simple as it appears, has been a 
topic of much heated debate. Courts have wrestled with the issue 
and have struggled to offer a cohesive and definitive standard.1 As 
a result, judicial decisions in this area have varied wildly, 
particularly with respect to determining what constitutes an 
unpatentable “abstract idea.”2 Fundamental disagreements remain. 
Even when ostensibly applying the same standards, judicial 
opinions reveal a deep, underlying ideological divide about 
fundamental purposes of patents, the ends they advance, and who 
should benefit from them. In a practical sense, the most 
problematic claims for subject matter eligibility analysis are those 
that raise the perennial question of overbreadth,3 in which a 
relatively insignificant (or nonexistent) “inventive” contribution is 
recited (and therefore a monopoly secured) in relatively broad 
claims that greatly surpass the scope of the inventive 
contribution—or simply recite a result rather than the actual 
solution to the underlying technical problem.4  
                                                 
1
 E.g., CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3131 (U.S. Dec. 6, 
2013) (No. 13–298). 
2
 E.g., compare Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 
2013), with CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
3
 Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 82, 89–
90 (2012). 
4
 Results- or effect-based claiming frequently arises through the use of 
functional (rather than structural) language, or through the recitation of method 
steps that relate to the physical world in only a vague, abstract way. It is, 
nonetheless, a problem that has existed for well over a hundred years, beginning 
with the introduction of claims in patent applications along with pre-grant 
examination in 1836. See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 173 
(1852) (“A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as 
that would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any means 
3
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Some key questions repeatedly arise when the patentability of 
business methods and other nontechnological activities are 
considered. Will protections of business methods displace 
technological endeavors, as historically understood? Should the 
grant of business method patents accommodate economic 
transitions that are alleged to flow from the so-called “post-
industrial” economy, or does the Constitution, statutory language, 
or judicial gloss preclude patents from extending outside of the 
realm of “technology,” more narrowly defined? Can patents on 
business methods ever be clearly distinguished from practical 
technology? These sorts of questions are central to an 
understanding of the deep ideological divide in the judiciary as 
evidenced by what are clearly conflicting patentable subject matter 
decisions. These inquiries illuminate the subtext of many disputes 
about the proper bounds of patent-eligible subject matter. 
The Supreme Court has analyzed exceptions from patent 
eligibility under the doctrine of “preemption.”5 Yet determining 
what does and does not constitute “preemption” remains a 
contentious issue.6 The lower courts and the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) still struggle when patents and 
patent applications recite methods having tenuous links to tangible 
yet commonplace things like general purpose computers. In this 
legal quagmire, some degree of clarity might be found through 
reference to efforts in one of the last places patent attorneys look: 
the social sciences.  
The present paper presents a possible extension of standards 
for patent eligibility based upon theories developed by economist 
Thorstein Veblen, who elaborated a dichotomy between 
                                                                                                             
whatsoever. This, by creating monopolies, would discourage arts and 
manufactures, against the avowed policy of the patent laws.”). 
5
 E.g., Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978). 
6
 Indeed, it is not clear that judges in lower courts are actually applying the 
preemption standard at all. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 
1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring).  
4
Cybaris®, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol5/iss2/1
[5:211 2014] PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 215 
 
 
economically productive and unproductive activity, extended from 
classical economics.7 This follows from Veblen’s observations that 
patents represent ways of segregating the gains and transmission of 
technology, even though “in the case of [such] intangible assets 
there is no presumption that the objects of wealth involved have 
any serviceability at large, since they serve no materially 
productive work, but only a differential advantage to the owner in 
the distribution of the industrial product.”8 While Veblen did not 
offer a precise test for determining patent subject matter eligibility, 
or even approach that question directly, he did provide a broad 
conceptual framework that can help illuminate a path toward a 
suitable patent eligibility standard, and, perhaps most importantly, 
can help evaluate various tests proffered to assess patent eligibility. 
The hope here is that a unification of many rationales given in 
judicial decisions over a period of centuries is possible by 
reclaiming the notion that patents must serve the social good,9 and 
that such a task can be accomplished using a Veblenian economic 
                                                 
7
 Veblen is generally credited with coining the phrase “evolutionary 
economics.” That term has taken on somewhat different meanings over time, 
and it now encompasses both orthodox and heterodox economic schools. The 
three leading schools of economic thought today are Neoclassical, Keynesian, 
and Marxist. See generally RICHARD D. WOLFF & STEPHEN A. RESNICK, 
CONTENDING ECONOMIC THEORIES: NEOCLASSICAL, KEYNESIAN, AND MARXIAN 
(2012). Neoclassical economics is considered “orthodox” while all others are 
considered “heterodox.” Id. Veblen’s work is considered heterodox; he was a 
critic of orthodox economics. He is variously described as either an evolutionary 
economist or an institutionalist economist.  
8
 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE STATE OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS (1914), reprinted in WHAT VEBLEN TAUGHT 178–79 
(Wesley C. Mitchell ed., Viking Press 1936) [hereinafter THE INDUSTRIAL 
ARTS]; Thorstein Veblen, On the Nature of Capital: Investment, Intangible 
Assets, and the Pecuniary Magnate, 23 Q.J. ECON., 104, 115 (1908), available 
at http://archive.org/details/jstor-1883967 [hereinafter On the Nature of 
Capital]. 
9
 An excellent discussion of just such a proposal is found in Dana R. Irwin, 
Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in the 
Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775 (2008); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232, 3239–46 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
5
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theory that aligns with the preemption doctrine that the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly relied upon. 
The new theory presented here sets up a Veblenian dichotomy, 
whereby the productive functions of “technology” (or “industry”) 
and unproductive “pecuniary” (or “ceremonial”) functions are 
distinguished with respect to patent eligibility. The former 
provides means to support life processes in an evolutionary sense, 
whereas the latter merely deals with invidious human social 
relations—perhaps more broadly termed sociopolitical or 
socioeconomic endeavors.10 Patent claims directed to no more than 
accumulating or distributing wealth, manipulating confidence, 
exerting influence, avoiding regulation, structuring a business or 
legal organization, leveraging social position, speculating, and the 
like, would fall into the latter category, while patent claims 
directed to articles of manufacture, knowledge of the use of tools, 
application of “matter-of-fact” scientific knowledge, and the like, 
would fall into the former category. Key here is that any invention 
for which utility is contingent upon social context would not be 
patent-eligible. However, inventions that relate, in the very 
broadest sense, to applied physics and engineering with results that 
are repeatable, are independent of social context (i.e., 
transcultural), and bear some reasonable connection to creating an 
economic surplus based around overcoming the scarcity of labor, 
energy or materials in a causal sequence of development, would be 
patent-eligible. In short, this paper suggests using a Veblenian 
technological/pecuniary dichotomy to evaluate the constitutionality 
of judicial tests for patent eligibility, and further that such 
evaluations should be applied at the point of inventive 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 232 
(MacMillan 1899) (“The substantial canons of the leisure-class scheme of life 
are a conspicuous waste of time and substance and a withdrawal from the 
industrial process; while the particular aptitudes here in question assert 
themselves, on the economic side, in a deprecation of waste and of a futile 
manner of life, and in an impulse to participation in or identification with the life 
process, whether it be on the economic side or in any other of its phases or 
aspects.”); MICHAEL HUDSON, THE BUBBLE AND BEYOND 415 (2012). 
6
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contribution, that is, by looking at where, in a given patent claim, a 
technical problem is alleged to be solved or a technical advance is 
otherwise alleged to be made. Such an approach is contrasted 
against other observations on patent eligibility, such as a 
suggestion by Thomas Cotter that a “Burkean” approach—based 
on the political outlook of Edmund Burke—be employed.11 
A Veblenian context for the patentable subject matter debate 
provides a way of evaluating proposed patentability tests. In other 
words, this provides a lens that can be used to test the tests for 
patent-eligible subject matter, by exploring the ideological and 
economic impacts of patent subject matter eligibility tests. Rather 
than force judges to evaluate an abstract question of degree (such 
as evaluation of the sufficiency of connections to tangible things) 
or make hypothetical comparisons (such as assessing whether a 
process could be performed purely mentally or whether other, 
unstated mechanisms can provide the same result), a shift toward a 
more functionally-oriented metric may allow more consistent 
outcomes by providing a shared sense of purpose in resolving the 
ambiguities that arise with the consideration of individual patent 
claims. Of course, the precise formulation of a bright-line 
functional metric is not the goal of this paper. Yet it is proposed 
that an evaluation of the contingency of a patent claim on social 
context to determine a relationship to a productive contribution to 
matter-of-fact technical knowledge may be a more useful form of 
analysis than one requiring a determination of whether a given 
invention could hypothetically be performed with purely mental 
steps, or whether there is a sufficient link to a machine or 
transformation of matter, as is often used to evaluate troublesome 
method claims in patents today.12  
                                                 
11
 Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855 (2007). 
12
 See, e.g., id. at 855, 884–94. 
7
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II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF VEBLEN 
Thorstein Veblen was a political economist raised in 
Minnesota, who has been called “one of the most important social 
thinkers of the last century[.]”13 He is frequently described as 
                                                 
13
 Ian Rappel, Fight the Power, SOCIALIST REV., July 2005, available at 
http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=9461 (statement by 
Noam Chomsky). For background and other general information on Thorstein 
Veblen, see generally KEN MCCORMICK, VEBLEN IN PLAIN ENGLISH: A 
COMPLETE INTRODUCTION TO THORSTEIN VEBLEN'S ECONOMICS (2006); 
GEORGE SOULE, IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMISTS 184–92 (1952); RICK 
TILMAN, THE LEGACY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN (Rick Tilman ed., 2003); RICK 
TILMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND HIS CRITICS 1891–1963 (1992);  THORSTEIN 
VEBLEN: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS (John Cunningham Wood ed., 1993); 
THORSTEIN VEBLEN: ECONOMICS FOR AN AGE OF CRISES (Erik S. Reinert & 
Francesca Lidia Viano eds., 2012); John Patrick Diggins, Thorstein Veblen and 
the Literature of the Theory Class, 6 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 481 
(1993); William M. Dugger, Radical Institutionalism: Basic Concepts, 20 REV. 
RADICAL POL. ECON. 1 (1988), reprinted in 4 EVOLUTIONARY THEORY IN THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 124 (Dugger et al. eds., 2003); Adil H. Mouhammed, A 
Critique of A Marxist Critique Of Thorstein Veblen, 6 AM. REV. POL. ECON., 
June 2008, at 19, available at http://arpejournal.com/ARPEvolume6number1/
Mouhammed.pdf; Rick Tilman, Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), in A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF DISSENTING ECONOMISTS 695 (Philip Arestis & 
Malcolm Sawyer eds., 2d ed., 2000) [hereinafter Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929)] 
(“His most famous book [was] The Theory of the Leisure Class, in which he 
developed his theory of status emulation. In this satirical study of the leisure 
class and the underlying social strata which emulate it, he argued that 
conspicuous consumption, conspicuous waste and ostentatious avoidance of 
useful work were practices by which social status was enhanced.”); Andrew B. 
Trigg, Veblen, Bourdieu, and Conspicuous Consumption, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 99 
(2001) (linking Veblen to later theorists like Pierre Bourdieu); L. Randall Wray, 
Veblen’s Theory of Business Enterprise and Keynes’s Monetary Theory of 
Production, 41 J. ECON. ISSUES 1 (2007) (linking Veblen to later economists like 
Keynes). Some earlier economists, like John Rae, worked along similar lines. 
See, e.g., JOHN RAE, STATEMENT OF SOME NEW PRINCIPLES ON THE SUBJECT OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: EXPOSING THE FALLACIES OF THE SYSTEM OF FREE 
TRADE, AND OF SOME OTHER DOCTRINES MAINTAINED IN THE “WEALTH OF 
NATIONS” (1834), available at https://archive.org/details/
statementofsomen00raejrich; Anthony Brewer, John Rae on the Causes of 
Invention, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
8
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having held Midwestern values in the sense of valuing 
workmanship, family, productivity and self-sufficiency, and 
opposing avaricious accumulation of wealth and power on the 
basis of social privilege, war, deception, sabotage, or looting. His 
theories were very egalitarian,14 and they included arguments that 
attacked misogyny, racism, jingoism, environmental destruction, 
and Social Darwinism.15 Much of his novel theoretical framework 
revolved around social drives toward unnecessary and wasteful 
consumption (competitive spending), the accumulation of wealth 
and other status-seeking actions brought about by invidious 
comparison with other persons, and similar human habits, 
motivations and social institutions, as distinguished from the way 
most economists focused on productive forces and marginal 
pricing.16 He is famously credited with introducing the terms 
                                                                                                             
download?doi=10.1.1.23.2702&rep=rep1&type=pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 
2013). 
14
 Phillip Anthony O’Hara, The Contemporary Relevance of Thorstein 
Veblen's Institutional-Evolutionary Political Economy, 35 HIST. ECON. REV. 78, 
83 (2002), available at http://www.hetsa.org.au/pdf/35-A-7.pdf (explaining that 
Veblen’s critical analysis was conducted with a view toward “[s]haring . . . 
[s]urplus product in a more egalitarian manner.”); Dugger, supra note 13; 
VEBLEN, supra note 10, at 142 (“It may even be said that in the modern 
industrial communities the average, dispassionate sense of men says that the 
ideal human character is a character which makes for peace, good-will, and 
economic efficiency, rather than for a life of self-seeking, force, fraud, and 
mastery.”).  
15
 William Dugger, Veblen’s Radical Theory of Social Evolution, 40 J. 
ECON. ISSUES 651 (2006); William M. Dugger, Veblen and Kropotkin on Human 
Evolution, 18 J. ECON. ISSUES 971 (1984); Ross E. Mitchell, Thorstein Veblen, 
Pioneer in Environmental Sociology, 14 ORG. & ENV’T  389, 394–98 (2001). 
16
 See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: 
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998); 
Michael Hudson, M for Marginalism, MICHAEL-HUDSON.COM (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://michael-hudson.com/2014/01/m-for-marginalism (“[The marginalist] 
approach takes the technological and institutional environment as given rather 
than making policy and social reform the major aim of economic analysis, as 
was the case with classical political economy. The antitheses of marginalism are 
thus institutionalism and Systems Analysis . . . . [M]arginalist analysis is a 
9
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“conspicuous consumption” and “conspicuous waste” to describe 
tendencies people have to make unproductive displays of their 
exemption from “vulgar” (real, productive) work, in order to 
reflect social status.17 However, Veblen saw more than just 
negative “acquisitive instincts” in humans; he also emphasized 
how the “parental bent” fostered care for future generations, “idle 
curiosity” fostered a benevolent search for knowledge, and the 
“instinct of workmanship” fostered the useful employment of 
science and technology.18 He is therefore credited with introducing 
the modern meaning of the term “technology” to popular discourse 
in America.19  
The conflict between “vested interests” dedicated to preserving 
an existing social order against changing circumstances and 
                                                                                                             
synonym for asocial analysis.”); see also L. Randall Wray, MMP #52 




 Veblen’s views here coincide surprisingly with later Freudian and 
Lacanian theories of the human psychology of desire. See, e.g., Slavoj Žižek, 
From Che vuoi? to Fantasy: Lacan with Eyes Wide Shut, HOW TO READ 
LACAN, http://www.lacan.com/zizkubrick.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2013) (“The 
original question of desire is not directly ‘What do I want?’, but ‘What do others 
want from me? What do they see in me? What am I for the others?’”). It is this 
aspect that most clearly differentiates Veblen’s theories from the methodological 
individualism of orthodox neoclassical economics. 
18
 THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS, supra note 8, at 25. Veblen saw the instinct of 
workmanship rivaled only by the “parental bent” (with both competing with the 
acquisitive instinct); see also Erik S. Reinert, Civilizing Capitalism: “Good” 
and “Bad” Greed from the Enlightenment to Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), 63 
REAL-WORLD ECON. REV., Mar. 25, 2013, at 65, available at http://
www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue63/whole63.pdf. 
19
 Eric Schatzberg, Technik Comes to America: The Changing Meanings of 
Technology Before 1930, 46 TECH. & CULTURE 486, 487–88, 498–507 (2006); 
see also Ronald Kline, Construing ‘Technology’ as ‘Applied Science’: Public 
Rhetoric of Scientists and Engineers in the United States, 1880–1945, 86 ISIS 
194, 217 (1995). Veblen has further been credited with inventing the term 
“captains of industry,” at least in its modern usage. SOULE, supra note 13, at 
188. 
10
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incursions from newcomers was of particular importance to 
Veblen. He assessed such conflicts through the interaction of 
technical, instinctive, and institutional factors. His greatest 
contributions arose from the warnings he issued about parasitic 
“pecuniary” interests siphoning off wealth created by industry, 
concluding that “a persistent excess of parasitic and wasteful 
efforts over productive industry must bring on a decline.”20 He was 
more astute than most at identifying the skillful sophistries of 
businessmen who were engaged in zero-sum battles over price 
differentials rather than contributing to production that benefitted 
the “generic ends of life.” In that way he distinguished “the kind of 
self-interest which contributes to wealth creation from that which 
constitutes predatory wealth extraction.”21 By most accounts he 
was a reform-minded iconoclast,22 who broke away from 
neoclassical economics in large part because he found its methods 
unscientific.23  
                                                 
20
 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 36 (photo. 
reprint 2013) (1904); see also Dan Little, Thorstein Veblen's Critique of the 
American System of Business, ECONOMIST’S VIEW (Nov. 13, 2013), http://
economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2013/11/thorstein-veblens-
critique-of-the-american-system-of-business.html (“One of the central 
impressions that emerges from reading [Veblen’s] The Theory of Business 
Enterprise is this: the modern American industrial economy is a coordinated 
system that requires many things to happen in sync with each other; but the 
owners of the components of this system often have strategic interests that lead 
them to take actions leading to de-synchronization and short-term crisis. There is 
a serious conflict of interest that exists between the interests of the owner and 
the needs of the system — and the public's interests are primarily served by a 
smoothly functioning system. So owners are in conflict with the broader 
interests of the public.”). 
21
 Reinert, supra note 18, at 58. 
22
 SOULE, supra note 13, at 184–86, 190–92 (calling Veblen “the Bad Boy 
of American Economics”). 
23
 Veblen is credited with coining the term “neo-classical” to describe an 
economic school. Thorstein Veblen, The Preconceptions of Economic Science – 
III, 14 Q.J. ECON. 240, 261 (1900). Neoclassical economics denotes “[t]he 
school that arose in the last quarter of the 19th century, stripping away the 
11
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Those with visions of economics similar to Veblen’s are 
frequently termed “institutionalist” economists, though the term 
“institutional economics” was not Veblen’s and over time has been 
applied to a variety of different economic theories that do not 
always conform to Veblen’s own.24 Within the realm of legal 
                                                                                                             
classical concept of economic rent as unearned income. By the late 20th century 
the term ‘neoclassical’ had come to connote a deductive body of free-trade 
theory using circular reasoning by tautology, excluding discussion of property, 
debt and the financial sector’s role in general, taking the existing institutional 
environment for granted.” Michael Hudson, N is for Neo-Serfdom, O for 
Offshore Banking, MICHAEL-HUDSON.COM (Jan. 23, 2014), http://michael-
hudson.com/2014/01/n-is-for-neo-serfdom-o-is-for-offshore-banking. Veblen 
was an early critic of the shift from classical economics toward the neoclassical 
school.  
24
 Latter-day commentators generally describe Veblen as an institutionalist 
economist, though that term was coined by Walter H. Hamilton, not Veblen 
himself. Many later “new” or “neo-” institutionalists deviate significantly from 
Veblen’s original theories. See, e.g., MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, THE 
INSTITUTIONALIST MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN ECONOMICS, 1918–1947 (2011); 
Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 173 (2001). Somewhat begrudgingly, Veblen’s theories are referred to 
generally as institutionalist ones in this paper. The Association for Evolutionary 
Economics is a contemporary organization that follows and extends Veblen’s 
economic outlook. ASS’N FOR EVOLUTIONARY ECON., http://www.afee.net (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2013). Veblen’s views are so pervasive, however, that some 
writers largely recreate his work without attribution. See, e.g., CHARLES H. 
FERGUSON, PREDATOR NATION: CORPORATE CRIMINALS, POLITICAL 
CORRUPTION, AND THE HIJACKING OF AMERICA (2013). Economists involved 
with post-Keynesian Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), such as those at the 
University of Missouri-Kansas City, have taken a great deal from Veblen’s 
theories and applied them to contemporary contexts. In particular, MMT takes 
an endogenous view of money and suggests that acquisition of money is a goal 
unto itself in a capitalist economy, because “Veblen recognized money as an 
institution whereupon possession of money gives the holder power.” Samuel 
Ellenbogen, Essays in Monetary Theory and Policy: On the Nature of Money 
(5), NEW ECON. PERSP. (Dec. 25, 2013), http://neweconomicperspectives.org/
2013/12/essays-monetary-theory-policy-nature-money-5.html. This is echoed in 
the comment, attributed to either Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. or Thomas Murphy but 
possibly apocryphal, that General Motors is in the business of making money, 
not cars.  
12
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thought, some of his ideas were adopted by legal realists in the 
original law and economics movement.25 
Veblen was noted for taking an overtly Darwinian approach to 
economics, and attempting to apply an evolutionary scientific, 
sociological and anthropological approach to economic theory.26 
That approach, combined with a special focus on the influence of 
social context, set Veblen and the other institutionalist economists 
apart from their orthodox, neoclassical counterparts.27 This also 
                                                 
25
 Robert Lee Hale and Justice William O. Douglas were perhaps the most 
noteworthy legal realists to rely on some of Veblen’s theories. See, e.g., FRIED, 
supra note 16; Neil Duxbury, Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 
MODERN L. REV. 421, 429-30 (1990); Ron Harris, The Encounters of Economic 
History and Legal History, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 297, 323 n.50 (2003); William 
O. Douglas and the Growing Power of the SEC, SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/
douglas/academia.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). Certainly, many others were 
strongly influenced by Veblen, such as Adolph Berle, Jr., who was part of 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust” and the author of a leading text on 
corporate governance. Charles O.T. O’Kelley, Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual 
Connection, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317 (2011); ADOLPH A. BERLE, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_A._Berle (last updated Feb. 4, 2014). To the 
extent that the later critical legal studies (CLS) movement traces its origins to 
legal realism, CLS lacks any coherent basis in Veblen’s theories. Cornel West 
has remarked how this represents a failing of CLS. Cornel West, CLS and a 
Liberal Critic, 97 YALE L.J. 757, 770 (1988).  
26
 Sophus A. Reinert, Darwin and the Body Politic: Schäffle, Veblen, and 
the Biological Metaphor Shift in Economics, in ALBERT SCHAFFLE (1821–1903): 
THE LEGACY OF AN UNDERESTIMATED ECONOMIST 129–52 (Jurgen Backhaus 
ed., 2010); see also Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Darwin, Veblen and the Problem of 
Causality in Economics, 23 HIST. & PHIL. LIFE SCI. 385 (2001).  
27
 “The institutionalists view human behavior as a process of cumulative 
adaption to changing circumstances within the cultural context in which the 
behavior takes place. This view is acknowledged to be tentative and subject to 
change in the light of evidence to the contrary. Unlike the institutionalists, the 
orthodox economists make an a priori assumption about the nature of human 
behavior, and do not subject it to any testing process.” William T. Waller, Jr., The 
Evolution of the Veblenian Dichotomy: Veblen, Hamilton, Ayres, and Foster, 16 
J. ECON. ISSUES, 757 (1982); see also Erik S. Reinert, Neo-Classical Economics: 
A Trail of Economic Destruction Since the 1970s, 60 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 
13
Zuege: A New Theory for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility: A Veblenian P
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
[5:211 2014] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 224 
makes Veblen an appealing reference point with regard to patent 
policy, which professes some relationship to scientific 
methodologies. Indeed, Albert Einstein—a former patent examiner 
no less—endorsed Veblen as a leading thinker on the philosophy 
of science in an economic context, and one of the only economists 
of his day worth reading.28 But readers should scrupulously avoid 
making too many assumptions about Veblen's views on patents 
from the present analysis, because his direct treatment of them was 
limited.29 
                                                                                                             
2 (2012), available at http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue60/whole60.pdf. 
Veblen’s views here are precisely the opposite of those expressed by former 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who once famously said, “And, you 
know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, 
and there are families.” Douglas Keay, Aids, Education and the Year 2000!, 
WOMEN'S OWN, Oct. 31, 1987, at 8–10. 
28
 See, e.g., William T. Ganley, A Note on the Intellectual Connection 
between Albert Einstein and Thorstein Veblen, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 245 (Mar. 
1997); ALBERT EINSTEIN, IDEAS AND OPINIONS 19 (Schilpp trans., Bonanza 
1988), translated in THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERTRAND RUSSELL, VOL. V (Schilpp 
ed., trans., Tudor 1944), reprinted in IDEAS AND OPINIONS 19 (Crown Publishers 
1954). 
29
 In reading Veblen, although this boils down to idle speculation, one gets 
a sense that he viewed patents as, at best, a tolerable evil—perhaps even as a 
counterproductive mechanism for the pecuniary interests to sequester certain 
knowledge away from public use for private gain—and (like loan credit), to 
generally increase the costs of doing business at the inevitable expense of 
engineering efficiency. See, e.g., Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 
8, at 115 n.1; THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN 
CIVILISATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 186 (Ardzrooni et. al eds., 1919), available at 
https://archive.org/details/placeofsciencein00vebl; VEBLEN, supra note 20; see 
also Ken McCormick, Veblen and the New Growth Theory: Community as the 
Source of Capital's Productivity, 60 REV. SOCIAL ECON. 263 (2002); Jonathan 
Nitzan, Differential Accumulation: Towards a New Political Economy of 
Capital, 5 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 169, 187 (1998). He seemed to view invention 
as something that would happen regardless of economic rent incentives. Richard 
V. Adkisson, Ceremonialism, Intellectual Property Rights, and Innovative 
Activity, 38 J. ECON. ISSUES 459, 461 (2004). Indeed, if the patent system 
evolved from political bargains struck in England with the Statute of 
Monopolies, discussed infra, then Veblen would have likely disapproved of 
14
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One of the most distinctive aspects of Veblen’s writing is the 
humorous, sarcastic and sardonic tone he frequently used, often to 
render backhanded insults against the rich and powerful. This 
made his writings, especially later ones, highly popular with 
general audiences, though in equal measure exposed him to 
criticism from his orthodox peers—many of whom, as apologists 
for privilege, were at least indirectly the subject of Veblen’s 
insults.30 His archaic tone can sometimes require some patience 
and careful analysis. Unsympathetic readers often intentionally or 
unintentionally misread his humor.31 Yet his work remains highly 
relevant today, and is well worth reading first-hand.  
                                                                                                             
patents on the basis of them giving too much weight to pecuniary interests. Still, 
given his emphasis on the accumulation of collective knowledge being of 
greater importance than any individual contributions, Veblen might have 
cautiously accepted what Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard Nelson called 
“Theory 2,” that patents induce inventors to disclose inventions that they would 
otherwise tend to maintain in secrecy. Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, 
Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 
1031, 1033, 1038-40 (1998). For other compendiums of economic theories for 
patents, see Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME II. CIVIL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 129–48 (Bouckaert et. al eds., 2000); Patent Economics: Part 5 – 
Theories, THE PATENT PROSPECTOR (Apr. 24, 2005), http://
www.patenthawk.com/blog/2005/04/patent_economics_part_5_theori.html; 
Patent Economics: Part 4 – Incentives, THE PATENT PROSPECTOR (April 17, 
2005), http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2005/04/
patent_economics_part_4_incent.html. It is also worth noting that Veblen 
despised lawyers. He once wrote that “law schools belong in the modern 
university no more than a school of fencing or dancing.” THORSTEIN VEBLEN, 
THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 211 (1918).  
30
 J.A. Hobson, The Economics of Thorstein Veblen, 52 POL. SCI. Q. 139 
(1937). 
31
 All this makes quoting Veblen in brief passages an almost useless 
endeavor, because his frequently sardonic and sarcastic tone requires that 
readers absorb the context he develops fully only across numerous pages or 
whole chapters of his writings. With that in mind, this paper often relies on 
secondary sources to condense Veblen’s thought in a “drier” tone. 
15
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The role of technology in society was crucial to Veblen’s 
economic analysis,32 even if letters patents appear only 
peripherally in his work. Yet Veblen and his followers still offer 
practical theoretical frameworks that can inform the narrow 
question of patent subject matter eligibility.33 But before reaching 
those topics, a Veblenian and institutionalist approach requires the 
establishment of some context for the present-day patent-eligible 
subject matter debate, because quite clearly many specific social 
and economic circumstances have changed since Veblen’s 
lifetime.34  
                                                 
32
 Due to his extensive analysis on the role of technology in economic 
analysis, Veblen is sometimes wrongly characterized as having suggested, in a 
reductionist, deterministic, and technocratic way that technology is always 
positive. Olivier Brette, Thorstein Veblen's Theory of Institutional Change: 
Beyond Technological Determinism, 10 EUROPEAN J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 455 
(2003), available at http://thorstein.veblen.free.fr/index.php/documents/65-
thorstein-veblen-theory-of-institutional-change-beyond-technology-and-
determinism-olivier-brette.html. Instead, “[t]he material and technical conditions 
are not an exogenous variable in Veblen's theoretical system. On the contrary, 
they stand in a system of interdependence in which they exert both a 
determining action on (individual and social) habits of action and thought and an 
action determined by the prevailing instinctive and institutional factors. 
Consequently, if technological progress is capable of leading to institutional 
changes, it is itself conditioned by the institutional logic and the instincts which 
prevail in society.” Id. “In Veblen's system, technological progress is thus really 
an endogenous variable in the evolution process.” Id. A fair analogy of Veblen’s 
views is this: “The industrial arts . . . are the motor of the system, but the motor 
is fueled from outside, and the only controls that are applied from the inside are 
brakes of uncertain strength and holding power.” Paul M. Sweezy, Veblen's 
Critique of the American Economy, 48 AM. ECON. REV., 21, 22 (1958).  
33
 See Adkisson, supra note 29, at 465 (noting that Veblen and similar 
thinkers offer insights to patent and other intellectual property policy); see also 
WILLIAM B. BENNETT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, AN ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION (1943). 
34
 Veblen died in 1929. Rick Tilman, Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), supra 
note 13, at 695. 
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III. CHANGES IN THE MAKEUP AND CHARACTER OF THE UNITED 
STATES ECONOMY 
A. Why It Matters  
In order to understand why judges, scholars, and practitioners 
have struggled so deeply and persistently with the question of 
patent eligibility in the present era, rather than another historical 
period, it helps to understand the changing social and economic 
context of the times. The U.S. economy has undergone great 
changes since the early 1970s, which have shaped the landscape in 
which the judiciary renders decisions in individual cases. In the 
aggregate, those decisions represent the judiciary’s input on 
important social and economic policy questions. Questions of 
patent law are as bound to this economic context as any other area 
of law. It has previously been suggested by John Duffy that the rise 
of business method patents can be explained by the law following 
technology, in a reactive sense.35 At the broadest level such a view 
is compelling. But while Duffy astutely recognizes a new and 
emerging perspective on patent eligibility, he omits the economic 
context and therefore offers no critique of current patent policy 
from an economic perspective.  
Economic circumstances play a large role in shaping the course 
of “invention” across an entire economy, and, in turn, shape the 
course of patent activity. Inventive activity always precedes patent 
activity. This rather straightforward observation merely 
emphasizes that there must be some “inventive” subject matter 
available to insert into a given patent application, as it were. But 
inventive activity exists only within a context of larger 
                                                 
35
 John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 
1263–68 (2011). This might be seen as a form of “cultural lag,” which is to say 
that cultural institutions always lag behind current circumstances. Richard L. 
Brinkman & June E. Brinkman, Cultural Lag: In the Tradition of Veblenian 
Economics, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 1009 (2006). 
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socioeconomic forces.36 The availability of resources to support 
and fund research often shape the development of inventions, 
facilitating some while precluding others. It has been argued that 
corporations, as entities that control significant resources, 
eventually came to largely dictate the circumstances and context 
for inventive activity.37 From there, it is hardly controversial to 
think that a shift of research funding from one area to another 
would have a corresponding impact on the degree of invention in 
those areas. Indeed, it is possible to picture “technology as a 
refractory yet periodically malleable expression of the distribution 
of power in society.”38 The ways in which scientific and 
engineering research is carried out have complex interactions with 
social orders, and are deeply affected by social, cultural and 
political biases and structures.39 From this perspective, changes in 
the makeup of the U.S. economy as a whole can be seen to 
influence what activities are (or are not) undertaken in significant 
volume that might generate patent applications. Such economic 
conditions can affect the gravitational pull, as it were, on trends in 
patenting and the framework for associated legal analysis, at any 
given time period.40  
Historical examples can shed light on the economic contexts 
for debates over patent policy through the present. Steven 
                                                 
36
 See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, IMPERIAL GERMANY AND THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION (1915), available at https://archive.org/details/
imperialgermany01veblgoog.  
37
 CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION 
AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800–1930, at 177–210 
(2009). This transition was fully realized during Veblen’s lifetime.  
38
 MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL 
DIVIDE 21 (1984); see also Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 
DAEDALUS 121 (1980), available at http://zaphod.mindlab.umd.edu/
docSeminar/pdfs/Winner.pdf. 
39
 R.C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES: BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY AND 
HUMAN NATURE 8 (1984). 
40
 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY 226–
27 (Chris Turner trans., Polity Press 2005) (2000). 
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Usselman and Richard John wrote a fascinating study of how 
tensions between railroad companies, farm interests, and 
independent inventors—based in large part on competing 
economic interests—shaped political battles over patent legislation 
in the 1870s.41 Among other salient points, Usselman and John 
note that for more than a hundred years independent proprietors 
(including “patent sharks”) without first-hand access to expensive 
existing technology have long tended to produce lower-quality 
patent applications in the eyes of the “experts” who work for the 
owners of that existing technology, and that the very basis of the 
patent system has long been seen as a subsidy to urban regions to 
the detriment of rural ones. Such analyses highlight the 
sociopolitical aspects of how policies embedded in the patent 
system can create winners and losers—with one group’s gains 
coming at another group’s expense. The antebellum patent system 
found itself at the center of a debate of over spheres of influence as 
proprietary capitalism declined and corporate capitalism 
emerged.42 Back then, the debate was driven by the shift of 
economic opportunities from the Atlantic seaboard to the North 
American interior (a region of expanded U.S. influence after 
victory in the Mexican war of 1846-48).43 A similar struggle is 
happening today, merely with different groups and regions playing 
leading roles in the debate. As explored below, financial activities 
currently occupy a dominant role in the U.S. economy, and related 
business interests wield such significant influence that their 
relationships to the patent system are in need of continued 
analysis.44 These struggles are pronounced when considering the 
question of the proper scope of patent-eligible subject matter.  
                                                 
41
 Steven W. Usselman & Richard R. John, Patent Politics: Intellectual 
Property, the Railroad Industry, and the Problem of Monopoly, 18 J. POL’Y 
HIST. 96 (2006).  
42
 Id. at 120.  
43
 Id. at 98–99. 
44
 Much current study focuses on the roles of so-called “patent trolls.” See, 
e.g., Michael D. Goldhaber, IP Insider: How Do You Say ‘Troll’ in Finnish?, 
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B. Recent Expansion of the FIRE Sector 
An extensive amount of analysis outside of the realm of patent 
law has focused on transformations of the economy in the United 
States in recent decades. Patent attorneys tend to ignore much of 
that literature.45 In this sometimes overlooked history, the concept 
of the “financialization” of the U.S. economy from the period of 
the 1970s onward is discussed.46 These analyses, of course, are but 
                                                                                                             
CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2013, at 53–54. One study found that a growing share of all 
patent litigation brought by non-practicing entities involves business method 
patents, reaching approximately 41% in 2011–2012. Investigations into NPE 
Litigation Involving Business Method Patents, PAT. FREEDOM (Sept. 4, 2013), 
https://www.patentfreedom.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/NPE-Ligitations-
involving-Business-Method-Patents_Sept-4-2013.pdf. This study may be 
underinclusive, in this author’s view, due to the use of a fairly narrow definition 
of “business method.”  
45
 Indeed, legal scholars in general tend to ignore a great deal of economic 
and sociological scholarship, particular those from the period before and during 
the Great Depression that critiqued economic crises. Fred Block, Relational 
Work and the Law: Recapturing the Legal Realist Critique of Market 
Fundamentalism, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 27, 28–29 (2013) (“Mainstream legal 
thinking, particularly in the United States, has for some time faced a crisis in its 
understanding of economic activity. This crisis results from the marginalization 
of the key insights of legal realist scholars of the 1920s and 1930s who had 
developed a theoretically sophisticated analysis of the actual workings of 
markets.”). Block notes that despite occasional references to Veblen, there has 
been relatively little work done in tracing out a historical lineage of economic 
sociology within the United States. Id. It is sadly common for patent attorneys to 
lack any familiarity with economists other than Joseph Schumpeter, and even 
then only on a cursory basis. 
46
 See, e.g., Jacob Assa, Financialization and Its Consequences: The OECD 
Experience, 1 FIN. RES., Jan. 2012, at 35 (summarizing empirical data on recent 
financialization); Costas Lapavistas, Theorizing Financialization, 25 WORK, 
EMP. & SOC’Y 611 (2011); Thomas I. Palley, Financialization: What It Is and 
Why It Matters 2 (Levy Institute, Working Paper No. 525, 2007), available at 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_525.pdf. The asserted starting point for 
financialization varies. Some commentators place the date in the 1980s, while 
others indicate that it began in the 1970s and intensified in the 1980s. 
20
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the latest in continued efforts to understand economic history.47 
But to ignore these shifts in understanding is to potentially tether 
an understanding of patent law to a bygone era that does not reflect 
current situations and challenges. 
Economists divide the overall economy into different sectors. 
One sector is referred to as the finance, insurance and real estate 
(FIRE) sector.48 Relative to other sectors, the domestic FIRE sector 
has grown dramatically in recent years.49 These large-scale, 
structural changes among different economic sectors are seen quite 
dramatically in the relevant data, particularly because the FIRE 
sector can “grow” by cannibalizing other sectors.50 Official U.S. 
government data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows 
that the FIRE sector overtook manufacturing in the 1980s in terms 
of gross domestic product (GDP), and as a percentage of corporate 
profits has begun to greatly surpass manufacturing since the 1990s. 
These trends are illustrated in Figures 1-3, which annotate the 
dates of the State Street Bank and Ex Parte Lundgren decisions 
that each expressed very broad views of patentable subject matter 
                                                 
47
 For a discussion of the economic changes in the United States from the 
period of roughly World War I to 1970, see Michael Hudson, SUPER 
IMPERIALISM: THE ORIGINS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. WORLD DOMINANCE 
(new ed., 2003). 
48
 Michael Hudson, F is for FIRE Sector, MICHAEL-HUDSON.COM (Sept. 
23, 2013), http://michael-hudson.com/2013/09/f-is-for-fire-sector.  
49
 Robin Greenwood & David Scharfstein, The Growth of Finance, 27 J. 
ECON. PERSP., Spring 2013, at 3 (noting that FIRE sector growth is apparent 
“[w]hether one measures the financial sector by its share of gross domestic 
product, by the quantity of financial assets, by employment, or by average 
wages”); Özgür Orhangazi, “Financial” vs. “Real”: An Overview of the 
Contradictory Role of Finance 1 (Political Economy Research Institute, 
Working Paper No. 274, 2011), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/
fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_251–300/WP274.pdf.  
50
 E.g., Reinert, supra note 27, at 7–11 (arguing that financial rents have 
displaced productive rents since the 1970s, and that Veblen has been unfairly 
ignored in analyzing that trend). 
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that encompass business methods and the like.51 Over the same 
time period, employment declined significantly in manufacturing 
while increasing, albeit to a smaller degree, in the FIRE sector.52 
Salaries and wages in the FIRE sector have also greatly outpaced 
those in other sectors.53 Some key characteristics of the modern 
economy are increased “rent based on privatized ‘common 
knowledge,’ . . . the much stronger structural role of 
unemployment,” and the reduction of salaried professions (experts, 
administrators, public servants, doctors, lawyers, journalists, 
intellectuals, artists, etc.) to subsistence on more basic wages.54 
These trends are linked to what is often called the rise of a “post-
industrial” economy.55 Yet for all the sociologists originally 
                                                 
51
 BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GDP BY 
INDUSTRY / VA, GO, II, EMP (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.bea.gov/industry/xls/
GDPbyInd_VA_NAICS_1947-1997.xls (containing statistics of industry value 
added based on the North American Industry Classification System data). The 
data illustrated in Figures 1–3 does not distinguish profits from financial 
activities by nonfinancial companies, a concept discussed further below.  
52
 TAE-HEE JO & JOHN F. HENRY, TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN: THE 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN THE AGE OF MONEY MANAGER CAPITALISM 28–29 
(2013), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48782 (citing U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis data). 
53
 Greenwood & Scharfstein, supra note 49, at 4–5. 
54
 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE YEAR OF DREAMING DANGEROUSLY 8 (2012) (citing 
JEAN-CLAUDE MILNER, CLARTÉS DE TOUT (2011)); see also PETER DRAHOS 
WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 1–3 (2002); Peter Drahos, Information Feudalism in 
the Information Society, 11 INFO. SOC’Y 209 (1995), available at http://
www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/articles/pdfs/1995infofeudinfodociety.pdf. 
55
 The term “post-industrial society” first arose in the 1960s to describe a 
shift from a manufacturing-based economy to a more service-based economy, 
and has been attributed to various commentators. See, e.g., Daniel Bell, Notes on 
the Post-Industrial Society (I), 6 PUB. INT. 24 (1967), available at http://
www.nationalaffairs.com/public_interest/detail/notes-on-the-post-industrial-
society-i; ALAIN TOURAINE, THE POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: TOMORROW'S 
SOCIAL HISTORY (Leonard F. X. Mayhew trans., Wildwood House 1971) (1969). 
It should be noted that Bell was a vocal critic of Veblen, while Touraine was, 
relatively speaking, much more sympathetic. Similar terms like “information 
society” also began to arise around this time. See, e.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, THE 
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writing on the topic of the so-called “post-industrial society,” few 
recognized the possible parasitic role of the FIRE sector in the 
Veblenian sense.56 Certain economists working along Veblenian 
lines have explored that aspect in greater detail.57 For instance, 
economist Michael Hudson has said that recent circumstances 
“could almost as well be called a lapse back into the pre-industrial 
                                                                                                             
PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1962); 
YONEJI MASUDA, JOHO SHAKAI NYUMON [AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION 
SOCIETY] (Pelikan-sha, Tokyo 1968). Today, it is noted that “[m]ajor industrial 
nations are, at the margin, moving away from the marketing of goods toward the 
renting of ideas.” Robert T. Averitt, The Economics and Management of 
Intellectual Property: Towards Intellectual Capitalism by Ove Granstrand, 34 J. 
ECON. ISSUES 988, 989 (2000) (book review).  
56
 For instance, it has been shown that the present, second financial era 
(following a first that overlapped with Veblen’s lifetime) had credit expansion 
leading to crises and busts. Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, Credit Booms 
Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-
2008, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1029 (2012), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w15512. “More money in relation to the size of the economy means that 
new money (i.e. new credit) is used mostly for buying up existing assets, not for 
enhancing production capacity.” NORBERT HÄRING & NIALL DOUGLAS, 
ECONOMISTS AND THE POWERFUL 79 (2012). Reference to the “post-industrial 
economy” often obscures and obfuscates such data and any associated 
conclusions. “The portmanteau term ‘postindustrial society’ failed to specify its 
basically financial aspect . . . .”  HUDSON, supra note 10, at 328; see also id. at 
65, 67, 104, 156, 212, 219, 323, 410.  The “post-industrial economy” is more 
like a “perpetual motion machine” and “might more accurately be called a 
rentier economy.”  NORBERT HÄRING & NIALL DOUGLAS, ECONOMISTS AND THE 
POWERFUL 212 (2012). 
57
 E.g., Michael Hudson, I is for Ideology, MICHAEL-HUDSON.COM (Nov. 
24, 2013), http://michael-hudson.com/2013/11/i-is-for-ideology (defining 
information economy as “[t]he strategy of financial populism is to convince 
people that the economy’s bottom 90% are best served by pursuing policies that 
favor the top 10%. Stated more bluntly, parasitism succeeds by lying.”). 
Anthropologists deserve some credit here too. For instance, David Graeber 
wrote a humorous article to this effect recently, discussing the rise of “bullshit 
jobs,” among them administrative and finance jobs. David Graeber, On the 
Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs, STRIKE! MAGAZINE, Summer 2013, at 10–11, 
available at http://www.strikemag.org/bullshit-jobs. 
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usury and rent economy of European feudalism.”58 Similarly, 
economist Hyman Minsky developed an alternative yet essentially 
synonymous concept of “money manager capitalism” to describe a 
stage arising out of welfare state capitalism that places industry in 
a back seat relationship relative to finance.59 Whatever the name, 
the effects are striking. As some hedge fund managers put it, “The 
money that’s made from manufacturing stuff is a pittance in 
comparison to the amount of money made from shuffling money 
around . . . .”60 These conditions are prone to arise when there is an 
                                                 
58
 Standard Schaefer, Who Benefited From the Tech Bubble?: An Interview 
With Michael Hudson, COUNTERPUNCH (Aug. 30, 2003), http://
www.counterpunch.org/2003/08/29/who-benefited-from-the-tech-bubble-an-
interview-with-michael-hudson; see also Michael Hudson, From the Bubble 
Economy to Debt Deflation and Privatization, 64 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 21 
(2013), available at http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue64/whole64.pdf; 
Slavoj Žižek, What Is an Authentic Political Event?, NEW STATESMAN (Feb. 12, 
2014), http://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2014/02/slavoj-zizek-what-
authentic-political-event (“[F]rom Balkan to Scandinavia, from the US to Israel, 
from central Africa to India, a new Dark Age is coming, with ethnic and 
religious passions exploding, and the Enlightenment values receding. These 
passions were lurking in dark all the time, but what is new now is the outright 
shamelessness of their display.”); Richard D. Wolff, US Political Dysfunction 
and Capitalism’s Withdrawal, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Oct. 27, 2013), 
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/10/27/us-political-dysfunction-and-capitalisms-
withdrawal (describing capitalism’s withdrawal from the “old centers” in the 
United States and elsewhere); Reinert, supra note 27, at 11–15 (adopting the 
term “post-industrial feudalism”); cf. VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN 
MODERN CIVILISATION, supra note 29, at 13 (Russell & Russell, 1961) (1906); 
DAVID MCNALLY, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A 
REINTERPRETATION 3 (1990), available at http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/
ft367nb2h4 (providing a summary of the feudalist economy). A similar claim 
has already been made specifically with respect to intellectual property by Peter 
Drahos. DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54; Drahos, supra note 54, at 
209–10. 
59
 JO & HENRY, supra note 52, at 13 (citing Hyman P. Minsky, Schumpeter 
and Finance, in MARKET AND INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SYLOS LABINI (Salvator Biasco et al. eds., 1993). 
60
 RAY DIALLO & AMIT SRIVASTAVA, BRIDGEWATER DAILY OBSERVATIONS, 
THE MONEY SUFFLER’S VIG 1 (2004); cf. Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, 
supra note 8, at 126–27 (“The dispassionate student of the current business 
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imbalance between the expansion of credit versus expansion of 
productive capacity, as has occurred since the early 1980s.61 The 
same happened in the 1920s during the run-up to the crash of 1929 
and the Great Depression.62 Yet despite other historical periods in 
which the FIRE sector was relatively large, the expansion of patent 
eligibility to things like business methods only occurred with the 
most recent, post-1970 FIRE sector expansion.  
In the patent realm, the so-called post-industrial economy is 
reflected by increasing patenting in areas of financial and other 
business methods, information technology and software, and the 
like.63 Such patenting tends to legitimate the activity, and to 
                                                                                                             
traffic, who is not overawed by round numbers, will be more impressed by the 
ease and simplicity of the maneuvers that lead to large pecuniary results in the 
higher business finance than by any evidence of pre-eminent sagacity and 
initiative among the pecuniary magnates [captains of industry].”); see also, e.g., 
Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC-Insured Institutions Earned $42.2 
Billion in the Second Quarter of 2013 (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://
www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2013/pr13075.html (explaining bank profits 
rose more than ten times faster than loan growth during one quarter). 
61
 HÄRING & DOUGLAS, supra note 56, at 78–80 (citing RICHARD A. 
WERNER, NEUE WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK: WAS EUROPA AUS JAPAN FEHLERN 
LERNEN KANN (Vahlen 2007)).  The recent phenomenon in which “banking, the 
stock market and the rest of the financial sector” have become decoupled from 
“the funding of new capital formation [can only] be analyzed by distinguishing 
between wealth and overhead.  And any such discussion rests ultimately on a 
concept (or set of concepts) dividing the economy’s employment, investment 
and lending into categories of ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive,’ or ‘earned’ or 
‘unearned’ income.”  HUDSON, supra note 10, at 67. 
62
 GEORGE SOULE, PROSPERITY DECADE 280–284 (1947); see also Darren 
Prince, Essays in Monetary Theory and Policy: On the Nature of Banking (2), 
NEW ECON. PERSP. (Dec. 23, 2013), http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2013/
12/essays-monetary-theory-policy-nature-banking-2.html. 
63
See, e.g., Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobvious Standard for 
Gene Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 165–68 (2000) (discussing the rise of biotech 
patenting); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ASSESSING FACTORS THAT 
AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT 
QUALITY, GAO-13-465, 11–13 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
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displace certain other activities. As discussed below, commentators 
like John Duffy and Thomas Cotter have argued that these trends 
should be embraced, if only gradually, when patentability is 
considered by the judiciary. But such views overlook—or turn a 
blind eye toward—relationships between invidious pecuniary 
activity and both economic instability and harm to the general 
public good. In contrast, those who equate specific aspects of the 
post-industrial economy with a resurgence of feudalism could 
further see “patent trolls” (sometimes more benevolently, though 
not always synonymously, called “non-practicing entities” or 
“patent monetization entities”) as attempting to secure near-feudal 
rent-extraction rights through patents.64 However, troll-like rent-
                                                                                                             
660/657103.pdf (discussing the rise in software patents, including business 
method patents); John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method 
Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 991 (2003) (citing Michael J. 
Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
309 (2002) and Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of 
Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 199, 211 (2000)) 
(discussing the rise of software-implemented business method patents).   
64
 See DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 209; HUDSON, supra 
note 10, at 410 (explaining that the “innovations [of today’s financial operators] 
take the not-so-creative form of predatory destruction of the economy for their 
own benefit . . . .  Industrial technology plays little role in this post-industrial 
creativity.”); see also, e.g., Cheryl Milone, Bad Patents, INTELL. PROP. ALM 
SUPPLEMENT, Fall 2013, at 27–28 (distinguishing “the so-called patent troll 
species of NPE, who manipulate the patent litigation process with poor-quality 
patents to extort settlements from businesses . . . .”); PATENT FREEDOM, 
INVESTIGATIONS INTO NPE LITIGATION INVOLVING BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 
(2013), available at https://www.patentfreedom.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/
09/NPE-Ligitations-involving-Business-Method-Patents_Sept-4-2013.pdf 
(patent litigation by non-practicing entities increasingly involves “business 
method” patents, reaching approximately 41% in 2011–2012). The present 
author sometimes jokingly refers to this as the “Spanish method,” with patent 
trolls akin to Spanish conquistadors simply planting a flag to claim vast tracts of 
land—or in this case, “inventive” subject matter—solely on the basis of a desire 
for resource (or economic rent) extraction, their “contribution” beginning and 
ending with the act of planting the flag on territory that already exists. See 
Austen Zuege, A New Era for Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, INTELL. PROP. 
TODAY, May 2012, at 21. Data from the firm RPX indicates that approximately 
25% of patent infringement defendants were sued by patent assertion entities in 
26
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seeking patent activity is widespread, extending far beyond merely 
non-practicing entities. In this sense, asserting claims for “business 
methods” and the like, in which patent eligibility is questionable, 
resembles the actions of feudal lords, who owned no means of 
production but through social privilege extracted rent from those 
who did.65 In much the same way, patents on financial and 
business activities in an era when credit expansion outpaces 
increases in productive capacity magnify the imbalances caused by 
private control of credit creation and access, placing productive 
industry at a further disadvantage vis-à-vis the financial sector.66 
The important point here, as elaborated below, is that pressure to 
expand patent eligibility is linked to the sorts of social contexts 
Veblen highlighted, in which general welfare is disadvantaged by a 
prevalence of invidious pecuniary activities over productive ones. 
Such a Veblenian analysis suggests that recent trends are less about 
technological innovation bringing forth a truly post-industrial 
society and more about pecuniary activity parasitically displacing 
real production in much same the way Veblen warned about so 
long ago. Yet those economic factors have existed before albeit 
without patent eligibility expansion. Therefore, we eventually turn 
to a discussion of how those domestic economic factors coincided 
with trends in intra-company management, shifts in global trade 
and industrialization, and a period of judicial expansion of patent 
eligibility triggered by the rise of (ostensibly) productive 
technologies like biotechnology and computer software. 
                                                                                                             
recent years. United States Government Accountability Office, supra note 63, at 
17 n.36. The term “patent assertion entity” focuses “on entities whose business 
model solely focuses on asserting typically purchased patents.” Id. at 2 n. 6.  
65
 MCNALLY, supra note 58. 
66
 See Wray, supra note 13, at 618 (noting Veblen’s observation that the 
credit economy tends to dominate over the goods economy in the normal 
course); see also HUDSON, supra note 10, at 156 (“If economic evolution is to 
reflect the inner logic and requirements of society’s technological capabilities, 
then finance capital must be subordinated to serve the economy, not be 
permitted to master and stifle it.”). 
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C. Blurring of Lines 
The relative performance of different economic sectors is only 
part of the story. There have also been changes within certain 
sectors that tend to blur the lines between the FIRE and 
manufacturing sectors. Traditional (real) industry has, in recent 
times, fitfully moved into financial operations, which began to 
represent a significant source of profits.67 Prominent recent 
examples are General Electric (“GE”) and General Motors 
                                                 
67
 DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE CRISES OF 
CAPITALISM  23 (2010) (“From the 1980s onwards reports have periodically 
surfaced suggesting that many large nonfinancial corporations were making 
more money out of their financial operations than they were out of making 
things.”); see also Michael Hudson, Trade and Payments Theory in a 
Financialized Economy, MICHAEL-HUDSON.COM (Oct. 26, 2011), http://
michael-hudson.com/2011/10/trade-theory-financialized; JO & HENRY, supra 
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Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC,” now Ally Financial).68 “[T]he 
the most significant development for GE in the last twenty years 
has been the expansion of the financial arm of the company - GE 
Capital, which includes GE Commercial Finance, GE Consumer 
Finance, GE Equipment Services, GE Insurance, and GE Energy 
Financial Services. General Electric [in 2010] derive[d] half of its 
revenue from financial services.”69 “Even corporations that did not 
set up a financial branch still actively engage in financial 
operations.”70 Those efforts were significant. Financial trading 
“manipulations often decide the profits of the entire corporation.”71  
These economic changes have shifted funding for research and 
development. Economist Özgür Orhengazi studied the 
financialization of the U.S. economy since about 1970, and found 
empirical evidence suggesting that financial activities have 
displaced research and development within ostensibly nonfinancial 
companies.72 This suggests that in the larger economy, financial 
                                                 
68
 Our Company, GECAPITAL.COM, http://www.gecapital.com/en/our-
company/company-overview.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2013); Our History, 
ALLY.COM, at http://www.ally.com/about/company-structure/history (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2013). 
69
 Pao-yu Ching, Challenging the Conventional Wisdom on the Causes and 




 Id.  
71
 Id.; see also Robert R. Locke, Managerialism and the Demise of the Big 
Three, 51 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 28, 38, 43 (2009), available at http://
www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue51/Locke51.pdf; Hyman P. Minsky, 
Schumpeter and Finance, in MARKET AND INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SYLOS LABINI 111–13 (Salvator Biasco et 
al. eds., 1993). 
72
 Özgür Orhangazi, Financialisation and Capital Accumulation in the 
Non-Financial Corporate Sector: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation on 
the US Economy: 1973–2003, 32 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 863 (2008) (econometric 
study finding support for the theory that increasing financialization of 
nonfinancial companies NFCs “impeded real investment by allocating funds 
away from real investment and by shortening the planning horizons of the 
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activities are presently displacing technological ones. This affects a 
balance between financial companies and ostensibly nonfinancial 
companies, but also the balance of power within ostensibly 
nonfinancial companies. After the economy became financialized, 
“corporations were now run by accountants rather than by 
engineers . . . .”73 Historically, “[e]ngineers on the shop floors and 
in the manufacturing divisions of M-form [multidivisional] 
corporations made artifacts. Top management, in which controllers 
trained in accounting increasingly replaced the engineers, thought 
about money, that is, about constantly improving return-on-
investment.”74 These changes naturally supported a growth in 
financial activity.  Even when engineers still ran large 
corporations—like GE’s former CEO Jack Welch, a trained 
chemical engineer—they often displaced technical innovation with 
an emphasis on financial speculation.75 In such a context, the 
business planning cycle tends to become too short to produce 
expected monetary returns through investment in research and 
development effort directed toward technological advancements in 
making artifacts, in comparison to financial actions like mergers 
and acquisitions, stock buy-backs, etc.76 For those and other 
                                                                                                             
[NFCs.]”); see also ÖZGÜR ORHANGAZI, FINANCIALIZATION AND THE US 
ECONOMY (Edward Elgar ed. 2008); William Lazonick, The Financialization of 
the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 859–60, 870 (2013); Costas Lapavistas, Theorizing 
Financialization, 25 WORK, EMPLOYMENT & SOCIETY 611, 620 (2011).  
73
 HARVEY, supra note 67.  
74
 ROBERT LOCKE & J.C. SPENDER, CONFRONTING MANAGERIALISM: HOW 
THE BUSINESS ELITE AND THEIR SCHOOLS THREW OUR LIVES OUT OF BALANCE 
5 (2011).  “[I]ndustrial firms have been turned into essentially financial entities 
since the 1980s.” HUDSON, supra note 10, at 104.  “Corporate industry has been 
taken over so thoroughly by the financial sector that there is little industrial 
voice left as such.” Id. at 65. 
75
 JEFF MADRICK, AGE OF GREED: THE TRIUMPH OF FINANCE AND THE 
DECLINE OF AMERICA, 1970 TO THE PRESENT 185–201 (2012).  
76
 William Lazonick has suggested, for instance, that pharmaceutical 
companies have used inflated drug prices to engage in stock buybacks rather 
than R&D expenditures. Lazonick, supra note 72, at 896–97; see also Fred 
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reasons, financial speculation is being substituted, to some degree, 
for investment in technology research and development (i.e., 
investment in the growth of productivity and the “real” economy). 
Patent attorneys may be aware of this phenomenon, if only 
obliquely. As the balance of power shifts within a given corporate 
setting, “inventors” start to come from outside engineering 
departments and pressure is exerted to have patent applications 
omit technical details that are often not understood by “inventors” 
from non-engineering sales and management departments.77 All 
this is in line with Veblen’s original theories. He noted the blurring 
of the relationship “between workmanship and salesmanship,” 
complaining that “much of what appears on the books as 
production-cost should properly be charged to the production of 
saleable appearances.”78  
D. Global Implications 
Financial and business endeavors take a privileged position is 
certain international negotiations. The United States and other 
North Atlantic states (the “Global North”) identify key parts of the 
                                                                                                             
Block, Relational Work and the Law: Recapturing the Legal Realist Critique of 
Market Fundamentalism, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 27, 44–47 (2013); F. Block & M. 
Keller, Where Do Innovations Come From? Transformations in the US 
Economy, 1970–2006, 7 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 459 (2009); Lynne L. Dallas, 
Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 
265, 279 (2012). IBM, General Electric Co., Microsoft Corp. and other 
companies have also been identified as promoting similar policies.  HUDSON, 
supra note 10, at 253-54. Of course, patenting is not an exact measure of 
invention, and innovative activity varies widely across industries.  
77
 Add to this the growing trend that software companies’ “core consumer 
product is now advertising.” Darwin Bond-Graham, Iron Cagebook: The 
Logical End of Facebook's Patents, COUNTERPUNCH (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
www.counterpunch.org/2013/12/03/iron-cagebook. Bond-Graham actually 
refers to the “tech industry” to describe the software industry, part of a troubling 
trend whereby the two terms are treated as synonymous, sometimes even going 
so far as to cast out things like roads, vehicles, and other artifacts from the scope 
of the term “technology.”  
78
 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 
IN RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA, 300 (1923). 
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FIRE sector together with pharmaceutical, information technology, 
agro-chemical and entertainment sectors as their core growth 
engines today, with active efforts to protect comparative 
advantages in global trade negotiations, such as in the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”).79 “Offshoring” of industrial production since the early 
1970s had presented a glaring gap in the traditional economic 
growth engines tied to industrial production, and treaties such as 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”) were negotiated with an eye toward preventing 
states of the Global South (i.e., the nations of Africa, Central and 
Latin America, and most of Asia) from advancing—by 
leapfrogging otherwise necessary intermediate technological 
stepping stones—in the Global North’s key growth sectors and 
thereby undermining the illusions of the North Atlantic states’ 
comparative advantages.80 This is a function of industrialization 
                                                 
79
 VIJAY PRASHAD, THE POORER NATIONS: A POSSIBLE HISTORY OF THE 
GLOBAL SOUTH 105–11 (2012); see also Valéria Guimarães de Lima e Silva, 
How to Reshape Treaties without Negotiations: Intellectual Property 
Enforcement as a Case Study of Global Governance by Stealth, OXFORD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESEARCH CENTRE 13 (Apr. 16, 2013), http://
denning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/events_files/
Paper_IP_enforcement_VS_NYU_Global_Fellows_Forum_2013.pdf. For a 
critique of the foundations of the classical, Ricardian theory of comparative 
advantage, see Reinhard Schumacher, Deconstructing the Theory of 
Comparative Advantage, 2 WORLD ECON. REV. 83 (2013), available at http://
wer.worldeconomicsassociation.org/article/download/59/41 (pointing out flaws 
in the theoretical foundations of trade liberalization embodied in WTO 
processes). 
80
 PRASHAD, supra note 79, at 105–11, 180–93; DRAHOS WITH 
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 36 (noting the incongruity of including 
provisions for the protection of creative monopolies that benefit North Atlantic 
states in treaties ostensibly about global trade liberalization, and that states use 
patent systems to cloak protectionist policies); Drahos, supra note 54, at 212; 
see also MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 284–89 (2000); NOAM 
CHOMSKY, YEAR 501: THE CONQUEST CONTINUES 112–17 (1993); cf. THE 
CHALLENGE OF THE SOUTH: THE REPORT OF THE SOUTH COMMISSION 109–13 
(1990). 
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occurring beyond the confines of the states in the Global North. 
The use of patents by governments, and multi-national companies, 
in promoting trade imbalances is well-explored.81 Indeed, an 
analysis of the TRIPS agreement evidences the strong influence of 
the Intellectual Property Group (“IPC”), comprised mainly of 
pharma, software and entertainment industry representatives, on 
the TRIPS negotiations, which resulted in efforts to enshrine 
existing trade imbalances against potential disruption by 
newcomers.82 Moreover, recent efforts of U.S. trade negotiators 
have pushed in the direction of expanding protections on sectors of 
comparative advantage that center around “business methods,” 
pharma, and the like.83 Such efforts are thrown into sometimes 
                                                 
81
 RONALDO FIANI, VEBLEN AND PATENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES FOR PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 8–9, available at http://www.academia.edu/3025654/
Veblen_and_Patents_An_assessment_of_the_strategy_of_multinational_enterpri
ses_for_protecting_intellectual_property_rights (last visited May 31, 2013) (“for 
Veblen . . . pecuniary motives do not work in the mainstream economics ideal 
world of perfect competition, but in the real world [of] competition where any 
expedient provided by social institutions to assure an advantage in competition 
will be taken.”). 
82
 Id. at 1–3, 15–17; DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54. 
83
 Leaked drafts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) treaty negotiations 
by the United States show attempts to expand patent-eligible subject matter to 
encompass protections for abstract concepts such as business methods, medical/
surgical procedures and the like, though the United States did abandon some 
hardline positions during negotiations. TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP IP GROUP 
COUNTRY NEGOTIATORS, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [RIGHTS] CHAPTER, ART. QQ.E.1 (Aug. 30, 2013), 
https://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wikileaks-secret-TPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf 
(“(a) patents shall be available for any new uses or methods of using a known 
product, (b) a Party may not deny a patent solely on the basis that the product 
did not result in enhanced efficacy of the known product when the applicant has 
set forth distinguishing features establishing that the invention is new, involves 
an inventive step, and is capable of industrial application.”) (emphasis added); 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights ch. 20, art. 8, §1, (Feb. 10, 
2011), available at http://keepthewebopen.com/assets/pdfs/
TPP%20IP%20Chapter%20Proposal.pdf; Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP), WIKILEAKS (Nov. 13, 2013), https://wikileaks.org/tpp/
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stark contrast to the sorts of efforts taken by delegations from 
lesser-developed nations of the Global South, who often seek 
technology transfer, including “technologies” impacting finance 
and business management.84 It seems clear that one aspect of 
                                                                                                             
pressrelease.html (noting that “[n]umerous key Pacific Rim and nearby nations – 
including Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, South Korea, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and, most significantly, Russia and China – have not been involved 
in the drafting of the [TPP] treaty.”); James Love, KEI analysis of Wikileaks 
leak of TPP IPR text, from August 30, 2013 (Nov. 13, 2013), http://
www.keionline.org/node/1825 (“An interesting example of how the US seeks to 
change national and global norms are the provisions in the TPP over patents on 
surgical methods. The WTO permits countries to exclude ‘diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals.’ The 
US wants to flip this provision, so that ‘may also exclude from patentability’ 
becomes ‘shall make patents available.’”); TPP Exposed: WikiLeaks Publishes 
Secret Trade Text to Rewrite Copyright Laws, Limit Internet Freedom 
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Nov. 14, 2013) (interviewing Lori Wallach), http://
www.democracynow.org/2013/11/14/
tpp_exposed_wikileaks_publishes_secret_trade (Characterizing the TPP IP 
chapter as being directed to “rent seeking—governments being lobbied by 
special interests to set up special rules that give them monopolies to charge 
higher prices.”); Risks of the Trans-Pacific Free Trade Agreement for Access to 
Medicines, Briefing Memo: Analysis of the Leaked U.S. Paper on Eliminating 
Patent Pre-Grant Opposition, PUBLIC. CITIZEN (July 7, 2011), https://
www.citizen.org/documents/analysis-of-leaked-US-paper-on-eliminating-
pregrant-opposition.pdf (arguing that U.S. proposals target Indian practices that 
curtail pharmaceutical patents). Although the leaked drafts still require 
“industrial applicability” for patent eligibility, the fact that Mexico proposed to 
explicitly exclude from patentability “the diagrams, plans, rules and methods for 
carrying out mental processes, playing games or doing business, and 
mathematical methods as such; software as such; methods to present information 
as such; and aesthetic creations and artistic or literary works” highlights how 
little agreement exists on what constitutes “industrial applicability” or 
“usefulness.” As will be clearer in view of the discussion below, the draft terms 
of the TPP are very anti-Veblenian.  
84
 See, e.g., Local Production of Pharmaceuticals and Related Technology 
Transfer in Developing Countries, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT (Sept. 19, 2012), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
diaepcb2011d7_en.pdf; STATEMENT ON THE URUGUAY ROUND: ADOPTED BY THE 
SOUTH COMMISSION, AT ITS THIRD MEETING, COCOYOC, MEXICO 10 (1988) 
(discussing “advances in corporate and financial management technologies”).  
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contemporary international trade relations is a belief that the 
United States can maintain its global position by imposing control 
on industry located abroad through control of global banking and 
finance, and ongoing trade negotiations have taken small steps to 
facilitate and cement such imbalances through patents. In other 
words, the U.S. strategy is to siphon off surpluses from productive 
industry located abroad for the benefit of the domestic FIRE 
sector.85 How this strategy benefits the general domestic 
population, outside the FIRE sector, is scarcely discussed. But, 
significantly, it departs from the long-standing policies in the 
United States designed—at least on their face—to promote 
industry through the patent system for the general public good. 
IV. CHANGING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS 
A. Historical Overview 
Standards on patentable subject matter have changed 
dramatically through recent years without statutory (or 
constitutional) changes.86 The most substantive change in the 
                                                 
85
 See BOURDIEU, supra note 40, at 226–27; Karl Fitzgerald, Trade 
Advantage Replaced by Rent Extraction, interview with Michael Hudson (Dec. 
17, 2013), http://www.prosper.org.au/2013/12/17/the-road-to-unearned-income 
(“You have really a financialisation of everybody’s income and it’s a rent theory 
of international trade instead of a cost of production theory of international trade 
competitiveness.”). 
86
 Rajnish Kumar Rai and Srinath Jagannathan, Do Business Method 
Patents Encourage Innovation, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM 2–3 (2012), 
available at http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Business-Method-
Patents-and-Innovation.pdf (summarizing the historical business method 
exemption doctrine, followed by the expansion of patent subject matter 
eligibility in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the effective elimination of the 
business method exemption doctrine). The authors accurately summarize the 
changes in patentable subject matter in broad strokes, but mistake the holding of 
the eBay case as being a ruling on patentable subject matter, when that question 
was not before the court—mentioned only in passing by Justice Kennedy in a 
concurrence. It is nonetheless noted that, as summarized by Rai and 
Jagannathan, the history of judicial expansion of patentable subject matter 
standards corresponds quite closely with the rise of the neoliberal era and the 
36
Cybaris®, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol5/iss2/1
[5:211 2014] PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 247 
 
 
patent laws came in 1952. Although the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act of 2011 did reshape the patent laws, patent-eligible 
subject matter and the strictures of 35 U.S.C. § 101 were left 
untouched.87 Recent transformations in the analysis of patent-
eligible subject matters have been almost entirely judicially-
driven—with some administrative influence exerted by patent 
office bureaucrats. The high water mark for broad patent eligibility 
was when the Federal Circuit issued the State Street Bank decision 
in 1998, indicating that business methods could be patentable.88 
The Supreme Court has weighed in to try to address the issue, but 
thus far only in limited areas that have barely scratched the surface 
of the problem. Most emblematic of the ideological struggles 
among the judiciary is the en banc ruling in the CLS Bank v. Alice 
case,89 in which the Federal Circuit, the circuit court with exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals involving patent law, was unable to find 
majority support for a cohesive methodology to analyze patent-
                                                                                                             
change in the makeup of the U.S economy described above. There are a 
voluminous number of articles summarizing historical trends in patent-eligible 
subject matter jurisprudence. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the 
Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1142–63 (1999); Irwin, supra note 9, 
at 788–89. However, the role of the 1952 patent law codification has been seen 
as a driver of patentable subject matter expansion, because the 1952 statutes 
may have rejected longstanding values underpinning the constitutional, statutory 
and judicial bases for the patent system. Id. at 782–810.  
87
 See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 
18(e) (2011). 
88
 State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 
F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In large part State Street Bank was instrumental in 
using the language of the 1952 patent law statutory codification, as well as the 
Chakrabarty and Diehr decisions of the Supreme Court, to justify ignoring the 
great weight of precedent finding business methods to be nonpatentable subject 
matter. A Patent Office case that took a similarly broad view of patent eligibility 
was Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ.2d 1385, (B.P.A.I. 2005) (per curiam). 
89
 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3131 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2013) 
(No. 13–298). 
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eligible subject matter.90 There was, for a long time, judicial 
consensus that business methods were not patentable.91 However, 
as technologies developed in the Twentieth Century, particularly 
ones such as biotechnology and computer software,92 courts began 
to expand the scope of patent-eligible subject matter93—some 
might say haphazardly—and eventually the Federal Circuit 
unilaterally lifted the long-established ban on patenting business 
methods.94 However, in this era of expanding technological 
development, the courts continued a rather open-ended expansion 
of patent eligibility in what might be seen as rather unprincipled 
ways. Judges opened the doors to new technologies by tweaking 
the tests applied for subject matter eligibility to accommodate 
some but not other endeavors, and in some instances lost sight of 
core policies that seem to have been taken for granted since the 
first patent statutes were passed in the United States. Not 
surprising, the judicial expansion of patent eligibility to business 
methods came precisely at a time when the economic clout of the 
                                                 
90
 Michael S. Borella & Rory P. Shea, Not Just a Flook?: Consideration of 
Prior Art When Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, 
Sept. 2013, at 19 (summarizing the CLS Bank plurality, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions).  
91
 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232, 3239–46 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); Irwin, supra note 86, at 794–95.  
92
 Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobvious Standard for Gene 
Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 143, 165–68 (2000) (providing evidence for the rise of biotech 
patenting since the 1990s); U.S. Gov. Account. Office, supra note 63, (the 
number of software patents, including business method patents, has risen 
dramatically since the early 1990s and surpassed all other types of patents in 
2011, though the numbers of nonsoftware patents has also increased over that 
same time period); Allison & Tiller, supra note 63, at 991 (noting surge of 
software-implemented business method patenting from the late 1990s). 
93
 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303 (1980); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
94
 State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 
F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ.2d 1385 (B.P.A.I. 
2005) (per curiam). 
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FIRE sector surpassed that of the manufacturing sector.95 These 
long-term changes eventually divorced the particular patent 
eligibility tests from whatever widely (if only tacitly) accepted 
ideological foundations they may have once had, particularly 
before the 1952 patent law codification.96 In order to identify a 
possible new footing, or even restore the old footing, it will be 
helpful to first elucidate some of the competing theories. 
Numerous articles have attempted to describe historical 
examples of “business method” patents granted by the USPTO 
decades or centuries before the modern business method patent 
debate began.97 However, the isolated nature of those exceptions 
tends to prove the rule that business methods were historically 
deemed non-patentable subject matter. But the possibility that in 
isolated incidences USPTO examiners have allowed patents to 
non-patentable subject matter should be no more controversial than 
to say that in some instances examiners have improvidently 
                                                 
95
 See supra Parts III.B-C. 
96
 “The [1952] Act did not address the [historical patent eligibility] 
exclusions—either to codify or to eliminate them.” Irwin, supra note 9, at 804; 
see also Colin P. Marks, Opening the Door to Business Methods: State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 37 HOUS. L. REV. 923, 
934 (2000) (“The omission of excludable material makes the statute problematic 
when considering business methods.”). In contrast, such exclusions from patent 
eligibility are explicit under European practice. Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, art. 52 (“The 
following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions . . . schemes, rules and 
methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, and 
programs for computers”). 
97
 See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 8–27 (1999); James S. Sfekas, 
Controlling Business Method Patents: How the Japanese Standard for Patenting 
Software Could Bring Reasonable Limitations to Business Method Patents in the 
United States, 16 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL. J. 197, 201–03 (2007); In re Comiskey, 
554 F.3d 967, 975–80 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Michael Risch, America’s First 
Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279 (2012) (giving examples of business method 
patents from the early patent registration system, before pre-grant examination 
of claims was introduced).  
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allowed claims over prior art under the novelty and non-
obviousness strictures of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 or where 
enablement was lacking under 35 U.S.C. § 112.98  
A brief review of the most significant judicial precedents on 
patent subject matter eligibility is instructive in understanding the 
framework of current challenges. First, it is noted that exemptions 
from patent eligibility have long been recognized. A key 
formulation of the judicially-created exceptions from patent 
eligibility is that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, 
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not 
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.”99 A review of selected precedents in this area 
shows clear limits imposed to restrict the permissible breadth of 
patents, and the shaping of patent eligibility tests by concern over 
naked attempts at rent-seeking that lack an associated contribution 
to a collective pool knowledge of technological proficiency. 
B. Relative Consistency in Supreme Court Decisions 
The Supreme Court has been fairly consistent in its views on 
patent eligibility. The articulation of the standards has evolved and 
changed, and fell into some disorder in a few early 1980s cases, 
but something akin to the “preemption” doctrine has been applied 
since at least the Nineteenth Century. Without wishing to burden 
                                                 
98
 In re Miller 418 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (Rich, acting C.J.); accord In 
re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 157 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 
(Fed. Cir. 1983), described a necessity for a functional relationship between 
printed matter and a substrate to meet the patentable subject matter requirements 
of § 101, that did not stop the USTPO from issuing a utility patent for 
“Religious Soap,” which claimed “1. A bar of soap which is embossed with 
religious markings.” U.S. Patent No. 3,936,384 (filed Jan. 14, 1975). 
99
 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); see also Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) 
(“‘[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.”) 
(quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). Business method 
(including medical treatment) and software inventions are generally analyzed as 
a question of whether they relate to an unpatentable “abstract idea.” 
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readers with extensive review of precedents, a select number of 
Supreme Court cases are summarized here.100 
The 1852 decision in Le Roy v. Tatham, involving a patent to 
pipe forming machinery, held that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is 
a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be 
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive 
right.”101 But more importantly, the Court said that “[a] patent is 
not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that 
would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by 
any means whatsoever.”102 Le Roy established a bedrock concept 
for all later patent eligibility cases by stating that claims cannot be 
framed so broadly and abstractly as to merely recite a result.103 
Similarly, O’Reilly v. Morse struck down a claim that sought to 
                                                 
100
 For further summaries, see Thomas F. Morrow, Challenging Patent 
Subject Matter Eligibility in Patent Litigation, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 26TH 
ANNUAL ADVANCED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW COURSE 1–12 (Feb. 14–15, 
2013), available at http://www.yettercoleman.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
Challenging-Subject-Matter-Eligibility-In-Patent-Litigation.pdf; see also Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3239-52 (2009), 
101
 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). The syllabus of the Court’s opinion 
restates the claim language at issue: “What we claim as our invention and desire 
to secure by letters patent is the combination of the following parts, above 
described, to-wit, the core and bridge, or guide piece, the chamber, and the die, 
when used to form pipes of metal under heat and pressure in the manner set 
forth or in any other manner substantially the same.” Id. at 171 (emphasis 
added). 
102
 Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175.  
103
 This idea of prohibiting claims directed merely to a result or effect is 
fundamental to later Supreme Court cases, but it is not embodied in the present 
patent statutes or even guidelines for patent examination promulgated by the 
USPTO. In contrast, other jurisdictions, such as Europe, explicitly prohibit 
result-based claiming by way of regulations that require: “As a general rule, 
claims which attempt to define the invention by a result to be achieved should 
not be allowed, in particular if they only amount to claiming the underlying 
technical problem.” GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT 
OFFICE pt. F, ch. IV, § 4.10 (rev. ed. 2013). Yet the mere fact that other 
jurisdictions prohibit this type of claiming is insufficient to explain why such 
prohibitions are important, which is where a Veblenian perspective is helpful. 
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provide monopoly protection over future inventions involving 
electrical or galvanic current to transmit signals:104 “[W]hile he 
shuts the door against inventions of other persons, the patentee 
would be able to avail himself of new discoveries in the properties 
and powers of electro-magnetism which scientific men might bring 
to light. . . . The court is of opinion that the claim is too broad . . . 
.”105 Yet again, the Court in Morse was concerned with claim 
breadth.  
Tilghman v. Proctor dealt with a process claim used to separate 
compounds from fatty bodies using water at high temperatures and 
pressures.106 The Court found Tilghman’s claim patentable, but in 
reaching that conclusion noted that different processes for 
achieving the same effect as that claimed by Tilghman were known 
in the prior art and that Tilghman himself disclosed an unclaimed 
lower temperature variation capable of achieving the same 
result.107 Importantly, the Court’s rationale mirrored that in Le Roy 
and Morse by finding that the claim language at issue was written 
narrowly enough to correspond to the actual invention and did not 
prevent others from utilizing different processes to achieve the 
same result.  
                                                 
104
 Claim 8 of Morse’s patent read: “Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself 
to the specific machinery or parts of machinery described in the foregoing 
specifications and claims, the essence of my invention being the use of the 
motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, 
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, letters, or 
signs, at any distances, being a new application of that power, of which I claim 
to be the first inventor or discoverer.” O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 
86 (1854) (emphasis added).  
105
 Id. at 113. 
106
 Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). There was only one claim in 
the patent-in-suit: “Having now described the nature of my said invention and 
the manner of performing the same, I hereby declare that I claim as of my 
invention the manufacturing of fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the 
action of water at a high temperature and pressure.” Id. at 709. 
107
 Id. at 710, 720–22.  
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Additionally, in Marchand v. Emken, the Court considered a 
patent directed to mechanizing a known process for making 
hydrogen peroxide.108  
The question, then, seems to be narrowed down 
to this: Does it constitute invention to stir, by a 
well-known and simple mechanical device, what 
had before been stirred by hand? The complainant 
desired to manufacture in large quantities what had 
before been produced chiefly in the laboratory. He 
knew how hydrogen peroxide had been made; every 
step in the formula was familiar. A mixture that 
needed stirring, and a vessel provided with a 
revolving stirrer, were ready at his hand. He put the 
former into the latter. This was all. The object of 
agitating the liquid while making hydrogen 
peroxide, is to keep the barium, which is three times 
as heavy as water, suspended in the acid, so that its 
particles may come in contact with the particles of 
acid. Whether they come in contact while going 
round, rising, settling, or remaining stationary can 
make no difference. Divest the case of the air of 
mystery with which it is environed, and it seems 
simple enough. The complainant's predecessors 
knew that to keep the barium up in the solution they 
must stir it. The complainant knew this. Unlike 
them, however, he manufactured on a scale large 
enough to make it essential to employ a power 
                                                 
108
 Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 273,569 read: “1. The method of making 
hydrogen peroxide by cooling the acid solution, imparting thereto a continuous 
movement of rotation, as well in vertical as in horizontal planes—such, for 
example, as imparted by a revolving screw in a receptacle—and adding to said 
acid solution the binoxide in small quantities, while maintaining the low 
temperature and the rotary or eddying movements, substantially as described.” 
U.S. Patent No. 273,569 (filed Aug. 2, 1882); Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 
195, 198 (1889). 
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shaft.109  
The Court answered the patentability question in the negative:  
There is here no sufficient foundation upon 
which to rest a claim which, if construed as broadly 
as the complainant insists it should be, practically 
makes all pay tribute who stir the mixture in 
question by machinery, and by hand also, provided 
substantially the same movement can be produced 
by hand-stirring, and this seems to be a disputed 
question upon the proof. The complainant's claim to 
be enrolled upon the list of inventors is based upon 
propositions too theoretical and visionary for 
acceptance.110 
Without discussion, the Court held that on the “disputed 
question upon the proof,” the mixture could be stirred by hand in 
the same manner as with machinery.111 In essence, the claim was 
struck down because it would have given too broad a patent 
monopoly, one not tied to an inventive contribution to an 
underlying technical problem. The Court found it impermissible to 
patent the use of conventional machinery for large-scale 
                                                 
109
 Id. at 199 (emphasis added). 
110
 Id at 200; see also In re Rundell, 48 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931); cf. 
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (explaining that the incidental use of a computer to perform a mental 
process does not impose a sufficiently meaningful limit on claim scope to confer 
patent eligibility); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful 
limit on the scope of a claim [to render the claim patent-eligible], it must play a 
significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than 
function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be 
achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing 
calculations.”). 
111
 Marchand, 132 U.S. at 200 (affirming the circuit court’s decision on the 
factual question). 
44
Cybaris®, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol5/iss2/1
[5:211 2014] PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 255 
 
 
commercialization of a known process, while still accepting that 
large-scale commercialization of the particular process had not 
previously been accomplished. But the Court’s rationale goes 
further to say that the abstract concept (“theoretical and 
visionary”112 ideas) that there are economies of scale associated 
with mechanization within the field of endeavor at hand (making 
hydrogen peroxide) is ineligible for patent protection.  
Turning to relatively more modern cases, Funk Brothers Seed 
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. reasoned that devising saleable 
packaging—in that case for “the aggregation of select strains of . . . 
several species” of inoculants—did not confer patent eligibility.113 
The emphasis on “application of the law of nature to a new and 
useful end” for patent eligibility resembles a requirement for an 
economically productive technical contribution,114 a concept 
discussed in detail below.115 The Funk Brothers opinion took a 
very strict view of what constitutes mere saleable packaging 
because the claimed invention sought to reduce a mutually 
inhibitive effect that different strains root nodule bacteria used as 
inoculants were previously thought to exert on each other.116 
Though given a fair reading, there may be some merit to the 
argument that an aggregation of inoculants provided no new 
productive benefit but only a pecuniary benefit in how inoculants 
were sold to end users. Although unfortunately not discussed in the 
Funk Brothers opinion, it is significant that the claims at issue used 
a negative limitation to provide preemptive coverage of a result 
without limits as to the particular combinations of non-inhibitive 
strains actually discovered (i.e., the essential element of the 
inventive solution to the underlying technical problem). Claim 4 
was illustrative: “An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a 




 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 131 (1948). 
114
 Id. at 130.  
115
 See infra Part IV. 
116
 Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.  
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plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of different 
species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains being 
unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in 
the leguminous plant for which they are specific.”117 In 
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter helpfully suggested that the 
patentee’s problem was the failure to claim particular combinations 
of bacterial strains that produced the non-inhibitive effect and that 
reciting the particular strains of bacteria might have made a claim 
patent-eligible.118 The Funk Brothers opinion did not articulate a 
definitive standard for establishing patent eligibility, but it is an 
important case in highlighting how aggressively broad claiming is 
a problem that the Supreme Court has traditionally chosen to 
address as a question of patent subject matter eligibility. Although 
frequently viewed by patent practitioners as overly restrictive, the 
Funk Brothers opinion was a piece with long-standing Supreme 
Court precedent.119 
In Gottshalk v. Benson, Justice Douglas analyzed claims to a 
method for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into 
pure binary numerals on a general purpose digital computer in his 
famous “nutshell” comment:  
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. 
But in practical effect that would be the result if the 
formula for converting BCD numerals to pure 
binary numerals were patented in this case. The 
mathematical formula involved here has no 
substantial practical application except in 
connection with a digital computer, which means 
that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent 
would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula 
                                                 
117
 Id. at 128 n.1. 
118
 Id. at 133–34. 
119
 See Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 710 (1880); O’Reilly v. Morse, 
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 
173 (1852). 
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and in practical effect would be a patent of the 
algorithm itself.120 
This “nutshell” announced the “preemption” doctrine as a limit 
on patent eligibility, encapsulating the rationale behind many prior 
Supreme Court decisions. This limit on patent eligibility prevents 
private monopolies over the common stock of ideas and scientific 
concepts needed for any use of technical proficiency for public 
benefit, that is to say, for use in any technical application. Yet the 
articulation of the “nutshell” analysis in Benson is confusing, in 
part because the remainder of the opinion sets off on an entirely 
different analysis, and, frankly, is rather unconvincing in how it 
                                                 
120
 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972). Although, curiously, 
the claims at issue were not reproduced in the Benson opinion, they are found in 
a lower court opinion: “8. The method of converting signals from binary coded 
decimal form into binary which comprises the steps of (1) storing the binary 
coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift register, (2) shifting the signals to the 
right by at least three places, until there is a binary ‘1’ in the second position of 
said register, (3) masking out said binary ‘1’ in said second position of said 
register, (4) adding a binary ‘1’ to the first position of said register, (5) shifting 
the signals to the left by two positions, (6) adding a ‘1’ to said first position, and 
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation for a 
succeeding binary “1” in the second position of said register. . . . 13. A data 
processing method for converting binary coded decimal number representations 
into binary number representations comprising the steps of (1) testing each 
binary digit position i, beginning with the least significant binary digit position, 
of the most significant decimal digit representation for a binary ‘0’ or a binary 
‘1’; (2) if a binary ‘0’ is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least significant 
binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation; (3) if a 
binary ‘1’ is detected, adding a binary ‘1’ at the (i + 1)th and (i + 3)th least 
significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant decimal digit 
representation, and repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit 
position of said most significant decimal digit representation; (4) upon 
exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant decimal digit 
representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the next lesser significant 
decimal digit representation as modified by the previous execution of steps (1) 
through (3); and (5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least 
significant decimal digit representation has been so processed.” In re Benson, 
441 F.2d 682, 683–84 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (reproducing claims 8 and 13 of 
Application Ser. No. 315,050), rev’d, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
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asks from a policy perspective whether computer programs 
constitute patent-eligible subject matter.121 However, the core of 
the “nutshell” analysis regarding preemption becomes clearer if 
viewed as barring patent eligibility for the mere recitation of a 
computer to capture a portion of the saleable market for the 
underlying algorithm (i.e., the abstract mathematical concept), 
which is significant for the present patent eligibility theory.  
Parker v. Flook found that a claim for which the asserted point 
of novelty lay with a mathematical algorithm was not patent-
eligible.122 Consistent with Benson, the Court held that “[e]ven 
though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be 
well known, an inventive application of the principle may be 
patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot 
support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its 
application.”123 In short, Flook held that adding a non-inventive 
recitation to restrict a claim to a particular industry’s usage of an 
abstract idea was not sufficient to confer patent-eligibility. Flook 
reaffirmed the principle that abstract ideas and other basic tools of 
scientific and technological work are treated as part of the prior 
art.124 Although more detail was added to the rationale of Benson, 
vague reference to the need for “applications” of abstract concepts 
to confer patent eligibility makes it difficult to consistently apply 
the Flook decision to other sets of facts. 
                                                 
121
 An interesting comment here comes from Donald S. Chisum, who has 
noted that the context for the Benson case was that vested interests in the 
computer hardware industry did not significantly profit from software at the 
time and sought to minimize disruptions from small newcomers in the software 
market by minimizing protection of software. Donald S. Chisum, Patenting 
Intangible Methods: Revisiting Benson (1972) After Bilski (2010), 27 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 446–49 (2011). The complaint 
Chisum raises here is whether patent standards cater to vested interests, and he 
sees Benson as exacerbating that problem. Id. 
122
 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978). 
123
 Id. at 594. 
124
 Id. at 591–92 (citing O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854); 
Neilson v. Harford, Webster’s Patent Cases 295, 371 (1844). 
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Diamond v. Diehr was the third Supreme Court case to deal 
with patent eligibility of software and associated methods and the 
first to find a claim patent-eligible.125 Although no prior decisions 
were explicitly overruled, it is clear that the Diehr decision broke 
with the rationale underlying Benson and Flook.126 Justice Breyer 
later noted the incongruity of Diehr and Flook during oral 
arguments for a subsequent case.127 By stating—contrary to the 
approach of Flook—that patent eligibility should not be assessed at 
the point of novelty, Diehr found a patent-eligible invention in a 
combination of elements.128 Yet examination of the purported 
inventive “combination” at issue in Diehr does not reveal any 
meaningful inventive contribution other than recitations that 
preempt using the Arrhenius equation within an economic market 
for curing rubber using automated machines of some sort. This is a 
situation nearly identical to that in the Marchand v. Emken case, 
yet the Court in Diehr reached an opposite result on 
patentability.129 As discussed below, it is possible to think of the 
                                                 
125
 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
126
 The number of justices dissenting from the Diehr majority opinion 
evidence the abrupt shift from Benson and Flook, to some extent. “Confusion 
originated in the inherent conflict between the Diamond v. Diehr and the Parker 
v. Flook Supreme Court decisions, since the majority decisions in these two 
cases appear to contradict each other in fundamental ways (see the Stevens 
dissent in Diamond v. Diehr for a discussion of this conflict). What was clear 
was that the patentability of a software related invention depended heavily on 
the claims crafted by the patent attorney.” Daniel A. Tysver, History of Software 
Patents, from Benson, Flook and Diehr to Bilski and Mayo v. Prometheus, 
BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/software-patent/history.html (last visited Mar. 
20, 2014) (internal hyperlinks omitted). It should also be noted that Justice 
Rehnquist, who wrote the Diehr opinion, dissented from the Flook decision. 
127
 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012), available at http://
patentlyo.com/media/docs/2011/12/10-1150.pdf (Breyer, J.) (“If you look at the 
Court’s cases, they seem to say Flook, one thing, and Diehr, another thing.”).  
128
 Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 at 188,190–92. 
129
 Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 195 (1889) (finding the claim 
unpatentable). 
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addition of only generic “machine automation” recitations to an 
underlying abstract concept as merely adding another abstract 
concept to the claim, namely the fundamentally social notion of 
replacing workers with machines. In this respect, Diehr provided 
the impetus for a surge in highly formalistic end-runs around the 
patent-eligibility question through careful claim drafting that adds 
cursory reference to a machine but does not recite the essential 
elements of the solution to the underlying technical problem.130 
Diehr starts to substitute a first-mover approach to patentability, in 
that any person first to recognize that an abstract concept has 
saleable economic value in a particular market can obtain a patent 
by restricting the scope of the patent monopoly to that particular 
area of economic activity, without more.131  
Diamond v. Chakrabarty was the first Supreme Court case to 
deal with patent eligibility for biotechnology inventions.132 The 
Court asked whether the claimed microorganism constituted a 
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of 
35 U.S.C. § 101; it held that the artificially synthesized 
microorganism being claimed was “the result of human ingenuity 
and research” and was patent-eligible.133 This seemed to reach a 
proper result, in that productive activities creating new synthetic 
organisms was found to be patentable, but the Chakrabarty opinion 
offered a somewhat skewed reading of legislative history; it 
suggested that there were few, if any, limits on patent eligibility—
                                                 
130
 Such an approach broke with Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Le 
Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1852); Marchand v. Emken, 
132 U.S. 195, 200 (1889). 
131
 See generally Irwin, supra note 9, at 814–15 (discussing a shift in 
underlying rationales for patentability standards). 
132
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  
133
 Id. at 313. Though Chakrabarty seemed to reach the correct result, the 
rationale that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to include anything 
under the sun made by man” aligns more closely with the problematic aspects of 
Diehr. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-
1923 at 6 (1952)). 
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something that colored many later judicial decisions,134 particularly 
in lower courts.  
Decades later, the Court decided Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, which similarly found that synthetic 
material such as complementary DNA (cDNA) was patent-
eligible.135 However, the Myriad Court found that claims directed 
to isolated segments of naturally occurring DNA sequences were 
not patent-eligible.136 “Myriad’s principal contribution was 
uncovering the precise location and genetic sequence of the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes within chromosomes 17 and 13.”137 
The Court found that unlike the inventor in Chakrabarty, “Myriad 
did not create anything. To be sure, it found an important and 
useful gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic 
material is not an act of invention.”138 Rebuffing a sweat-of-the-
brow labor theory, the Court critically held that “extensive effort 
alone is insufficient” to confer patent eligibility.139 The overly broad 
claim at issue reflected only effort (and money) invested in the 
discovery of information necessary for further development of 
saleable products and services in the associated field, rather than 
the contribution of a solution to an underlying technical problem.  
Bilski v. Kappos was the first Supreme Court decision to 
directly assess the patent eligibility of what was unequivocally 
acknowledged as a “business method.”140 Specifically, Bilski 
                                                 
134
 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3248-50 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
135
 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 
2119 (2013). 
136
 Id. at 2120.  
137
 Id. at 2216.  
138
 Id. at 2217. The Court noted that “Myriad’s claims . . . [do not] rely in 
any way on the chemical changes that result from the isolation of a particular 
section of DNA.” Id. at 2118.  
139
 Id. at 2118.  
140
 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010). 
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claimed a method of hedging losses in commodities trading.141 The 
method claims in Bilski did not require a computer or other 
machine or apparatus. The Court held that the claims were not 
patent-eligible because they were drawn to “an unpatentable 
abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and 
Flook.”142 The most significant holding in Bilski was in 
overturning the lower court’s finding that the “machine-or-
transformation” test was the exclusive test for patent eligibility. 
Instead, the Court held that: “[T]he machine-or-transformation test 
is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for 
determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under 
§ 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for 
deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”143 
The Court nonetheless avoided any meaningful discussion of 
constitutional limits on patent eligibility. Like many other Supreme 
Court cases on patent eligibility decided after 1980, Bilski focuses 
rather narrowly on statutory interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 
omits much of the constitutional and policy-based analysis of 
earlier cases. The major failing of the Bilski opinion itself is that it 
tends to treat Benson, Flook, and Diehr as if those prior decisions 
took a consistent approach to the question of patent eligibility, 
when they clearly do not. The majority opinion made no attempt to 
reconcile the inconsistency in those precedents. To draw a football 
analogy, the majority’s Bilski decision punted the ball down the 
field, thus putting off until a later date the difficult task of 
                                                 
141
 Claim 1 read “(a) initiating a series of transactions between said 
commodity provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers 
purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said 
fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumers; (b) identifying 
market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said 
consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity 
provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series 
of market participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of 
consumer transactions.” Id. at 3223–24. 
142
 Id. at 3231.  
143
 Id. at 3227.  
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harmonizing precedent. In his final decision before retirement, 
Justice Stevens wrote a concurrence (joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor) indicating that he “would restore patent 
law to its historical and constitutional moorings.”144 Stevens noted 
that business methods were categorically excluded from patent 
eligibility for centuries, and it was only in the 1990s that the 
Federal Circuit began to call that categorical exclusion into 
question.145  
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 
made “preemption” a primary criterion for patent-eligible subject 
matter under § 101.146 Application of the machine-or-
transformation test for patentability, still used extensively by lower 
courts, was relegated to a decidedly secondary position in the 
analysis, at best.147 According to the majority in Mayo, “a process 
that focuses upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain other 
elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an 
‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice 
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law 
itself.”148 The mere act of “picking out the relevant audience”—
which essentially involves identifying the saleable market for an 
abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon—is not enough 
to confer patent eligibility.149 From a Veblenian perspective, this 
can be seen as a requirement that patent claims be directed to a 
contribution to the common stock of technical proficiency, rather 
than merely staking a pecuniary claim to concepts that are 
fundamental to any work in a given field. There was, indeed, a 
                                                 
144
 Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
145
Id. at 3232, 3239–50. Justice Stevens’ concurrence is well worth reading 
on its own. Much of the discussion that follows in this article is along the lines 
of the argument laid out in Justice Stevens’ Bilski concurrence. 
146
 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 
(2012); see also Zuege, supra note 64, at 19.  
147
 Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1302–04. 
148
 Id. at 1294. 
149
 Id. at 1299. 
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cursory reference to this concept in the Mayo opinion, which stated 
that rent-seeking through patenting can be problematic,150 and that 
there is a “two-edged sword” in the encouragement of invention 
through monopoly grants that requires a careful balance.151 Mayo 
was a re-affirmance of the rationale of the Flook line of cases and 
various Nineteenth Century Supreme Court precedents that dealt 
with the question of patent eligibility in terms of whether a 
patentee (or patent applicant) is overreaching by presenting 
preemptive patent claims that lack the inventive contribution 
required as part of the quid pro quo of a patent monopoly. Yet 
Mayo hardly settled the debate, and, despite some helpful but 
tentative and brief asides, still fell short of clearly articulating a 
general theory as to why the concept of “preemption” really 
matters, such that judges, patent office staff, and patentees can 
have a shared sense of purpose in applying a patent eligibility 
standard—however formulated. 
C. Conflicting Views on the Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit remains the locus for the patentable subject 
matter debate, with a “deep underlying philosophical divide” 
regarding the correct approach for patent eligibility analysis.152 
Yet, there is a growing consensus on the still-divided Federal 
Circuit that something close to a technological arts test should be 
applied.153 For instance, certain current and recently departed 
                                                 
150
 Id. at 1301–02 (quoting W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305–306 (2003)). 
151
 Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1305. 
152
 Dina Roumiantseva, The Eye of the Storm: Software Patents and The 
Abstract Idea Doctrine in CLS Bank v. Alice, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 569, 
577–78 (2013). 
153
 For comments on the divide among current Federal Circuit judges on 
this issue, see Bruce Sunstein, New Obstacles Are Raised to Protecting 
Computer-Related Inventions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Dec. 2013, at 27; 
Roumiantseva, supra note 153, at 577–88. For summaries of technological arts 
tests applied in select other countries, see, e.g., Jay Erstling et al., Usefulness 
Varies by Country: The Utility Requirement of Patent Law in the United States, 
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Federal Circuit judges have fairly consistently ruled in a variety of 
cases that to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 there 
must be a close nexus between a recited computer and the nature of 
the invention. Although those judges stop short of stating a 
technological arts test, their opinions seem to reject the notion that 
business and financial methods can ever be patent-eligible, such as 
by finding that such methods could have been performed mentally 
or finding the cursory recitation of a computer (or other concrete 
object) insufficient to satisfy § 101. These judges have expended 
considerable effort across numerous opinions to try to elucidate in 
a meaningful way what level of detail is required to reduce the 
level of abstraction of a claim sufficient for patent eligibility.154 
                                                                                                             
Europe and Canada, 3 CYBARIS 1 (2012), http://web.wmitchell.edu/cybaris/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Erstling-Salmela-Woo.pdf. In Europe, business 
methods and software per se are categorically excluded from patent eligibility. 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 
268 (“EPC”) (“The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions . . 
. schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or 
doing business, and programs for computers.”). 
154
 E.g., Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J.); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen 
IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1075–81 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting); 
Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Dyk, J. 
dissenting); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (en banc) (per curiam) (Lourie, J., concurring), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 
3131 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2013) (No. 13–298); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life 
Assurance Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Lourie, J.); 
MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F 3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., 
dissenting); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Fort 
Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(Dyk, J.); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (Dyk, J.); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting); In re 
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Dyk, J.) (revised opinion); In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Dyk, J., with Linn, J., 
concurring). It is speculative to assess how Federal Circuit judges feel about this 
issue, generally, and some judges may have changed their views over time. 
However, some Federal Circuit judges, like Judge Dyk and current Chief Judge 
Rader, have clearly come out on opposite sides of the debate. There have been 
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Cases from this faction of the Federal Circuit seem cognizant that 
the Constitution may impose limits on what the patent statutes can 
make patent-eligible and hint at some sort of technological-arts-
like test.155 While this first faction has tried to bring clarity to the 
patent subject matter eligibility debate, they have yet to articulate a 
sufficiently clear theory or test to establish consensus. The 
discussion that follows will illustrate how a Veblenian perspective 
might strengthen and clarify an underlying theory for such tests, 
consistent with various Supreme Court opinions—and particularly 
Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Bilski.  
Another faction of Federal Circuit judges have been firmly 
opposed to patent eligibility challenges and insist that patent 
eligibility challenges are really questions of claim 
novelty/obviousness, definiteness, and/or enablement and as such 
can or should be addressed under other statutory sections of the 
patent laws.156 Led by Chief Judge Rader, the most vociferous 
                                                                                                             
attempts to assign Federal Circuit Judges to opposing camps, though. See 
Roumiantseva, supra note 153, at 578, 581–82 (placing Judges Rader, Newman, 
Plager, and O’Malley in the broad “coarse filter” camp/faction and Judges Dyk, 
Prost, Moore, Schall, and Bryson in the “limiting test” camp/faction); Sunstein, 
supra note 154, at 27. More recently appointed Judges like Renya, Wallach, and 
Taranto seem to fall into the “limiting test” camp/faction. See CLS Bank Int’l, 
717 F.3d 1269 (Lourie, J., concurring); Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d 1266; 
Accenture Global Servs., 728 F.3d 1336; Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced 
Biological Labs, SA, No. 2013-1186, 2014 WL259824 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24, 2014) 
(Taranto, J.) (nonprecedential). 
155
 The rationales in opinions from these judges align with Supreme Court 
cases like Benson and Flook. 
156
 E.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 
1075 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J.); Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 
627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[S]ubject matter might . . . be so 
conceptual that the written description does not enable a person of ordinary skill 
in the art to replicate the process.”) (Rader, C.J.); Bilski, 545 F.3d at 977–94 
(Newman, J., dissenting); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 
1342,1345–48 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, J.) (emphasizing other statutory limits 
for patentability and attempting to diminish the significance of the “pre-
emption” doctrine); Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1335 (Plager, J., dissenting-in-part, 
concurring-in-part); CLS Bank Int’l., 717 F.3d at 1292–1336 (dissenting and 
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Federal Circuit judge on this point, the opinions of this faction 
reflect a view that patentable subject matter “may include even 
methods of doing business.”157 For instance, these judges 
repeatedly reject or ignore calls to specify the level of complexity 
of computer programming necessary to no longer be “abstract” 
under § 101.158 These judges also consistently frame issues under 
the rubric of the sweeping scope of § 101, and the definition of 
“process” in § 100, without reference to limiting language of the 
Patent & Copyright Clause of the Constitution or early Supreme 
Court cases and therefore without recognition of the ways that the 
language from the 1952 patent law revisions (and later legislative 
amendments) may have departed from constitutional limits.159 
They conclude that the statutory threshold is very low, a “coarse 
filter,”160 and they put few teeth into the “preemption” doctrine.161 
There are numerous problems with the second faction’s view that 
concerns raised about patent subject matter eligibility should not 
be addressed under § 101 but should instead be policed elsewhere, 
such as under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112. For one, this view 
renders § 101 somewhat dead letter, in a way that may simplify 
judicial decision-making but only at the expense of forcing 
                                                                                                             
dissenting-in-part opinions, and additional reflections); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 
290 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J.). 
157
 Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1342 (citation omitted); see also Bilski, 130 
S.Ct. at 3223-24 (2010) (reciting claim 1). 
158
 Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1353 (“[T]his court does not define the level 
of programming complexity required before a computer-implemented method 
can be patent-eligible.”).  
159
 The rationales in opinions from these judges tend to align with the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Diehr more so than in Benson or Flook, for 
instance. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 
F.2d 1053, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1992 (Rader, J., concurring) (arguing that Diehr 
limited Benson and supposedly “refocused” the patentability analysis on the 
statutory language rather than “vague” judicial exclusions). 
160
 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1066; Research Corp. 
Techs., Inc., 627 F.3d at 869. 
161
 E.g., Ultramercial, Inc., 722 F.3d at 1345–46 (Rader, J.). 
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accused infringers and patent examiners to waste efforts on more 
burdensome investigations to uncover prior art, etc. This position 
takes an unequal view of the burdens associated with the 
arguments under different statutory sections and expresses concern 
for the amount of effort involved only when that effort is expended 
by judges—anathema to a legal realist analysis. The refusal to 
consider multiple bases for unpatentability is also not justified in 
any meaningful way. For instance, patent litigators rarely believe 
that a validity challenge under § 112 has a great chance of success, 
yet panels of the Federal Circuit seem to imply that making a § 112 
invalidity argument is a preferred approach.162 There is a large 
disconnect in that regard. Moreover, indefiniteness issues 
surrounding functional claiming at the point of novelty (in claims 
without means-plus-function or step-plus-function recitations) are 
rarely relied upon by patent examiners, and the topic receives no 
treatment in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.163 This 
second faction of Federal Circuit judges is perhaps the most 
resistant to clarity in the area of patent eligibility, but a Veblenian 
perspective might provide them with a new way to look at the 
underlying issues and perhaps find common ground with the other 
faction.  
Many of the changing interpretations can be viewed as 
reflecting changing economic ideologies held by the judiciary.164 
                                                 
162
 The standard for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is currently 
awaiting Supreme Court review. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 
F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (U.S. Jan, 10, 2014) 
(No. 13-339). 
163
 Contra, e.g., Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ.2d 1207 (B.P.A.I. 2008). 
However, President Obama recently initiated a training program around the 
issue of functional claiming. FACT SHEET—Executive Actions: Answering the 
President’s Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation, 




 Similarly, Robert Post suggested that variations in patent allowance 
rates after the Civil War reflected not changes in inventive activity but primarily 
58
Cybaris®, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol5/iss2/1
[5:211 2014] PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 269 
 
 
For instance, Federal Circuit opinions often argue (without much 
empirical support) in terms of the economic effect of various 
patent policy decisions.165 In this context, questions regarding who 
should benefit from access to creative monopolies as secured by 
patents are highly relevant. If the major basis of the economy in 
the United States moves away from productive technology—
machines, electronics, chemicals and the like—then it seems 
inevitable that patents restricted to productive technology would 
experience a corresponding decline in significance. But this raises 
the question, too, of whether economic factors should change the 
interpretation of the patent laws in order to maintain the role of 
patents. Or should patents instead be subject to the rise and ebb of 
external economic factors, declining in prominence in along with 
industrial sectors? One gets the sense that some Federal Circuit 
judges fear patents will lose prominence if the economy shifts 
away from industrial activities and the patent system does not 
follow along. Vested interests in the patent system—and judges of 
the Federal Circuit must fall in this category,166 though they do 
                                                                                                             
changes in ideological outlook by Patent Office administrators, with 
“liberalizers” ideologically favoring more patent grants and “scientific men” 
ideologically favoring less. Robert C. Post, ’Liberalizers’ Versus ‘Scientific 
Men’ in the Antebellum Patent Office, 17 TECH. & CULTURE 24 (1976). 
165
 E.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1075 (Rader, J., joined 
by Newman, J., additional views) (“[I]f one nation makes patent protection 
difficult, it will drive research to another, more accommodating nation.”). This 
seems like an absurd argument, given that patent protection is typically provided 
regardless of the location where the invention was developed, and a researcher 
can forego patent protection in her native country while seeking it elsewhere.  
166
 Numerous commentators have alleged a pro-patent bias in the Federal 
Circuit. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011) 
(proffering a model to explain expanding patentability); Thomas F. Cotter, Book 
Review: Law, Economics, and Intellectual Property, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, 
Mar. 2004, at 2, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/antitrust_source/bookreview.authcheckdam.pdf. But see Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, What Are the Sources of Patent Inflation? An Analysis of 
Federal Circuit Patentability Rulings, 121 YALE L.J. 347 (2011) (critiquing the 
Masur patent inflation model). 
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hear matters outside the realm of patent law—seem reluctant to 
place limits on the scope of patent subject matter eligibility but 
instead tend to adopt liberal, expansive views on patent subject 
matter eligibility.167 At the very least, it seems that those arguing 
for broad patent eligibility tend to have no concern about patents 
covering nonproductive activities, in a Veblenian sense. On the 
other side of the argument, it can be argued that an expanded scope 
of patentability devalues the kinds of productive technologies that, 
in a historical sense, have been the foundation of the patent system 
for centuries, and thought to be a driver of general welfare.  
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT 
It has been suggested by numerous others that the 
constitutional question of what is patent-eligible subject matter is 
central to assessing patent eligibility for business methods and 
other nontechnological “inventions.”168 The question has been 
raised across numerous judicial opinions, from the Supreme Court, 
lower courts, and administrative bodies. One of the clearest 
discussions came from the landmark case of Graham v. John 
Deere, interpreting the then fairly recent 1952 revisions to the 
patent statutes.  
                                                 
167
 See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against 
Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2013, at 3–4 (“[T]he political demand for 
stronger patent protection comes from old and stagnant industries and firms, not 
from new and innovative ones.”); Ouellette, supra note 166, at 349 (suggesting 
that the Federal Circuit may have been created with the purpose of increasing 
findings of patent validity and infringement). 
168
 E.g., Alan L. Durham, ‘Useful Arts’ in the Information Age, 1999 BYU 
L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1999); Richard Stern, Being Within the Useful Arts as a 
Further Constitutional Requirement for US Patent Eligibility, EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 6, 10 (2009); Thomas, supra note 97, at 4–6; John R. Thomas, The 
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (1999); Robert 
A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical 
Algorithms: The Constitutional Limit on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. 
REV. 31 (1999); Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business 
Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and 
Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 61 (2002). 
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At the outset it must be remembered that the 
federal patent power stems from a specific 
constitutional provision which authorizes the 
Congress “To promote the Progress of . . . useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.” Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8. The clause is both a grant of power and a 
limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the 
power often exercised in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is 
limited to the promotion of advances in the “useful 
arts.” It was written against the backdrop of the 
practices—eventually curtailed by the Statute of 
Monopolies—of the Crown in granting monopolies 
to court favorites in goods or businesses which had 
long before been enjoyed by the public. See 
Meinhardt, Inventions, Patents and Monopoly, pp. 
30–35 (London, 1946). The Congress in the 
exercise of the patent power may not overreach the 
restraints imposed by the stated constitutional 
purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly 
without regard to the innovation, advancement or 
social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress 
may not authorize the issuance of patents whose 
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the 
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials 
already available. Innovation, advancement, and 
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge 
are inherent requisites in a patent system which by 
constitutional command must “promote the 
Progress of . . . useful Arts.” This is the standard 
expressed in the Constitution and it may not be 
ignored.169  
                                                 
169
 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) 
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This express linking of technology to social progress in 
Graham echoed views widely held when the Constitution was 
framed.170  
[T]he Constitution dictates the interpretation of 
‘process’, ‘machine’ and similar words in s.101—
limiting them to things within the ‘useful Arts.’ At 
the very least, it may be presumed . . . that one 
cannot promote the progress of ‘useful Arts’ by 
rewarding or regulating activities not within the 
‘useful Arts.’171  
Available history regarding deliberation on this constitutional 
language indicates that the “useful Arts” language was specifically 
inserted in place of alternate language. At the constitutional 
convention, James Madison proposed language “To grant patents 
for useful inventions,” “To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a 
certain time,” and “To establish public institutions, rewards and 
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades and 
manufactures,” all of which was rejected in favor of the language 
proposed a few weeks later: “To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries[.]”172 The final language of the Constitution reflects a 
different and narrower scope of legislative authority than proposed 
                                                                                                             
(emphasis added).  
170
 Irwin, supra note 9, at 785.  
171
 Stern, supra note 168, at 10. This statement should be qualified by 
noting that the same clause allows promotion of “science” as use to provide 
copyrights. Stern goes on to argue for a general theory of the useful Arts and 
suggests a dichotomy of sorts. In reaching that conclusion, however, his 
explanation of “technological arts” and “industrial arts” are unsupported, and 
rest on shaky philosophical foundations.  
172
 Madison Debates, August 18, 1787, THE AVALON PROJECT: YALE LAW 
SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_818.asp (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2012) (statement by Mr. Madison); see also Durham, supra note 169, 
at 1431. 
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by Madison.173 Moreover, as described in detail by Alan Durham, 
the term “useful arts” at the time the Constitution was drafted was 
used in general parlance to describe all sorts of areas of 
technology, engineering, craft, workmanship, and technique, but 
was never described as encompassing business or business 
methods.174 Durham notes, as has Dana Remus Irwin, that much of 
the confusion surrounding the scope of patentability of things like 
business methods can be traced to the 1952 codification of the 
patent laws, in which the term “art” was replaced with “process” 
when delineating utility requirements for patentability, without any 
clear intent to change the overall scope of patent-eligible subject 
matter.175  
Recognition of constitutional limits on patent-eligible subject 
matter has not been discussed in great detail in more recent 
Supreme Court opinions, which since 1980 have focused more on 
statutory interpretation. Discussion of constitutional limits on 
patentability has been somewhat sporadic in the Federal Circuit 
and other lower courts. However, In re Comiskey explicitly stated 
that the Patent & Copyright Clause of the Constitution “limited the 
subject matter eligible for patent protection to the ‘useful arts.’”176 
“The Constitution explicitly limited patentability to ‘the national 
purpose of advancing the useful arts—the process today called 
technological innovation.’”177 That constitutional limit was used to 
                                                 
173
 This followed the general trend of patent laws being put in place to limit 
monopolies, rather than to encourage them.  
174
 Durham, supra note 169, at 1424–44; see also Irwin, supra note 9, at 
782–810 (suggesting that the 1952 patent law codification was a driver of 
patentable subject matter expansion and a break from the constitutional 
framework). 
175
 Durham, supra note 169, at 1425 n.24; Irwin, supra note 9, at 804–10. 
176
 In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Graham v. 
John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)). 
177
 Id. at 977 (quoting Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (en banc)); see also MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d, 1250, 
1269–70 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J. dissenting); cf. Classen Immunotherapies, 
63
Zuege: A New Theory for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility: A Veblenian P
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
[5:211 2014] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 274 
govern the application of statutory provisions in Comiskey, noting 
that “the present statute does not allow patents to be issued on 
particular business systems—such as a particular type of arbitration—
that depend entirely on the use of mental processes. In other words, 
the patent statute does not allow patents on particular systems that 
depend for their operation on human intelligence alone, a field of 
endeavor that both the framers and Congress intended to be beyond 
the reach of patentable subject matter.”178  
Administrative agencies overseeing the U.S. patent system 
have tended to adopt very liberal standards for patentability. A 
number of years ago, the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (BPAI), the former name for the administrative court 
within the USPTO (now called the Patent Trial and Appeal Board), 
decided Ex parte Lundgren,179 in which the majority rejected a 
“technological arts” test for business method patents.180 Yet 
Administrative Patent Judge Jerry Smith, dissenting, took the view 
that a technological arts test was necessary, in that the language of 
                                                                                                             
Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Rader, J., joined by 
Newman, J., additional views) (“[A]fter all, patents require a translation of 
technology into text, i.e., patent claims. Inevitably the subject matter exclusions 
of eligibility doctrines depend on the way that claims are drafted. Thus, careful 
claim drafting or new claim forms can often avoid eligibility restrictions. 
Eligibility then becomes a game where lawyers learn ingenious ways to recast 
technology in terms that satisfy eligibility concerns.”) (emphasis added). 
178
 Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 980.  
179
 Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ.2d 1385, (B.P.A.I. 2005). 
180
 Id.; see also Robert E. Thomas & Larry A. DiMatteo, Harmonizing the 
International Law of Business Method and Software Patents: Following 
Europe’s Lead, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 11 (2007) (noting that Lundgren 
rejected “the international trend towards requiring a minimal technical 
advancement or contribution for the patentability of business methods”). Contra 
Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The exclusive right, 
constitutionally derived, was for the national purpose of advancing the useful 
arts—the process today called technological innovation.”); In re Waldbaum, 457 
F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Rich, J., concurring) (“The phrase 
‘technological arts,’ as we have used it, is synonymous with the phrase ‘useful 
arts’ as it appears in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.”). 
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§ 101 could not be interpreted in a way that exceeds the power 
granted to Congress to enact that statutory section under the Patent 
& Copyright Clause of the Constitution. He noted that “the term 
‘technological arts’ should be construed to mean nothing more 
than a threshold nexus to some field of technology to fall within 
the constitutional mandate.”181  
Some have argued that patent eligibility cannot be restricted by 
the Constitution. Numerous commentators have alleged a threshold 
on domestic patentable subject matter standards imposed by the 
TRIPS agreement, which would allegedly prohibit certain limits on 
patentable subject matter.182 However, the constitutional patentable 
subject matter inquiry cannot be subsumed by analysis under a 
treaty because the Supreme Court has repeatedly and 
unequivocally stated that constitutional limits override any treaty 
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause in Article VI, § 2.183 Moreover, 
the idea that other member states would object to a technological 
                                                 
181
 Ex parte Lundgren, 76 USPQ.2d 1385, 5 (B.P.A.I. 2005) (Smith, 
dissenting). 
182
 Thomas, supra note 97, at 49; Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal 
Professions, supra note 86, at 1142–43, 1177–84; Cotter, supra note 11, at 878–
79; see also Rajnish Kumar Rai & Srinath Jagannathan, Do Business Method 




 The Supreme Court “has regularly and uniformly recognized the 
supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 
(1957). “It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be 
held valid if it be in violation of that instrument.” The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 
U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1871). See also Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 
332, 341 (1924); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 700 (1898); 
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 
635, 656–57 (1853). However, purely statutory analysis would be subject to any 
limitation imposed by treaty. Yet Thomas does not acknowledge the Global 
South’s position on patents, particular on medical technologies, in that the 
Global South despises allowing its people to die merely to preserve comparative 
advantages and profit margins for the North Atlantic states. See PRASHAD, supra 
note 79. 
65
Zuege: A New Theory for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility: A Veblenian P
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
[5:211 2014] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 276 
arts test on the basis of the TRIPS agreement also somewhat 
ignores that many other countries already have such eligibility 
limits and generally support them.184 
In sum, the arguments in favor of a constitutional limit on 
patent eligibility that constrains interpretation of statutory dictates 
for patentability are more compelling than contrary positions. The 
Graham case could hardly have been clearer on that point. 
Arguments that treaties require expansive patent eligibility 
standards quickly run afoul of the Supremacy Clause and therefore 
fall away. All this leaves one with the impression that 
counterarguments for expansive patent eligibility stem from a 
rejection or disregard of underlying constitutional dictates and 
Enlightenment-era values that influenced the framing of the 
Constitution.  
VI. ASSESSING PATENT ELIGIBILITY AT THE POINT OF INVENTIVE 
CONTRIBUTION 
Patent eligibility could be best analyzed through an approach 
that focuses on the point of inventive contribution, also called a 
point of novelty analysis.185 This would look to the essential 
element(s) of the alleged solution to a technical problem as recited 
in a given patent claim. “Under the ‘point of novelty’ approach, if 
the novelty or advancement in the art claimed by the inventor 
resided solely in a step of the process embodying a mental 
operation or other unpatentable element, the claim was rejected 
                                                 
184
 See, e.g., Erstling et al., supra note 154, at 1; TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP IP GROUP COUNTRY NEGOTIATORS, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [RIGHTS] CHAPTER, ART. QQ.E.1 (Aug. 
30, 2013), available at https://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wikileaks-secret-
TPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf. 
185
 Chao, supra  note 3, at 83, 91 (calling this subject matter eligibility 
analysis a “point of novelty” approach unfortunately tends to generate much 
confusion with what is presently a separate statutory requirement of novelty for 
patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 102). 
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under § 101 as being directed to nonstatutory subject matter.”186 
The reason such an approach is desirable is that broad claims, of 
the sort that tend to raise patent eligibility questions, are often 
written in such a way that they recite a desired result without any 
meaningful limits as to how that result is achieved through 
                                                 
186
 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 200 n.15 (1981) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted); cf. Application of Seid, 161 F.2d 229 (C.C.P.A. 1947) (“[A] 
mere matter of choice in ornamentality . . . produces no new mechanical effect 
or advantage considered to constitute invention” and is therefore not eligible for 
utility patent protection.); Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Levous, 35 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 
1929) (stating that a claim to a rectangular ice cream desert was invalidated by a 
prior art spherical or ball-shaped one, because “[t]here is no invention in merely 
changing the shape or form of an article without changing its function except in 
a design patent”). For a proposal for a “revised” two-part point of novelty 
subject matter eligibility test, see Chao, supra note 186, at 94 (“If the limitation 
embodying the point of novelty does not describe an unpatentable concept, the 
claim qualifies as patentable subject matter. If the limitation embodying the 
point of novelty merely describes one of these unpatentable concepts, the court 
should proceed to the second part of the analysis— examining the other 
limitations. If the other limitations are not directed at an unpatentable concept 
and have a strong nexus with the point of novelty, the claim is patentable. The 
nexus requirement excludes ‘insignificant post-solution activity’ and other 
limitations that are not central to the point of novelty.”). However, Chao’s test 
still leaves some uncertainty about how to meaningfully characterize 
“unpatentable concepts” without the machine-or-transformation test. Id. 
Moreover, Chao’s approach requires analysis of extrinsic evidence in order to 
assess the first part of the test. Id. In contrast, applying a problem-solution 
analysis to identify an alleged point of inventive contribution could be 
performed based solely on the intrinsic record of a given patent or patent 
application, and later analysis of whether the point of inventive contribution 
constitutes a productive contribution to the common stock of technical 
proficiency (a concept discuss further below) would tend to require relatively 
little analysis of extrinsic evidence. Id. Nonetheless, the plurality opinion of the 
Federal Circuit in CLS Bank adopted a two-part analysis similar to Chao’s 
recommendation. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3131 (U.S. Dec. 6, 
2013) (No. 13–298); accord Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software, 
Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Yet the CLS Bank plurality opinion 
approach still tends to require claim construction prior to patent eligibility 
analysis, which is a weakness of that approach.  
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technical means.187 In such cases, the “how” part of the alleged 
invention is recited merely in terms of an abstract idea, a law of 
nature, or a natural phenomenon. At times, today, the “how” part is 
recited by only the most cursory and general reference to general 
purpose computers and the like—an approach that begs the 
question of whether reciting, essentially, that computers allow 
automated calculations to be performed, constitutes merely an 
unpatentable abstract idea unto itself.188 Alternatively, this might 
                                                 
187
 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 173 (1852) (“A patent is not 
good for an effect, or the result of a certain process, as that would prohibit all 
other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever.”). The 
problem of results-based claiming is explicitly addressed under guidelines for 
European patent practice. “As a general rule, claims which attempt to define the 
invention by a result to be achieved should not be allowed, in particular if they 
only amount to claiming the underlying technical problem.” GUIDELINES FOR 
EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE § 4.10 (rev. ed. 2013). 
Moreover, “[t]he claims . . . must be clear, meaning not only that a claim must 
be comprehensible from a technical point of view, but also that it must define 
clearly all the essential features of the invention . . . .” Id. § 4.5.1. “Essential 
features of a claim are those necessary for achieving a technical effect 
underlying the solution of the technical problem with which the application is 
concerned (the problem usually being derived from the description). The 
independent claim(s) should therefore contain all features explicitly described in 
the description as being necessary to carry out the invention. Any features 
which, even if consistently mentioned in the context of the invention throughout 
the application, do not actually contribute to the solution of the problem are not 
essential features.” Id. § 4.5.2. 
188
 Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 195, 199 (1889). Some cases establish a 
similar proposition that one cannot merely claim the “automation” of a known 
manual activity without reciting a particular automation mechanism that 
represents an inventive contribution to an underlying technical problem. 
“Appellant argues that his rejected claims rest upon an automatic mechanism. 
The mere statement that a device is to be operated automatically instead of by 
hand, without a claim specifying any particular automatic mechanism, is not the 
statement of an invention. . . . Much of the argument made here is directed to the 
various elements of appellant’s automatic mechanism. It is sufficient to say that 
however inventive these elements may be, they are not mentioned in the rejected 
claims, and hence can have no effect upon on conclusion thereon.” In re 
Rundell, 48 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (internal citations omitted); In re Venner, 
262 F.2d 91 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (internal citations omitted) (“[I]t is well settled that 
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be viewed as seeking monopoly rights over a solution (that uses 
technology) to a social problem. Merely reciting that a machine 
(e.g., computer) performs a task rather than a person is not a 
solution to a technical problem but is instead an abstract idea 
regarding a social question of whether employers hire employees 
or purchase machines instead. Put another way, the “invention” 
may really be a solution to a social problem rather than a technical 
problem, albeit a solution that utilizes technology—typically 
ubiquitous technology (at least at the level of abstraction that such 
technology is recited in the claims). This “point of inventive 
contribution” approach does not simply convert the patent 
eligibility analysis to a consideration of novelty and/or 
obviousness, but rather is an insistence that the patentee or patent 
applicant should have to limit her claims to more than just a 
statement of a desired result or an essentially bare statement of a 
technical problem (without reciting the technical solution)—
something explicitly required by rule in other jurisdictions.189 In 
other words, claims that recite an effect (or result) must delineate 
both cause and effect and not merely the effect (or result) in 
isolation. The desired effect (or result) may be new and 
nonobvious, or the underlying technical problem may have been 
previously unsolved, but if there is no recitation in the claims of 
how that effect is achieved (the technical causal mechanism), then 
preemption and a lack of patent eligibility become meaningful 
concerns. These concerns appear in the backdrop of many Supreme 
Court cases on patent eligibility, at least when the actual claim 
language is considered.190 Moreover, cases like Bilski present 
                                                                                                             
it is not ‘invention’ to broadly provide a mechanical or automatic means to 
replace manual activity which has accomplished the same result,” and 
“[p]atentability cannot be predicated upon a mental step.”). However, these 
cases treat the question as one of obviousness rather than of patent eligibility. 
189
 Cf. GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE §§ 
4.5, 4.10 (rev. ed. 2013) (requiring a technical solution). 
190
 A problem with opinions like Gottschalk v. Benson is that they do not 
provide any meaningful analysis of the actual claim language at issue. See Supra 
Part IV.A. 
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attempts to claim solutions to social allocations of wealth already 
in existence (e.g., hedging investment risk), which through one 
mechanism or another courts have historically tended to find 
constitute no more than unpatentable abstract ideas, or the like. In 
other words, proffered “solutions” to social “problems” are not 
generally thought of as being within the realm of the technological 
or useful arts. Claims like that of Bilski clearly fail a technological 
arts test, but asking whether a claim at the recited point of 
inventive contribution provides a productive contribution to the 
common stock of technological proficiency is a much more direct 
way to repeatedly reach the sorts of conclusions found in Supreme 
Court cases for centuries, from Marchand to Funk Brothers to 
Flook to Mayo. Practically speaking, courts and USPTO staff 
could analyze claims to identify the purported inventive 
contribution, and if it contains only a result or effect, without 
reciting the mechanism (or step) that causes it, or if it relates to a 
social question rather than a technical problem, then patent 
eligibility could be denied due to preemption. Other jurisdictions 
sort claims in a two-part manner like this with great success.191  
Judicial precedent is highly confused when a “point of novelty” 
type of patent eligibility analysis is considered—comparable to the 
presently endorsed point of inventive contribution approach. 
Justice Rehnquist wrote in the Diehr case that patent subject matter 
eligibility cannot be assessed at the point of novelty.192 That 
statement seems to have been a miscalculation, and one that the 
Supreme Court should explicitly correct.193 In other areas of patent 
                                                 
191
 See, e.g., European Patent Convention r. 43(1). 
192
 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981); see also Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236 (2010); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). Flook stated that the Court’s approach is “not at all inconsistent with 
the view that a patent claim must be considered as a whole.” Parker v. Flook, 
437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
193
 For a contrary view, arguing that the Supreme Court was correct to 
disregard the point of novelty, see Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1253, 1277–79 (2011). Lemley’s analysis rests on somewhat dubious 
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law, such as with respect to indefiniteness caused by functional 
claiming at the point of novelty, the Supreme Court and 
subsequent lower court opinions have endorsed an approach that 
looks to the point of novelty of a given patent claim.194 While the 
analysis of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires by statute 
that “the claimed invention as a whole” (formerly worded as “the 
subject matter as a whole”) be analyzed, 35 U.S.C. § 101 includes 
no such explicit requirement for the analysis of utility.195 In other 
words, the statutory language of § 101 does not preclude a point of 
inventive contribution analysis.  
It continues to be a source of confusion that the Supreme Court 
has mostly deferred to lower court precedents barring a point of 
novelty analysis of patent eligibility. As a result, Judges on the 
Federal Circuit have struggled through the question of whether the 
point of novelty, or something like it, should be considered in 
assessing patent subject matter eligibility. For example, in the 
nonprecedential opinion for Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced 
Biological Labs, SA, a Federal Circuit panel noted that the method 
claim at issue “calls on a computer to do nothing that is even 
arguably an advance in physical implementations of routine mental 
information-comparison and rule-application processes.”196 Such a 
statement hints that the recitation of a “computer” does not fall at 
the point of inventive contribution, that is, the computer does not 
                                                                                                             
assumptions about expansive patent grants always being desirable, of the sort 
routinely criticized by economists. Id at 1279. 
194
 E.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946); 
Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ex 
parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ.2d 1207 (B.P.A.I. 2008), Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-
Surgery Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also In re Abrams, 188 
F.2d 165, 166,170 (C.C.P.A. 1951). 
195
 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2011) (pre-AIA), and 35 U.S.C. § 103 
(2014) (post-AIA), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).  
196
 Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs, SA, No. 2013–1186, 
2014 WL 259824, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24, 2014) (nonprecedential).  
71
Zuege: A New Theory for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility: A Veblenian P
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
[5:211 2014] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 282 
relate to any alleged technological advance.197 On the other hand, 
the opinion for Accenture Global Services v. Guidewire Software, 
Inc. quoted the en banc plurality opinion of CLS Bank as saying 
that to assess preemption of an abstract idea “the court must first 
‘identify and define whatever fundamental concept appears 
wrapped up in the claim.’”198 This approach on its face seems 
indefensible. What is the “invention” for purposes of a 
patentability analysis if not what is claimed?199 The Federal Circuit 
made a clearer point with a seemingly contrary statement in 
another, earlier case. “In considering patent eligibility under § 101, 
one must focus on the claims. This is because a claim may 
‘preempt’ only that which the claims encompass, not what is 
disclosed but left unclaimed.”200 These statements seem to be 
premised on conflicting ideas of what should be assessed for patent 
eligibility, and how that should be done—a question of which of 
the seemingly conflicting rationales of cases like Flook or Diehr 
should be applied.  
Most recent case law under the machine-or-transformation test 
for patent eligibility has focused on attempts (in view of the 
                                                 
197
 Cf., e.g., Alexsam, Inc. v. IDT Corp., 715 F.3d 1336, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
198
 Accenture Global Servs. v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail 
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of what 
statutory category (‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’ 
35 U.S.C. § 101) a claim’s language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the 
underlying invention for patent-eligibility purposes.”). 
199
 See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring) (“While a computer or complex computer 
program . . . may be necessary to perform the method, it is not what the claim 
specifically requires[.]”); In re Rundell, 48 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (“Much of 
the argument made here is directed to the various elements of appellant’s 
automatic mechanism. It is sufficient to say that however inventive these 
elements may be, they are not mentioned in the rejected claims, and hence can 
have no effect upon on conclusion thereon.”).  
200
 Dealertrack v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
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hopelessness of making software and business methods satisfy the 
“transformation” prong)201 by patent owners (or applicants) to 
recite a computer to satisfy the “machine” prong. These cases push 
toward something like an analysis at the point of inventive 
contribution. For instance, in the frequently-cited CyberSource 
opinion, a Federal Circuit panel stated that “the incidental use of a 
computer to perform [a] mental process . . . does not impose a 
sufficiently meaningful limit on . . . claim[] scope.”202 In another 
opinion, it was held that where “[t]he claims are silent as to how a 
computer aids the method, the extent to which a computer aids the 
method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of 
the method. The undefined phrase 'computer aided' does not make 
the claimed concept any less abstract than an underlying abstract 
idea.203 “Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim 
covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to 
render the claim patent eligible.”204 In one of the clearest 
statements the Federal Circuit has issued on this point, it was held 
that “[i]n order for the addition of a machine to impose a 
meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant 
part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than 
function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution 
                                                 
201
 Courts have made clear that little if anything outside the realm of 
manufacturing methods can satisfy the “transformation” prong. “The mere 
manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy the transformation 
prong.” CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375. An “abstract concept cannot be 
transformed into patentable subject matter merely because of connections to the 
physical world through deeds, contracts, and real property.” Fort Properties, Inc. 
v. American Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012); cf. 
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877) (“A process is a mode of treatment 
of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, 
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different 
state or thing.”). 
202
 CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375.  
203
 Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333.  
204
 Id. (citing SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 
(Fed. Cir. 2010)); accord Fort Properties, Inc., 671 F.3d at 1323.  
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to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a 
computer for performing calculations.”205 Yet, unfortunately, 
though that statement added the term “obvious” to the subject 
matter eligibility standard, it was added in such a way that still 
breeds confusion. 
The trickiest aspect of analysis under the “machine” prong of 
the machine-or-transformation test remains the assessment of 
mental processes. There appears to be agreement on the Federal 
Circuit that purely mental processes are not patent-eligible because 
they constitute abstract ideas.206 “Merely claiming a software 
implementation of a purely mental process that could otherwise be 
performed without the use of a computer does not satisfy the 
machine prong of the machine-or-transformation test.”207 Yet this 
mental process analysis places a heavy burden on the patent 
examiner or court addressing the question. It generally requires 
comparison to a hypothetical—an unclaimed mental process. In 
CyberSource,208 the court had an admission by the CEO of the 
company that owned the patent that the method had actually been 
performed mentally in the past,209 and in Fort Properties the patent 
owner admitted during prosecution that the use of a computer was 
not necessary.210 Those admissions are the sorts of “golden facts” 
not available with respect to most patents or patent applications. A 
                                                 
205
 SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1333; cf. Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 195, 
199 (1889).  
206
 E.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1377; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 
722 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
207
 CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375; cf. SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1332–33 
(“We are not dealing with a situation in which there is a method that can be 
performed without a machine.”). 
208
 CyberSource dealt with not only method claims but also a so-called 
Beauregard claim, which recited a “computer readable medium containing 
program instructions” that are executed by one or more computer processors to 
carry out recited steps (i.e., method or process recitations).  
209
 CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373. 
210
 Fort Properties, 671 F.3d at 1319 (applicant represented during 
prosecution that the recited methods “need not be performed by a computer”). 
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patent examiner would typically not have the benefit of such 
admissions on the record and is therefore forced to hypothesize 
about the possibility of mental execution. Examiners, often quite 
rightly, tend to struggle with such mental exercises that are not 
based on evidence of record,211 potentially leading to the issuance 
of a patent claims drawn to non-patent-eligible subject matter. The 
same problems arise for judges in litigation.212 Any doctrine that 
tends to require an admission by the patent applicant or owner that 
the invention could be performed mentally is problematic because 
a clever patent applicant or owner can simply avoid making such 
an admission. But by looking at the point of novelty in a claim, 
that is to say the point where the essential element of a solution to 
an underlying technical problem is recited, trivial connections to 
tangible, non-mental things like computers can be disregarded 
when they are not implicated at the alleged point of novelty. For 
instance, much greater clarity on patent subject matter eligibility 
could be achieved if the United States required by statute that 
patent claims be in two-part form as required in Europe,213 with 
known, prior art elements separated from the recitation of the 
asserted inventive contribution.214  
                                                 
211
 The main problem is that the examiner or other person assessing patent 
eligibility must effectively “invent” beyond the recited claim in order to analyze 
it, which make the entire patentability analysis look like a farce. 
212
 Indeed, when a Federal Circuit panel decided Smartgene, Inc. v. 
Advanced Biological Labs, SA, No. 2013–1186, 2014 WL259824 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (nonprecedential), under a “mental steps” analysis without the benefit of 
an admission in the record as in Fort Properties or CyberSource, the opinion 
was published as nonprecedential.  
213
 This format is called Jepson form in the United States and is permitted 
but is not required. 
214
 European Patent Convention Rules Relating to Fees, EUR. PAT. OFF., r. 
43(1), at 370 (Oct. 2013), http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/
0/00E0CD7FD461C0D5C1257C060050C376/$File/
EPC_15th_edition_2013.pdf (“The claims shall define the matter for which 
protection is sought in terms of the technical features of the invention. Wherever 
appropriate, claims shall contain: (a) a statement indicating the designation of 
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In the Veblenian view, outlined further below, the dichotomy 
between industrial and pecuniary activity suggests looking at 
where the alleged gain from a claimed invention falls, in a 
functional sense. If the proffered gain falls not within a 
technological function, but within pecuniary or social spheres, then 
the claim is directed to nonpatentable subject matter. For instance, 
if a claim merely outlines the scope of the creative monopoly 
desired by way of patent (i.e., the desired social consequence), but 
does not delineate a contribution to the common stock of technical 
knowledge, it fails to escape the purview of the pecuniary and 
therefore should be deemed to lack the particular quid pro quo 
required for a patent grant. This analysis can most meaningfully be 
addressed by looking to the point of novelty or undertaking a 
problem/solution analysis similar to what is performed under many 
foreign patent law regimes in certain patentability contexts. When 
U.S. courts resist such an approach, they only foster confusion and 
abuse.  
VII. GENERAL CONTOURS OF THE NEW THEORY 
A. The Veblen Dichotomy 
Thorstein Veblen introduced what is now commonly referred 
to as the “pecuniary-industrial dichotomy,” the “ceremonial-
technological dichotomy,” the “ceremonial-instrumental 
dichotomy,” or sometimes even simply the “Veblen dichotomy.”215  
[T]he central feature of Veblen’s work . . . was 
                                                                                                             
the subject‑matter of the invention and those technical features which are 
necessary for the definition of the claimed subject‑matter but which, in 
combination, form part of the prior art; (b) a characterising portion, beginning 
with the expression ‘characterised in that’ or ‘characterised by’ and specifying 
the technical features for which, in combination with the features stated under 
sub‑paragraph (a), protection is sought.”).  
215
 O’Hara, supra note 14, at 94. Clarence Ayres restated Veblen’s concept 
as the “ceremonial-technological dichotomy.” RICK TILMAN, THORSTEIN 
VEBLEN & JOHN DEWEY, C. WRIGHT MILLS AND THE GENERIC ENDS OF LIFE 
107 (Rowman & Littlefield 2004). 
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his development and use of the dichotomy between 
business and industry, what his disciples were later 
to call the ‘ceremonial-technological dichotomy’. 
They and Veblen employed it as an analytical 
device, as an approach to the larger problem of 
value in economics and as part of a theory of social 
change. In his usage, the dichotomy was extended 
to include salesmanship as opposed to 
workmanship, free income versus tangible 
performance, individual gain as opposed to 
community serviceability, invidious emulation 
versus technological efficiency, and competitive 
advertising versus the provision of valuable 
information and guidance. To Veblen much of the 
activity that the business community engaged in 
was wasteful and futile, for the profitability of 
market exchange did not necessarily measure its 
social value in achieving the generic ends of life. 
However, he was not adequately specific about 
which pursuits are industrial and which are 
businesslike or which have both traits. Nevertheless, 
it is clear in retrospect that such judgements [sic] 
depend on the meaning assigned by Veblen to 
‘fullness of life, impersonally considered’ which 
was his way of indicating that the ‘generic ends of 
life’ are transcultural in nature and often not served 
by profit-making.216 
This was not a bright-line test in terms of the particular 
industry or businesses involved, but rather dealt with the processes 
and functions involved.217 When sorting processes according to the 
                                                 
216
 Rick Tilman, Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), supra note 13, at 167; see 
also JONATHAN NITZAN & SHIMSHON BICHLER, CAPITAL AS POWER: A STUDY OF 
ORDER AND CREORDER (Routledge 2009); Nitzan, supra note 29, at 169. 
217
 TILMAN supra note 215, at 93–108; see also R.L. Brinkman, Culture in 
Neoinstititional Economics: An Integration of Myrdal and Galbraith Into the 
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dichotomy, “[i]t is a question of the character of the process rather 
than a question of the contrivances employed.”218 Veblen believed 
that the functional character of technology is its application to 
natural forces involving labor, materials and energy: “[K]nowledge 
is useful, or may be made so, by applying it to control of the 
processes in which natural forces are engaged. This employment of 
scientific knowledge for useful ends is technology . . . .”219 
Technology and the machine process220 deal with “impersonal, 
dispassionate insight into the material facts with which mankind 
has to deal.”221 Veblen wrote at length about how he saw the 
“instinct of workmanship” fostering the useful employment of 
science and technology to contribute to the “material well-being” 
and “biological success” of the human race.222 His interest was in 
                                                                                                             
Veblen-Ayres Matrix, 40 AM. J. OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, 401, 402–04 
(1981). 
218
 VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 6. 
219
 VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILISATION, supra note 
29, at 16; see also Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Veblen and Darwinism, 14 INT’L REV. 
OF SOCIOLOGY 343, 344 (2004) (providing that the Darwinism that Veblen 
adopted “means causal explanation, where a cause is understood as necessarily 
involving transfers of matter or energy. Divine, spiritual, miraculous or 
uncaused causes are ruled out. Explanations of outcomes are in terms of 
connected causal sequence.”); see also, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE 
OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF 
AMERICA 231 n.1, 236 (Viking Press 1938) (1923).  
220
 In Veblen’s usage, the “machine process” was a component of 
“technology” separated by a level of abstraction. Schatzberg, supra note 19, at 
503. 
221
 VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION, supra note 
219, at 1.  
222
 VEBLEN, supra note 8, at 25. Veblen saw the instinct of workmanship 
rivaled only by the “parental bent” (with both of those instincts competing with 
the acquisitive instinct); see also Reinert, supra note 18, at 65 (identifying in 
Veblen productive proclivities, and the unproductive instinct of predation); cf., 
e.g., Naomi Klein, How Science Is Telling Us All to Revolt, NEW STATESMAN 
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.newstatesman.com/2013/10/science-says-revolt 
(positioning scientists against financiers when modeling how climate 
catastrophe and possible extinction of the human species might be avoided). 
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productivity gains from labor-and-energy-driven capital.223 The 
functional character of invidious business or pecuniary activity, in 
contrast to industrial activity, is culturally or socially context-
dependent and not generally limited by labor or energy scarcity. 
Much of Veblen’s thinking about engineering in this respect 
showed some affinity with German economists (especially the 
German Historical School) and demonstrated high regard for 
German industrial practices, in which the concept of Technik drew 
a connection between useful, practical skills and knowledge.224 “In 
                                                 
223
 Michael Hudson, Veblen’s Institutionalist Elaboration of Rent Theory, 
Speech given at the Veblen, Capitalism and Possibilities for a Rational 
Economic Order Conference, Istanbul, Turkey (June 6, 2012), available at http:/
/michael-hudson.com/2012/07/veblens-institutionalist-elaboration-of-rent-
theory/; see also Paul N. Goldstene, Veblen's Theory of Value and the Problem 
of Revolution, 6 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 507, 511-16 (1993). 
224
 Robert R. Locke, Reassessing the Basis of Corporate Business 
Performance: Modern Financial Economics’ Profit Control Versus Integrated 
People and Process Improvement, 64 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 110, 110, 115–
20 (2013), available at http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue64/
whole64.pdf. Eric Schatzberg has discussed Veblen’s pivotal role in importing 
the concept of Tecknik to America, and highlighting how subsequent thinkers 
lost much of Veblen’s nuance. Schatzberg, supra note 19, at 487–88; VEBLEN, 
supra note 36, at 181–189. Veblen saw the predominance of “captains of 
industry” over “captains of finance” as key to the rise of imperial Germany 
leading up to World War I. More generally, some of Veblen’s contemporaries 
who shared many theoretical similarities were Werner Sombart and Simon 
Patten. See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 125 (1899) (reviewing SIMON N. PATTEN, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH THOUGHT: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1899)); Thorstein Veblen, Book Review, 11 J. 
POL. ECON. 300 (1903) (reviewing WERNER SOMBART, DER MODERNE 
KAPITALISMUS (1902)); Thorstein Veblen, Book Review, 23 J. POL. ECON. 846 
(1915) (reviewing WERNER SOMBART DER BOURGEOIS: ZUR 
GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MODERNEN WIRTSCHAFTSMENSCHEN (1913)). Veblen’s 
work also reflected in some ways that of Henry George. See, e.g., Jim Horner & 
John Martinez, Thorstein Veblen and Henry George on War, Conflict, and the 
Military: An Institutionalist Connection, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 633 (1997); James 
H. Horner, Seeking Institutionalist Signposts in the Work of Henry George: 
Relevance Often Overlooked, 52 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 247 (1993). 
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Germany the idea of Technik [the combination of Können 
(practical skills and industrial arts) and Wissen (knowledge)] was 
the essence of engineering . . . .”225  
Veblen outlined clear distinctions between “the kind of 
[productive] self-interest which contributes to wealth creation 
from that which constitutes predatory wealth extraction.”226 He 
described the socially and culturally determined monetary gains of 
accumulated wealth and “assets” in contradistinction to 
technological capital. Although the so-called “cumulative 
causation” aspect of his thinking is often disregarded or 
misunderstood,227 he said that pecuniary gains of wealth and 
“assets” “are ‘timeless,’ . . . in so far as the enterprise from which 
they accrue is dissociated from the technological circumstances 
and processes of industry, and only in so far. Technological 
(industrial) procedure, being of the nature of physical causation, is 
subject to the time relation under which causal sequence runs.”228 
That is not to say that business and pecuniary functions do not 
have deep and wide-ranging influence, but their social contingency 
lends them a different character than technology and the machine 
process. In this sense, nontechnological activities can essentially be 
divorced from the causally-linked evolution of the state of the art 
                                                 
225
 Locke, supra note 224, at 110, 115–20.  
226
 Reinert, supra note 18, at 58; HUDSON, supra note 10, at xiv, xviii, 105, 
130, 133, 383, 435 (explaining the financial sector “seeks to make money from 
the economy in an extractive way.  Finance today is acting in a way that de-
industrializes economies, not builds them up.”  “[T]he idea of ‘wealth creation’ 
has come to refer to raising the price of stocks and bonds that represent claims 
on wealth (‘indirect investment’) rather than direct investment in capital 
spending, research and development to increase production.”). 
227
 See Malcolm Rutherford, Veblen's Evolutionary Programme: a Promise 
Unfulfilled, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 463 (1998). 
228
 Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 8, at 129; see also 
VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 37 (describing the machine process by saying “[i]ts 
metaphysics is materialism and its point of view is that of causal sequence”). 
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(in the Darwinian sense).229 Put more simply, technology is 
transcultural, while pecuniary activity is not. Technological 
advance faces different constraints than pecuniary activities, and 
Veblen recognized that such a divergence could lead to various 
price manipulations like over-capitalization (e.g., watered stock) 
and credit bubbles brought about by pecuniary activities, which 
can have disastrous effects on the economy as a whole.230 In the 
practice of patent law, this is often seen with method claims that 
use technology but are directed, at bottom, to only business 
practices that merely direct the benefit of that use without 
overcoming a problem associated with the current state of the 
technological arts.231 Decisions on how to allocate benefits, wealth, 
and economic value are purely social matters of a different 
character than the “matter of fact” (objective) constraints on 
knowledge of cause and effect involved in solving technical 
problems. Allocations of value produce no net gain, they just 
reposition actors within a social matrix (i.e., relative social status 
changes), while advances in technical knowledge have potential to 
provide a net gain in terms of increases in general well-being and 
standards of living. 
Others have articulated similar dichotomies, such as architect, 
engineer, and futurist R. Buckminster Fuller’s “Class-One” and 
                                                 
229
 See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Veblen and Darwinism, 14 INT’L REV. SOC. 
343, 345–48 (2004) (explaining Veblen’s Darwinian views on “cumulative 
causation”); see also Alfred E. Kahn, Fundamental Deficiencies of the American 
Patent Law, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 475, 479 (1940). 
230
 See Wray, supra note 13, at 618. 
231
 Although elsewhere this paper criticizes the use of hypotheticals to test 
patentable subject matter eligibility (such as whether a method could 
hypothetically be performed purely mentally), there is the possibility that a test 
could ask hypothetically whether a patent claim would make sense if placed in a 
different cultural context. For instance, if a patent claim relates to the legal 
obligations associated with deeds to real property, one could ask if the claim 
would present any productive benefit if practiced in another jurisdiction where 
all land is owned by a monarch or the state, or where the “rule against 
perpetuities” does not exist, etc.  
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“Class-Two” evolutionary trending distinction. The former 
represents the “integration of experience-won information” that 
“increase[s] the capacity of humanity at large to cope with the 
exigencies of life” in a way that “accounts for humans’ presence 
on Earth,” while the latter represents “ego-flattering,” “initiative 
taking,” “political reform,” credit taking, “power-structure,” 
“privilege,” and “manipulation”-related activities.232 He used the 
term “ephemeralization” to describe doing more with less through 
technological advancement.233 Fuller’s comments are in a sense a 
mere extension of Veblen’s theories.  
Similar distinctions have been echoed in the realm of legal 
commentary. The Veblen dichotomy was mirrored in some ways 
by an influential 1952 article by patent attorney Robert Coulter, 
which distinguished useful arts as practiced by tradesmen from 
cultural arts that he described to include grammar, logic, rhetoric, 
arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy.234 Likewise, a similar 
approach was suggested more recently by John Thomas, who said:  
By restricting patentable advances to the 
repeatable production or transformation of material 
objects, and excluding subject matter founded upon 
the aesthetic, social observation or personal skill, 
[an] industrial application requirement would 
restore a sense of patentable subject matter that 
matches our sensibilities.235  
Yet Coulter and Thomas’ approaches can be greatly refined 
and bolstered with reference to Veblen’s economics, by tying the 
                                                 
232
 R. BUCKMINSTER FULLER, CRITICAL PATH 229–30 (1981).  
233
 R. BUCKMINSTER FULLER, NINE CHAINS TO THE MOON 276–79 (1938). 
234
 Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 417, 496 (1952). 
235
 John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 7 (1999); see also John R. Thomas, The 
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1142, 1177–84 
(1999).  
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analysis to economic well-being in the real world rather than 
merely alluding to historical traditions and arbitrary customs.236  
Prior judicial decisions have held that a claim cannot carve out 
a portion of an abstract concept for patent protection merely on the 
basis reciting an incidental machine, computer or broad field of 
endeavor.237 Such claims amount to merely reserving a portion of 
the commercial market for an abstract idea (i.e., use of the abstract 
idea in a given technological environment) without regard for any 
technological contribution to public knowledge or restrictions on 
further innovations by others.238 Claims that are “preemptive of a 
fundamental concept or idea that would foreclose innovation” in a 
                                                 
236
 Thomas’ paper on the “post-industrial patent system” makes no 
reference to any of the various sociologists alternatively credited with coining 
the term “post-industrial society,” or to Veblen or any other economists. He 
instead focuses on philosophers of science. Paul W. DeVore, cited by Thomas, 
echoes some views similar to Veblen, nonetheless. Although Thomas refers to 
“restor[ing] a sense of patentable subject matter that matches our sensibilities,” 
and “our long-held sense of the reach of the patent system,” he provides no 
explanations for the economic or cultural bases for those “sensibilities” or 
“long-held sense,” only more philosophical ones. Thomas, The Post-Industrial 
Patent System, supra note 235, at 43–44; Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal 
Professions, supra note 235, at 1142. 
237
 E.g., Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
(citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); see also Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 195, 199–200 
(1889). 
238
 See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid 
pro quo . . . for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public 
from an invention with substantial utility.”); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 
Pet.) 1, 23 (1829) (If an invention is already commonly known and used when 
the patent is sought, “there might be sound reason for presuming, that the 
legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right,” given the absence of a 
“quid pro quo.”); Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1301–02 (2012) (noting how problematic rent seeking is associated with 
preemptive patent claims); MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 
1266,1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
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given area are too abstract to be eligible for patent protection.239 
The problem of preemption is only overcome with a reduction in 
the level of abstraction by tying the inherent pecuniary aspects of a 
patent monopoly (discussed below) to the recitation of productive 
contributions to the general stock of technological knowledge of 
cause-and-effect relationships. Cases on the issue of patent 
eligibility have seen judges wrangle over where such a threshold is 
crossed (or if the threshold is even a meaningful one)240 and have 
set forth many different tests and clarifications that lack 
uniformity.241 But such a threshold could be clearly established 
with reference to the Veblen dichotomy. It is possible to fairly 
consistently translate judicial concern over “abstract ideas” as an 
underlying concern for patent protection on what Veblen called 
“invidious” or “pecuniary” activity, with the level of abstraction 
reduced sufficiently for patent eligibility only when patent claims 
are tied to workmanlike technological activity.242  
B. Economic Surplus and Productivity 
A distinction can be drawn between technological advances 
that can create economic surplus or wealth (which can later be 
disposed of any a variety of ways), and ceremonial, business or 
social endeavors that control economic value or surplus or wealth 
                                                 
239
 Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333; see also Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1301–02; 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 91–92 (1972). 
240
 E.g. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1342, 1353 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (“[T]his court does not define the level of programming complexity 
required before a computer-implemented method can be patent-eligible.”). 
241
 See generally CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3131 (U.S. 
Dec. 6, 2013) (No. 13–298). 
242
 Today it is really only the subset of Federal Circuit judges advocating an 
expansive “coarse filter” approach to patent eligibility who diverge from this 
tenet. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1066 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 
869 (2010). 
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already in existence.243 This was a major feature of Veblen’s 1914 
book, The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial 
Arts, which described transformations in society whereby 
economic surpluses were first created by technological advances 
but then looted, appropriated, and subverted, through war in early 
phases of civilization and then by the sabotage and appropriations 
of the pecuniary business interests in later phases.244 He thought, 
however, that modern technology was so productive that historical 
examples failed to impress the significance of how the 
wastefulness of nonproductive pecuniary activities parasitically 
detracted from general welfare.245 Although Veblen was not the 
                                                 
243
 Dugger, Veblen’s Radical Theory of Social Evolution, supra note 15, at 
651; RICK TILMAN, A VEBLEN TREASURY: FROM LEISURE CLASS TO WAR, 
PEACE, AND CAPITALISM xxiv (Sharpe 1993); STEPHEN EDGELL, VEBLEN IN 
PERSPECTIVE: HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT 77 (Sharpe 2001); O’Hara, supra note 
14.; Reinert, supra note 18, at 58–69 (“A major achievement of Enlightenment 
economics, on which I argue Veblen builds, was to separate the economic 
activities where the vested interests contributed to the common good—where 
wealth-production was a by-product of self-interest and greed—and where greed 
produced no such beneficial effects.”); Mitchell, supra note 15, at 392; Dugger, 
Veblen and Kropotkin on Human Evolution, supra note 15, at 978; cf. JOHN 
RAE, STATEMENT OF SOME NEW PRINCIPLES ON THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY, EXPOSING THE FALLACIES OF THE SYSTEM OF FREE TRADE, AND OF 
SOME OTHER DOCTRINES MAINTAINED IN THE “WEALTH OF NATIONS” (1834), 
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=-
4TXAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false; Brewer, supra 
note 13; see also Schatzberg, supra note 19, at 499 (“[I]n essence [Veblen’s 
expressed conflict between “business” and “industry”] centered on the 
distinction between wasteful and productive tendencies in human evolution.”).   
244
 Sociologist C. Wright Mills, for one, elaborated on the ceremonial-
technological distinction in the context of industrial relations in later historical 
phases, focusing on the ways in which industrial managers deal with workers to 
achieve ceremonial ends rather than technological ones. TILMAN supra note 215, 
at 107.  
245
 VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 36, 64–65 (“In so far as the gains of . . . 
unproductive occupations are of a substantial character, they come out of the 
aggregate product of other occupations in which the various classes of the 
community engage. . . . But owing to the very high productive efficiency of the 
modern mechanical industry, the margin available for wasteful occupations and 
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first or last economic theorist to discuss concepts that surround 
surplus value, he went further than those before him in illustrating 
the relationship of social institutions to the control of such value.246 
His particular emphasis on the control of surplus to bolster social 
status represents a significant departure from (if not an implicit 
refutation of) Say’s law—“supply creates its own demand”—
which is the foundation of much of neoclassical economics and the 
equilibrium theories that Veblen despised yet dominate orthodox 
economics to this day.247 This also allowed Veblen to completely 
abandon the labor theory of value relied upon by classical 
                                                                                                             
wasteful expenditures is very great.”); see also Hudson, supra note 223 (“It was 
left to Veblen to deal with the rentiers’ increasingly dominant yet corrosive role, 
extracting their wealth by imposing overhead charges on the rest of society.”); 
HUDSON, supra note 10, at xiv, xviii, 105, 130, 133, 383, 435 (“The banking 
system has been decoupled from the real economy.  The financial sector’s 
independent and self-referential expansion path is independent of the ‘real’ 
economy’s surplus, or its ability to support this overhead.  Financial returns are 
made in extractive ways, as a subtrahend from the surplus created by labor and 
tangible capital, rather than funding capital accumulation.  Productivity is raised 
by working labor harder and exploiting it more, not by technology.”  “The 
banker’s ‘product’ is society’s debt overhead.”). 
246
 Veblen drew this long-established concept from classical economics.  
HUDSON, supra note 10, at 19-203 (summarizing relevant classical economic 
theory, including that of surplus value). An important early example was 
François Quesnay of the French physiocrat school, whose TABLEAU 
ÉCONOMIQUE (1759) outlined economic interactions between “productive,” 
“proprietary,” and “sterile” classes. Quesnay, however, emphasized agriculture 
over industry, for largely chauvinistic reasons given the greater role of 
agriculture in France as compared to England, France’s chief rival at the time.  
247
 Adil H. Mouhammed, Veblen and Keynes: On the Economic Theory of 
the Capitalist Economy, 155 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 594, 599–
600 (1999); see also Debunking Economics, Part VIII: Macroeconomics, or 
Applied Microeconomics?, UNLEARNING ECON. (Aug. 26, 2012), http://
unlearningeconomics.wordpress.com/2012/08/26/debunking-economics-part-
viii-macroeconomics-or-applied-microeconomics (citing STEVE KEEN, 
DEBUNKING ECONOMICS : THE NAKED EMPEROR DETHRONED? (2011)). Contra 
Say’s Law, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say%27s_Law (last 
modified Mar. 17, 2014). 
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economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo.248 He instead 
posited value as being pecuniary (i.e., based on money), and in 
turn saw money as being endogenous—a social creation—with 
humans engaging in production to acquire money as a 
representation of social status and power.249 The late sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu, in championing a return to the challenge put forth 
by institutional economics, noted that it was Veblen who “long ago 
enunciated the effects of structure, or of position within a structure, 
on the definition of needs and hence on demand.”250 In this way, 
Veblen represented a singular voice on the fundamental economic 
question of how “value” is conceptualized. 
Importantly, Veblen’s dichotomy “breaks the link between 
production and distribution.”251 In doing so, a novel theory of 
economic value is introduced, albeit somewhat obliquely.252 
Distribution of socially-recognized assets had a different character 
than the industrial activities that provide the means of production. 
It is the existential notion of absurdity (Veblen instead preferred 
the term opacity) that anchors Veblen’s argument for 
differentiating productive and unproductive functions in economic 
                                                 
248
 O’Hara, supra note 14, at 90–93; Dugger, supra note 13, at 1; see also 
Labor Theory of Value, WIKIPEDIA https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Labor_theory_of_value (last modified Mar. 11, 2014). 
249
 G. Parker Foster & B. Ranson, Thorstein Veblen on Money and 
Production, 9 ECON. ET SOCIETIES 221 (1987), reprinted in 2 THORSTEIN 
VEBLEN: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 444–49 (John Cunningham Wood ed., 
Routledge 1993) (noting how Veblen’s thinking here anticipated that of John 
Maynard Keynes); L. Randall Wray, Endogenous Money: Structuralist and 
Horizontalist 4 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 512), available at http://
www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_512.pdf.  
250
 BOURDIEU, supra note 40, at 211. 
251
 TILMAN, supra note 215, at 97 (citing Thorstein Veblen, Industrial and 
Pecuniary Employments, 3 PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
ASSOCIATION 190, 215–16 (1901)). 
252
 Paul N. Goldstene, Veblen's Theory of Value and the Problem of 
Revolution, 6 INT’L J. POL. CULTURE & SOC’Y 507, 511–16 (1993). 
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analysis,253 and likewise can anchor an argument against extending 
patent protection to unproductive functions.  
C. Asset Relationships 
Veblen noted the different characters of tangible and intangible 
assets, on the one hand, and capital goods on the other.254 Both are 
ways in which products and processes are capitalized. A given 
item may have characteristics of both, in varying degrees. Tangible 
assets are rather self-explanatory, yet intangible ones raise deeper 
issues. Letters patents were noted in his analysis for their character 
as intangible assets, due to their special legal status that grants the 
patent holder a right to exclude others from practicing the claimed 
invention.  
The tangible assets capitalize the preferential 
use of technological, industrial expedients,—
expedients of production, dealing with the facts of 
brute nature under the laws of physical cause and 
effect,—this preferential use being secured by the 
ownership of material articles employed in the 
processes in which these expedients are put into 
effect. The intangible assets capitalize the 
preferential use of certain facts of human nature—
habits, propensities, beliefs, aspirations, 
necessities—to be dealt with under the 
psychological laws of human motivation; this 
                                                 
253
 In Veblen’s idea of blind drift, which is the substance of his arguments 
involving the absurd, “[h]istory contains no meaning save what humans impart 
to it.” Dugger, supra note 13, at 1. 
254
 “[T]angible assets, commonly so called, capitalize the processes of 
production, while intangible assets, so called, capitalize certain expedients and 
processes of acquisition, not productive of wealth, but affecting only its 
distribution.” Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 8, at 117; see also 
STEVE KEEN, DEBUNKING ECONOMICS - REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION: THE 
NAKED EMPEROR DETHRONED? 142–57 (2011) (explaining how “capital” should 
not really be used interchangeably to describe both “a sum of money” and “a 
collection of machinery,” though some economists confusingly do so). 
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preferential use being secured by custom, as in the 
case of old-fashioned good-will, by legal 
assignment, as in patent or copyright, by ownership 
of the instruments of production, as in the case of 
industrial monopolies.255  
Further, as to the character of a patent right 
considered as an asset[.] The invention or 
innovation covered by the patent right is a 
contribution to the common stock of technological 
proficiency[.] It may be (immediately) serviceable 
to the community at large, or it may not;—eg, a 
cash register, a bank-check punch, a street-car fare 
register, a burglar-proof safe, and the like are of no 
immediate service to the community at large, but 
serve only a pecuniary use to their users[.] But, 
whether the innovation is useful or not, the patent 
right, as an asset, has no (immediate) usefulness at 
large, since its essence is the restriction of the 
usufruct of the innovation to the patentee[.] 
Immediately and directly the patent right must be 
considered a detriment to the community at large, 
since its purport is to prevent the community from 
making use of the patented innovation, whatever 
may be its ulterior beneficial effects or its ethical 
justification.256  
Key to these insights is the relationship to the traditional quid 
pro quo of the patent grant.257 Every patent has at least theoretical 
                                                 
255
 Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 8, at 123–24 (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
256
 Id. at 115 n.1 (emphasis added). This resembles a Jeffersonian view on 
the value of patents.  
257
 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223–24 (2002) (discussing the 
foundation of patent right—and copyright—in a quid pro quo framework); 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, 
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value as an intangible asset.258 This is fundamentally a social 
(pecuniary) value, as it rests on social norms that give weight to 
the rule of law establishing exclusionary rights in patents. This is 
also the basis for the incentive theory on which the U.S. patent 
laws have rested—rightly or wrongly—from their first 
enactment.259 Public disclosure of an invention is “the price paid 
for the exclusivity secured” by the patent monopoly given to an 
inventor.260 For instance, in parallel with Veblen’s critiques, 
economist Alfred Marshall distinguished temporally-limited 
“quasi-rents,” associated with patent grants as reward for 
innovation, from predatory, unearned rents.261 Yet the subject 
                                                                                                             
142 (2001) (“The disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of 
the right to exclude.’” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 
484 (1974))); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 
161 (1989) (“the quid pro quo of substantial creative effort required by the 
federal [patent] statute”); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The 
basic quid pro quo ... for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by 
the public from an invention with substantial utility.”); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 
U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829) (If an invention is already commonly known and used 
when the patent is sought, “there might be sound reason for presuming, that the 
legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right,” given the absence of a 
“quid pro quo.”); see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) 
(“[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both 
the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, 
in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”); MySpace, 
Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., 
dissenting). 
258
 This distinction is lost in some economic treatments of patents, or at 
least not completely articulated. See, e.g., Irwin, supra note 9, at 814, 820 
(noting that “economic good” and “social good” are not coextensive as is 
sometimes assumed). 
259
 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 229 
(1964). 
260
 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 216. 
261
 Hudson, supra note 223; Quasi-rent, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quasi-rent (last updated Aug. 10, 2013). It does bear 
mentioning here that Veblen was, in general, critical of Alfred Marshall. The 
basic idea is that although patents are about rent-seeking, the quid pro quo of 
patent grants balances the inherent rent-seeking aspect against a public benefit 
90
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matter of a given patent claim may or may not relate to tools, real 
production, and technological knowledge of cause-and-effect. This 
correlates directly to the question of patent subject matter 
eligibility and goes to the balance struck by the patent laws 
between rewarding inventive activity, on the one hand, and 
conveying creative monopolies, on the other.262 Some, like Joseph 
Schumpeter, tend to assume that the latter always promotes the 
former, while others, like Veblen, tend to see possible divergences.  
It might be said that a patent claim that does not recite a 
contribution with a sufficient relationship to “technological 
proficiency” or “usefulness at large” should not be subject matter 
eligible, because it represents merely a naked pecuniary benefit 
and therefore is about “getting something for nothing” or a “free 
lunch.” The point, along Veblenian lines, is to identify and limit 
zero-sum pecuniary rent-seeking. “Any and all greed and self-
interest is obviously not compatible with public interest, only the 
self-interest which increases rather than diminishes the size of the 
economic pie.”263 This is a more economic-centered approach than 
the “machine-or-transformation” test applied in patent law,264 yet 
also the opposite of the tacit economic rationale applied by some 
judges to the analysis of patent eligibility today.265 All patents are 
                                                                                                             
for a temporally-limited period.  Veblen said that discussions of “rent” or 
“quasi-rent” were “of great theoretical weight.” VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 201, 
n. 6.  
262
 DAVID F. NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM 84-109 (Knopf 1977). 
263
 Reinert, supra note 18, at 58, 62 (noting a need to “separate the kind of 
self-interest which contributes to wealth creation from that which constitutes 
predatory wealth extraction. In other words productive self-interest or good 
greed must be separated from bad greed . . . . Thorstein Veblen’s work was the 
one making the clearest separation between the human proclivities that produce 
– respectively – good and bad greed.”).  
264
 See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MPEP § 2106 (8th 
ed. Rev. 8, Aug. 2012). 
265
 Irwin, supra note 9, at 814 (“Today, the standards [for patent eligibility] 
encompass any product of human action that creates economic value. If 
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intangible assets, but when a patent claim fails to extend beyond 
the essentially social realm of intangible assets and fails to provide 
a contribution to the common stock of technological proficiency, 
then subject matter eligibility should be deemed lacking. A patent 
claim that relates only to intangible assets is a naked grant of 
economic monopoly power, in a zero-sum sense, without a 
concomitant contribution to the repeatable human mastery of 
nature (i.e., applied physics and engineering).266  
When courts criticize patent claims as being to “abstract ideas” 
because those claims have only incidental connections to 
machines, etc.,267 it often is because the patent applicant or owner 
                                                                                                             
something has value in use or exchange . . . it now constitutes patentable subject 
matter.”) (internal citations omitted). In many ways, Irwin’s analysis is along 
Veblenian lines, by criticizing the refusal of neoclassical economics to recognize 
distinctions between productive and unproductive activities or the endogenous 
and social nature of economic valuation, and by rejecting the distinction drawn 
in some economic schools between exchange value and use value. Compare id., 
with BOURDIEU, supra note 40. The “economic” rationale summarized by Irwin 
also rejects the Enlightenment ideal that private greed is tolerated only when it 
promotes the public good, and instead endorses any private gain without 
consideration of the public good—making such analyses blind to whether the 
asserted private gain came at the expense of another (a zero-sum result). See 
Reinert, supra note 18, at 58, 62. This is a turn toward what the Lowell Mill 
Girls’ once criticized as the “new spirit of the age: gain wealth, forgetting all but 
self.”  
266
 This is why Veblen could mention “letters patent” and “letters of 
marque” in the same breath when discussing the preferential benefits of 
immaterial wealth. Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 8, at 113–14; 
see also Zuege, supra note 64, at 21. Veblen drew a distinction between 
serviceability “at large” and serviceability merely to a user. The “usefulness” of 
a patent that covers a known process may be tremendous for the patent holder in 
the self-interested, intangible asset sense, due to the patent holder’s ability to 
levy what amounts to a quasi-extortionate tax on businesses relying on the 
process (i.e., rent-seeking). But while such a raw transfer of wealth is “useful” to 
the patent holder accruing the benefits of such a transfer, it is of no use to 
society writ large, which gains no step forward in repeatable efforts of applied 
physics and engineering. 
267
 See, e.g., Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 
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is merely seeking to surrender a part of the monopoly power that 
“capitalize[s] the preferential use of certain facts of human nature-
habits, propensities, beliefs, aspirations, necessities” (usually the 
part least profitable to him or her) without tethering him- or herself 
to any particular “contribution to the common stock of 
technological proficiency.” The patent applicant/owner may be 
willing to accept a smaller monopoly, but such argument should be 
deemed irrelevant. The question that should be asked is how the 
patent applicant or patentee has claimed a contribution to the 
“common stock of technological proficiency” to justify any 
monopoly grant at all.268 Has a given “inventor” enabled human 
beings to repeatably achieve a result in the (transcultural) natural 
world that humans were unable to previously accomplish?269 Or 
has he or she merely found a way to exert influence in a social 
matrix, possibly by seeking a patent monopoly—however large or 
small—to reserve an entire field of endeavor to him- or herself? 
The former can be economically productive, while the latter is 
invidious and nonproductive.270 A contribution of a nontechnical 
                                                                                                             
450 U.S. 175, 191 – 92 n.14 (1981)); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Marchand v. Emken, 132 U.S. 195, 199 
(1889).  
268
 Cf. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 
2012 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“A patentee does not uphold his end of [the patent 
system’s] ‘bargain’ if he seeks broad monopoly rights without a concomitant 
contribution to the existing body of scientific and technical knowledge.”).  
“Technological progress reduces the value of physical capital in place.”  
HUDSON, supra note 10, at 312. 
269
 See VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 37 (“The discipline of the machine 
process . . . inculcates a habit of apprehending and explaining facts in terms of 
material cause and effect.”). 
270
 Even Ronald Coase, from the so-called “freshwater” neo-classical 
school of economics, had to concede—albeit tucked into a footnote—a very 
Veblenian point that (for a parallel situation involving broadcast 
communications licenses), “A waste of resources may result when the criteria 
used by courts to delimit rights result in resources being employed solely to 
establish a claim.” R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. 
LAW & ECONOMICS 1, 27 n.54 (1959). To the extent that Coase attempted to 
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and nonproductive disclosure as to business methods or the like 
should therefore be seen as insufficient to satisfy the quid pro quo 
of a patent monopoly. Such business method patent claims amount 
to no more than piling the pecuniary on top of the pecuniary, 
without crossing over to the realm of nonpecuniary technological 
proficiency.  
D. Equal Access  
When the U.S. patent system was first established, in the initial 
constitutional authorization and through its early administration, it 
represented both a continuance and a divergence from the British 
patent system on which it was largely based. The constitutional 
clause “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” continued to 
give inventors (and authors) a central role,271 but the United States 
went further in making its patent system more egalitarian than the 
system in England.272 The early administration of the patent system 
in the United States made patents available to a much wider set of 
socioeconomic classes than in England, which had historically 
tended to preserve upper class privilege through royal grants of 
                                                                                                             
merge institutional economics with marginal analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880–1960, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 863, 875 (2010), he was rejecting the basis of Veblen’s program.  
271
 The role of inventors was established in the British Statute of 
Monopolies of 1624. This has carried through as a bedrock principle of America 
patent law. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. ___, No. 09-1159, Slip Op. at *6 (U.S., June 6, 
2011) (“Although much in intellectual property law has changed in the 220 
years since the first [American] Patent Act, the basic idea that inventors have the 
right to patent their inventions has not.”). 
272
 It scarcely bears mentioning that the United States was still lacking in 
egalitarian practices by modern standards, given that slavery was protected, 
women denied the right to vote, etc. But the trend was toward increasing 
egalitarianism.  
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monopolies.273 Moreover, the practice of the “useful arts” was 
from antiquity through the American revolutionary period viewed 
as the province of lower classes.274 Reciting “useful arts” as a 
constitutional limitation on patent grants carries a significant social 
meaning, linking patent monopolies to the “vulgar” workmanlike 
activities of lower classes. Yet as Veblen later articulated, things 
like privilege and monopoly (including patent monopolies) are 
connected to the pecuniary interests of the leisure and business 
classes—those who typically see themselves as above the sort of 
“workmanship” associated with the useful arts.  
In these respects, the American patent system represented a 
relatively egalitarian convergence of upper and lower class 
interests.275 Veblen’s discussion of intangible asset capitalization 
                                                 
273
 B. Zorina Khan, Intellectual Property and Economic Development: 
Lessons from American and European History, BRITISH COMM. INT. PROP. 
RIGHTS (London, 2002), available at http://network.idlo.int/Publications/
Khan%20Z.%20-
%20Intellectual%20Property%20and%20Economic%20Development,%20Less
ons%20from%20History.pdf; B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 
Institutions and Technological Growth During Early Economic Development: 
Evidence from the Great Inventors of the United States, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 395, 
1790–1930 (2004) (noting, inter alia, that early U.S. patents were less restricted 
to inventors with “elite” backgrounds than in Britain during the same era, and 
early U.S. patent system fees were a fraction of those in Britain); see also 
Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American Patent 
System: How Well Do the Idea and Implementation of Patents Mesh With the 
Aims of a Democratic Society?, 71 AM. SCIENTIST 500 (1983); Irwin, supra note 
9, at 796–97. 
274
 Leo Marx, Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, 51 
TECH. & CULTURE 561, 573 (2010). 
275
 Chris Dent has written about how the British Statute of Monopolies 
represented a political compromise between essentially different class interests, 
and was emblematic of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. In this 
context, the Statute of Monopolies eliminated patents in areas other than for 
invention. Chris Dent, ‘Generally Inconvenient’: The 1624 Statute of 
Monopolies as Political Compromise, 33 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 415 (2009); 
see also MAX LOUIS KENT, THE BRITISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE SPIRIT OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE SOCIETY FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF 
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through patents implicitly recognizes that convergence.276 Yet, 
recent expansions of patent subject matter eligibility threaten to 
erase this contextual grounding.  
By opening patentability to the domains of invidious pecuniary 
interests—like those of the FIRE sector—the strict connection to 
the lowly “useful arts” is broken and the egalitarian class 
convergence embedded in the U.S. patent system is denigrated. 
This harkens back to the pre-Statue of Monopolies British system 
that tended toward monopoly grants to protect the privileges of 
vested interests.277 The seeming regression to the economic 
conditions of “post-industrial feudalism” discussed above carries 
with it an urge to shift social institutions as well, pushing patent 
law institutions back the pre-Enlightenment era when they 
encompassed naked grants of privilege, unmoored from the bounds 
of the useful arts.278 While criticizing the underlying views that 
rely on a labor theory of value, Veblen discussed how the Western 
European (and specifically English) view of ownership, which had 
                                                                                                             
ARTS, MANUFACTURES AND COMMERCE (1754–1815) 215–22 (2008). In the 
Veblenian view, the ways in which feudal privileges were both preserved and 
limited as evidenced by the political compromise of the Statute of Monopolies, 
and then carried over in part to American patent law, is of particular interest.  
276
 Veblen very much wrote about social shifts in balances of power, and 
was in some respects lamenting how egalitarian ideals from the Enlightenment 
era were being lost in America at the dawn of the Twentieth Century. 
277
 Thomas Ewing, The American Patent System, in CENTENNIAL 
CELEBRATION OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: BEING A COMPLETE 
SUMMARY OF ALL THE SPEECHES & DATA OF THE BANQUET & PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE ONE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM 6 (U.S. 
Gov. Printing Office, 1937); Dent, supra note 275, at 443 (noting that patents 
were sometimes granted to someone other than the inventor); Allen Nard & 
Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia, 2 
REV. L. & ECON. 223, 258–90 (2006). 
278
 This is part of what Veblen means when he distinguishes the causal 
sequence of technology from the evolution of pecuniary institutions—the latter 
can ebb and flow while technological knowledge doesn’t. For a discussion of the 
influence of Enlightenment thought on the question of patentability, see Irwin, 
supra note 9, at 785–96.  
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carried forward to the modern age, first arose during the era of 
“handicraft and petty trade” from the theories of people like John 
Locke, and dealt with ownership claims arising from productive 
work.279 This supplanted a view from medieval (feudal) times 
when ownership was premised on social standing (the divine rights 
of kings, hereditary privilege, etc.).280 Where Veblen went beyond 
Enlightenment thinkers like Locke, was in his exposition of the 
industrial-pecuniary dichotomy to more clearly distinguish 
productive activity from unproductive activity during a more 
modern age of mechanized industry, and in rejecting an economic 
value theory premised exclusively on one factor like labor. In 
present circumstances, opening patent eligibility to business 
methods and the like allows pecuniary interests to exert further 
control over the economy without interfacing with the lowly realm 
of the useful arts, turning the conception of patent rights back to 
the period before the Enlightenment and before the Statute of 
Monopolies set the stage for Enlightenment thinkers like Locke. 
VIII. EXPLORING SOCIAL ASPECTS FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY 
ANALYSIS IN A VEBLENIAN FRAMEWORK 
A. The Nature of Pecuniary Activities 
If a Veblenian dichotomy is to be applied to patent subject 
matter eligibility questions, it is important to understand the 
invidious social nature of pecuniary activities. Veblen saw 
financial securities instruments and real estate as the two chief 
examples (though certainly not the only examples) of pecuniary 
business activities that lacked serviceability at large.281  
                                                 
279
 VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 71–82. 
280
 Id. at 75–77. 
281
 He also frequently mentioned advertising and sales as privately 
benefitting business without corresponding serviceability at large. Id. at 52–55 
(“The great end of consistent advertising is to establish such differential 
monopolies resting on popular conviction.”). Compare id., with Graeber, supra 
note 57. Moreover, he saw gambling and games of chance as also lacking 
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Of these strictly economic activities that are 
lucrative without necessarily being serviceable to 
the community, the greater part are to be classed as 
“business.” Perhaps the largest and most obvious 
illustration of these legitimate business 
employments is afforded by the speculator in 
securities. By way of further illustration may be 
mentioned the extensive and varied business of real-
estate men (land-agents) engaged in the purchase 
and sale of property for speculative gain or for a 
commission; so, also, the closely related business of 
promoters and boomers of other than real-estate 
ventures; as also attorneys, brokers, bankers, and 
the like, although the work of these latter will more 
obviously bear interpretation in terms of social 
serviceability. The traffic of these business men 
shades off insensibly from that of the bona fide 
speculator who has no ulterior end of industrial 
efficiency to serve, to that of the captain of industry 
or entrepreneur as conventionally set forth in the 
economic manuals.  
The characteristic in which these business 
employments resemble one another, and in which 
they differ from the mechanical occupations as well 
as from other non-economic employments, is that 
they are concerned primarily with the phenomena of 
value—with exchange or market values and with 
purchase and sale—and only indirectly and 
secondarily, if at all, with mechanical processes. 
What holds the interest and guides and shifts the 
attention of men within these employments is the 
main chance. These activities begin and end within 
                                                                                                             
serviceability and fundamentally based on predatory instincts rather than 
scientific matter-of-fact knowledge. See generally VEBLEN, supra note 10, at 
276–78, 282. 
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what may broadly be called “the higgling of the 
market”. Of the industrial employments, in the 
stricter sense, it may be said, on the other hand, that 
they begin and end outside the higgling of the 
market. Their proximate aim and effect is the 
shaping and guiding of material things and 
processes. Broadly, they may be said to be primarily 
occupied with the phenomena of material 
serviceability, rather than with those of exchange 
value. They are taken up with the phenomena which 
make the subject matter of Physics and the other 
material sciences.282  
Early on Veblen drew this distinction between invidious 
“pecuniary” activities, which tended to function in the realm of 
pricing and socially contingent value judgments, from those of 
industry, which were noninvidious and matter-of-fact issues of 
efficiency, and he carried the idea forward through his later work. 
Indeed, he used the term “price system” to refer generally to the 
endogenous (and socially contingent) nature of economic value 
determinations, as distinct from the practical and useful qualities of 
workmanlike engineering activity.283  
First, take “inventions” for financial securities operations and 
practices. These are generally a product of confidence and 
euphoria, and are tied to particular social contexts. Economist John 
Kenneth Galbraith (a noted adherent of Veblen’s theories) later 
said that “financial operations do not lend themselves to 
innovation.”284 Rather, “[a]ll financial innovation involves, in one 
                                                 
282
 Thorstein Veblen, Industrial and Pecuniary Employments, 2 PUB. AM. 
ECON. ASS’N, 190, 204–05 (1901), available at https://archive.org/details/jstor-
2485814. 
283
 See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE 
SYSTEM (1921). 
284
 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
EUPHORIA 19 (Penguin Books 1993); see also VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 103–
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form or another, the creation of debt secured in greater or lesser 
adequacy by real assets.”285 Finance often revolves around 
“speculative” activities, which involve “changing prices of goods 
which have already been produced, rather than . . . the production 
of new goods and services.”286 In this way recently reported 
“productivity gains” in the U.S. economy have often really 
“involved control of government and cultural attitudes, not 
technology as most people understand the term.”287 The high-
volume, nearly instantaneous computerized securities trading 
undertaken by financial traders known as “quants,”288 for instance, 
tends to look much like a game of misleading competitors 
(especially other quants) in intention in order to make speculative 
profits off zero-sum arbitrage.289 In some ways, the “quants” 
simply deployed a computerized Keynesian beauty contest, the 
classic example given by economist John Maynard Keynes, of 
economic activities being less about objective fact or individual 
opinion than of gauging public perceptions within a social 
                                                                                                             
04, (“[A]ll advances made by banking houses or by other creditors in a like case, 
. . . all these ‘advances’ go to increase the ‘capital’ of which business men have 
the disposal; but for the material purposes of industry, taken in the aggregate, 
they are purely fictitious items. . . . Funds of whatever character are a pecuniary 
fact, not an industrial one; they serve the distribution of the control of industry 
only, not its materially productive work.”). 
285
 GALBRAITH, supra note 284; see also Michael Hudson, Wall Street's 
Power Grab, COUNTERPUNCH (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.counterpunch.org/
2010/01/19/wall-street-s-power-grab. Similar views appear regularly in the 
popular press. E.g., Matt Taibbi, Looting the Pension Funds, ROLLING STONE 
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/looting-the-
pension-funds-20130926. 
286
 Reinert, supra note 18, at 57, 66. 
287
 Schaefer, supra note 58 (quoting Michael Hudson). 
288
 For an overview of “quants,” see SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS 
(2010).  
289
 Pam Martens, Inside the Flash Crash Report, COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 4, 
2010), http://www.counterpunch.org/2010/10/04/inside-the-flash-crash-report. 
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context.290 Taken to the absurd, this is very much like the battle of 
wits between Vizzini (played by Wallace Shawn) and The Man in 
Black (played by Cary Elwes) in the movie The Princess Bride in 
which two men compete to the death as one tries to select a wine 
chalice to drink from that is free from poison—noting of course 
Vizzini’s attempt to deceive the Man in Black with distraction and 
a surreptitious maneuver.291  
Another, closely related aspect is to avoid regulation, that is, to 
circumvent legal restrictions on capital flow.292 In essence, 
“financial innovation” for financial instruments and trading can be 
generalized as variations in leverage in such instruments and 
transaction, and in the manipulation of balance sheets through 
accounting practices. While these may admit a certain 
accomplishment and personal skill, it is a game of confidence. And 
confidence games are social ones. Persons achieving such financial 
accomplishments have certainly expended effort to do so, but it 
remains difficult to see how such effort bears any relationship to 
the ways productive innovation has been recognized in traditional 
                                                 
290
 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST 
AND MONEY (1936); see also Keynesian Beauty Contest, WIKIPEDIA, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keynesian_beauty_contest (last updated June 7, 2013). 
291
 THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Twentieth Century Fox 1987). 
292
 HARVEY, supra note 67, at 99–100 (“One of the purposes of this 
innovation wave was to avoid regulation and to create new arenas in which the 
capital surpluses could be profitably deployed in ‘free’ (that is, unregulated) 
markets without constraint.”); James K. Galbraith, The Final Death (and Next 
Life) of Keynes, Keynote Lecture to 5th Annual “Dijon” Conference on Post 
Keynesian Economics, Copenhagen, Denmark (May 13, 2011), http://
www.zcommunications.org/the-final-death-and-next-life-of-keynes-by-james-k-
galbraith (discussing, in the context of the work of Thorstein Veblen and John 
Commons, the use of technology by finance “for the purpose of breaking down 
and evading the law” and that volumes of recent financial vehicles are hyper-
vulnerable to fraud). The argument that patents that restrict this sort of activity 
might be to the public benefit is not pursued here. See generally Christopher A. 
Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 921 (2010). 
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industrial sectors.293 These take on something more like factors of 
sociopolitical action rather than of technological progress, because 
society at large stands to gain nothing at all.  
Next, take real estate. The domain of real estate is really about 
legal rights to territory, and residential real estate at least is 
generally a matter of formalities and transactions in establishing 
claims to particular space. Investment in real estate tends toward 
being speculative, and can divert the use of loan credit away from 
productive employment in industry.294  
The key to understand Veblen and indeed, the 
Reform Era, is to analyze land rent, and how urban 
real estate speculation was becoming not only the 
fastest way to get rich, but also the major customer 
of banking and high finance. . . . Veblen became 
justly famous for describing small towns (and by 
logical extension, big cities) as real estate 
promotion projects, trying to get the proverbial 
“something for nothing.” He described America’s 
rapid urbanization as a great real estate game—what 
today is called a zero-sum game in which one 
party’s winnings are another’s loss.295  
Commenting on the sale of Veblen’s former home, Professor 
Sidney Plotkin noted, “He understood that real estate was an 
                                                 
293
 Indeed, most statistics compiled on research and development and 
innovation do not include financial products. Robert M. Hunt, Ten Years After: 
What Are the Effects of Business Method Patents in Financial Services?, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA BUSINESS REVIEW 21, 27 (3rd 




 See, e.g., VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 102–03. 
295
 Michael Hudson, The Social Economics of Thorstein Veblen, EH.NET 
(Oct. 23, 2012), available at http://michael-hudson.com/2012/10/the-social-
economics-of-thorstein-veblen/; see also VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 64–65 
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exercise in inflated values that could vanish in a split second.”296 
Pierre Bourdieu’s landmark study of the French single-family real 
estate market later demonstrated how real estate transactions were 
influenced by a structural field, that is to say a “space of possibles” 
open to economic actors.297 Much as Veblen discussed “vested 
interests,” Bourdieu concludes that “[t]he forces of the field orient 
the dominant towards strategies whose end is the perpetuation or 
reinforcement of their domination.”298 Again, like Veblen, 
Bourdieu noted that “technological capital” plays a crucial role, but 
only when combined with other forms of capital.299 It is those 
nontechnological aspects that come into play when considering 
patenting related to real estate—principally the patenting of 
methods for conducting real estate transactions and handling 
associated securities. Bourdieu emphasized how the nature of 
single-family home sales revolved around marketing and sales 
efforts intended to convince buyers to live further from city centers 
than they would otherwise choose, to feel as if they have purchased 
a “traditionally built” home that in fact is made with “industrial” 
pre-fab methods, and to commit to a purchase above resale value. 
                                                 
296
 Patricia Leight Brown, An Inconspicuous Consumption Yields, at Last, 
to Market Forces, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/
09/national/09menlo.html. 
297
 BOURDIEU, supra note 40, at 194–195; see also Anna Leander, Pierre 
Bourdieu on Economics, 8 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 344, 347 (2001) (“[I]t is 
precisely the formation of the rules of the game, of interests and of identities that 
gives shape to social identity.”). Bourdieu’s economic field theory is akin to 
Einstein’s general theory of relativity in physics, in so much as the specific 
weapons or strengths of economic entities in a structural field exert weight in 
that field apart from any direct intervention or manipulation by that entity, much 
like the way gravity is explained by Einstein not as a force acting upon discrete 
bodies as in Newtonian physics but as a characteristic of the curvature of space-
time as a result of the physical reality of space-time being represented as force-
free continuous functions of independent variables. See Albert Einstein, On the 
Generalized Theory of Gravitation, 182 SCI. AM. 13, 15-16 (April 1950), 
reprinted in IDEAS AND OPINIONS 341–56 (Bonanza 1988). 
298
 BOURDIEU, supra note 40, at 202. 
299
 Id. at 203. 
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Bourdieu also emphasized how the nature of single-family home 
sales revolved around cultural and legal contexts such as 
government support for private mortgage loans over public 
housing.300 Here it might also be worth considering a character 
from novelist Sinclair Lewis: “[h]is name was George F. Babbitt. 
He was forty-six years old now, in April, 1920, and he made 
nothing in particular, neither butter nor shoes nor poetry, but he 
was nimble in the calling of selling houses for more than people 
could afford to pay.”301 Patents involving real estate are likely to 
revolve around customs that govern transaction protocols, in a 
constant interaction with the social peculiarities of the agents 
involved in sales, particularly the “effect of trusting closeness or 
hostile aloofness.”302 For instance, adding computers to the 
transactions merely increases the aloofness. These are social and 
pecuniary activities, part of the “higgling of the market,” and bear 
no relationship to mastering the cause-and-effect nature of the 
physical world.  
Allowing patents on what amount to social relations is 
problematic. While there is much discussion of whether business 
methods should be patent-eligible, a more pointed question is 
whether claims drawn to a business model, unmoored from 
technological constraints, should be patent-eligible. Business 
models fall into the realm of social relations, and perhaps can be 
analyzed as such more readily and objectively than assessing how 
substantially or meaningfully the model relates to tangible objects 
like general-purpose computers. This question is important though, 
because the latitude to seek claims to a given invention at any level 
of abstraction means that nearly any invention can be claimed so 
broadly as to constitute a business model, even in situations where 
more narrowly drawn claims to the same invention would no 
longer consist only of the business model (as the asserted point of 
                                                 
300
 See generally id.  
301
 SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBIT 6 (Modern Library 2002) (1922). 
302
 BOURDIEU supra note 85, at 175. 
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novelty).303 Business models do not solve technical problems, but 
only dictate who controls (and therefore who benefits from) 
transactions and associated wealth.  
Many of these concerns seem like the same ones underlying 
judicial statements in the Prometheus and Flook cases regarding 
pre-solution and post-solution activities. In the Veblenian view, the 
judicial term “pre-solution activities”304 is best viewed as a 
euphemism for protecting a subject matter space in which 
inventive activity is planned, and in which the planned inventive 
activity may or may not later occur or succeed.305 That term can be 
seen to describe overbroad functional or genus language in patent 
claims, like that of Samuel Morse in O’Reilly v. Morse,306 in which 
protection is prospectively sought over possible and unrealized 
future invention by reciting only the desired result without 
reference to the technical mechanism(s) actually invented.307 
                                                 
303
 See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 
1057, 1078, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting). Judge Moore stated 
quite well how Classen could have claimed any number of specific contributions 
but instead sought what amounts to a monopoly on any study of a particular 
phenomenon. This is quite close to saying that Classen was claiming what 
amounted to a business model for the use of medical phenomena.  
304
 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 
(2012). 
305
 According to Veblen, “[b]usiness conceptions and methods antedate the 
machine process.” L.A. O’Donnell, Rationalism, Capitalism and the 
Entrepreneur: The Views of Veblen and Schumpeter, 5 HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 199 (1973), reprinted in 3 THORSTEIN VEBLEN: CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENTS 219 (John Cunningham Wood ed., 1993). 
306
 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S 62, 68 (1852). Contra Tilghman v. Proctor, 
102 U.S. 707, 710, 720–22 (1880) (noting that the “patent is for a process, and 
not for any specific mechanism for carrying such process into effect,” but 
further noting that different processes for achieving the effect claimed by 
Tilghman were known in the prior art and that Tilghman himself disclosed an 
unclaimed lower temperature variation, in essence acknowledging that the claim 
language at issue was not preemptive). 
307
 O’Reilly, 56 U.S at 113 (“[W]hile he shuts the door against inventions 
of other persons, the patentee would be able to avail himself of new discoveries 
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Further, the judicial term “postsolution activity”308 can be seen as 
another euphemism for nontechnological activities that lack a 
sufficient connection to a technological process or artifact, by 
instead being after-the-fact attempts to privately direct or sequester 
the saleable benefits of prior technological achievement.309 The 
term “postsolution activity” often precisely describes patent claims 
directed to business activities that make arbitrary and passing 
reference to known technologies, while making a further 
“contribution” only to means for socially allocating value, such as 
through a new business model that relates purely to the saleability 
of pre-existing invention or technology.310 
                                                                                                             
in the properties and powers of electro-magnetism which scientific men might 
bring to light . . . .”). In short, this is an instance that the technical causal 
mechanism that allows the result to be repeatably achieved must be claimed, not 
merely disclosed.  
308
 Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 590 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
174, 191–92 (1981). 
309
 “By the sale of the output the business man in industry ‘realizes’ his 
gains. To ‘realize’ means to convert salable goods into money values. The sale 
is the last step in the process and the end of the business man’s endeavor. When 
he has disposed of the output, and so has converted his holdings of consumable 
articles into money values, his gains are as nearly secure and definitive as the 
circumstances of modern life admit. It is in terms of price that he keeps his 
accounts, and in the same terms he computes his output of products. The vital 
point of production with him is the vendibility of the output, its convertibility 
into money values, not its serviceability for the needs of mankind. A modicum 
of serviceability, for some purpose or other, the output must have if it is to be 
salable.” VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 30. 
310
 As an example, this could involve the inventor of a business method 
recognizing that a customer might change its practices if doing so is tied to 
buying a new computer system, even if the customer could have readily changed 
its practices without the purchase of a computer system. In other words, the 
“tangible” machine—the computer system—is something tied to saleability 
(triggering the customer’s desire to purchase something) rather than to changes 
in practices alleged to be more efficient or to solve a problem. In terms of 
productivity, the computer system is a red herring.  For that matter, the 
underlying practices may not relate to productivity either, but may be driven 
entirely by a desire to work employees harder and longer, increase power and 
control of management over labor, etc. 
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B. Example Claim Analyses 
Some patent-specific examples may clarify these Veblenian 
distinctions between productive and unproductive activities. For 
instance, an inventor may devise a new method for operating an 
existing machine, say, by operating different components at 
different speeds to achieve higher throughput with fewer defects. 
Such a process-oriented achievement puts forth no new structure or 
machine, but does enhance economic surplus through the manner 
of using such a machine. This seems like a patent-eligible 
contribution. The same might be said for devising a new sequence 
for chemically separating compounds more efficiently. Such an 
advance relates to the technology involved in the application of 
chemical principles to reduce material or energy inputs, and seems 
patent-eligible.311 Pure “business methods” are a rather easy case 
from a Veblenian perspective—they would simply be categorically 
excluded from patentability. But business methods can appear in 
unlikely places, as explained below. Software also presents a 
particularly thorny problem because it can easily have both 
technological and pecuniary functions in varying degrees.312 But 
the abstraction problem encountered with software patents313 can 
be assessed in a more practical manner with reference to the 
Veblen dichotomy, which can allow assessment of the tipping 
point where high levels of abstraction relinquish a connection to 
productive industrial activity leaving only unproductive pecuniary 
activity. Let us turn to a few more concrete examples of patent 
                                                 
311
 See, e.g., Tilghman, 102 U.S. 707, 710 (1880) (finding a process for 
separating fat patentable). 
312
 Jaron Lanier, in his philosophically muddled way, lamented that social 
media software had allowed influence to overtake innovation, which was 
something of a warmed-over Veblenian argument. JARON LANIER, YOU ARE 
NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO (2010). 
313
 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURUR, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009); Mark 
A. Lemley & Julie E. Cohen, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 47–50 (2001). 
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claim language to illustrate how the Veblen dichotomy might be 
applied to the question of patent eligibility. 
For instance, DealerTrack involved U.S. Patent No. 6,292,788 
(filed Dec. 3, 1998) (“the ’788 Patent”), of which independent 
claim 1 is representative:314 
1. A method of creating a real estate investment 
instrument adapted for performing tax-deferred 
exchanges comprising: 
aggregating real property to form a real estate 
portfolio; 
encumbering the property in the real estate 
portfolio with a master agreement; and 
creating a plurality of deedshares by dividing 
title in the real estate portfolio into a 
plurality of tenant-in-common deeds of at 
least one predetermined denomination, each 
of the plurality of deedshares subject to a 
provision in the master agreement for 
reaggregating the plurality of tenant-in-
common deeds after a specified interval. 
From the Veblenian perspective, claim 1 of the ’788 Patent is 
clearly directed to pecuniary activities that hinge upon social 
constructs of tax laws, title to real property, and speculative 
investment, and therefore should not be patentable.315 This is 
                                                 
314
 Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
315
 U.S. Patent No. 6,292,788 col. 12 l. 52–64 (filed Dec. 3, 1998). Another 
example would be claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,584,167 col. 23 l. 8–16 (filed 
June 22, 2004),  (“the ’167 Patent”), which claims “1. A real estate disclosure 
reporting method comprising the steps of: compiling a plurality of items of 
disclosure; relating said items of disclosure according to a plurality of condition 
categories; researching a particular property to determine a plurality of known 
ones of said items of disclosure; and disclosing said known ones according to 
said condition categories.” The ’167 patent was originally classified in class/
subclass 707/1, “for computerized data processing systems and corresponding 
methods for the retrieval of records stored in a database or as computer files.” 
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consistent with the Federal Circuit’s holding when considering the 
claim: 
In Bilski II, the Supreme Court explained that 
the dependent claims were not patent eligible 
though they “limit[ed] an abstract idea to one field 
of use or add[ed] token postsolution components.” 
130 S. Ct. at 3231. See also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 
n.14 (“A mathematical formula does not suddenly 
become patentable subject matter simply by having 
the applicant acquiesce to limiting the reach of the 
patent for the formula to a particular technological 
use.”). 
The restriction here is precisely the kind of 
limitation held to be insufficient to confer patent 
eligibility in Bilski II. The notion of using a 
clearinghouse generally and using a clearinghouse 
specifically to apply for car loans, like the 
relationship between hedging and hedging in the 
energy market in Bilski II, is of no consequence 
without more. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (noting 
that the principle that a mathematical formula “is 
not accorded the protection of our patent laws . . . 
cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the 
use of the formula to a particular technological 
environment”316  
                                                                                                             
While such a claim seems to fail the machine-or-transformation test, and to 
primarily relate to what could be considered purely mental steps, it also has 
meaning only in a pecuniary and social sense, because it is premised on legal 
(or, more broadly, social) obligations associated with real estate transactions 
rather than productive efficiency gains associated with technological cumulative 
causation. For those reasons, claim 1 of the ’167 patent would seem non-patent-
eligible from a Veblenian perspective. 
316
 Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1334 (emphasis added). 
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From a Veblenian perspective, this is a bit like saying that 
claims to more narrowly circumscribed pecuniary activities—
abstract ideas limited to a particular industry or technological 
environment—are still directed to pecuniary activities, and 
therefore lack a sufficient connection to a technological 
contribution to justify patent eligibility.317 A claim like that in 
DealerTrack disrupts the quid pro quo of the patent grant and 
amounts to just a naked grant of rent-seeking monopoly without 
contributing to production.  
A similar example is U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 
2007/0288360 (filed Apr. 5, 2007) (“the ’360 Application”), of 
which independent claim 1 is representative: 
1. An interface system for matching a position 
with an applicant based on credit information, 
comprising:  
a credit user entry module that allows a credit 
user to define the position and enter a 
position grade associated with the position;  
an applicant entry module that allows the 
applicant to enter applicant information;  
a credit bureau module that generates an 
applicant grade based on the applicant 
information and credit information stored in 
a credit bureau database;  
a decision module for comparing the position 
grade with the applicant grade to determine 
whether the applicant is qualified for the 
position; and  
                                                 
317
 It is in relation to the notion of the supposed quid pro quo of the patent 
bargain where Veblen discusses the underlying policy of granting any patent, 
rhetorically asking, “whatever may be its ulterior beneficial effects or its ethical 
justification.” Veblen, On the Nature of Capital, supra note 8, at 115–16 n.1.  
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a notification module for notifying the credit user 
and the applicant whether the applicant is 
qualified for the position. 
Although not explicitly discussed by the ’360 Application, a 
key goal of the claimed system is to provide an intermediary in 
such a way as to avoid regulatory burdens that limit access to 
credit information and credit scores (themselves a purely social 
creation).318 Claim 1 of the ’360 Application does not delimit itself 
to technological improvements in terms of labor, materials or 
energy savings, but instead focuses on the highly abstract forms of 
interfaces that provide a socially acceptable platform for regulatory 
avoidance (specifically in relation to credit access).319 Perhaps the 
unclaimed specifics of the “decision module” or “notification 
module” would present a technological advance, but the claim is 
written too abstractly to capture any such alleged technological 
contribution. Although during prosecution of the ’360 Application 
an examiner issued rejections alleging the claims impermissibly 
recited software per se,320 the Veblenian perspective would not 
view the issue in terms of technicalities of form like the recitation 
of software versus hardware (there would be no categorical ban of 
software patentability). Instead, the Veblenian approach would 
look at claim 1 of the ’360 Application as a merely pecuniary 
system to avoid regulation and mediate trust, and therefore would 
say claim 1 should not be patent-eligible because it is not directed 
to a productive contribution to an underlying technical problem. 
Further examples can be found in less conspicuous fields. For 
instance, U.S. Patent Application Publication Number 
2013/0068890 (filed Sept. 20, 2011) (“the ’890 Application”), 
                                                 
318
 See, e.g., Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
108–159, 117 STAT. 1952 (2003). 
319
 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. US 2007/0288360 A1 cl. 1 (filed Apr. 
5, 2007). 
320
 Non-Final Rejection, U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2007/0288360 
(filed Apr. 5, 2007), at 3, June 23, 2011. 
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entitled “Dual Boarding System for Aircraft,” published March 21, 
2013 and assigned to The Boeing Company, includes the following 
independent claim: 
1. A method for boarding an aircraft, the method 
comprising:  
lining up passengers in a first line and a second 
line relative to a doorway for the aircraft; 
and  
controlling a flow of the passengers in the first 
line and the second line through the 
doorway and a corridor connecting the 
doorway to an interior of the aircraft in 
which the flow of the passengers passes 
through a number of spaces in the corridor 
in which the number of spaces is reserved 
for a number of crew members during an 
emergency operation in which the 
passengers exit the aircraft. 
The ’890 Application was classified upon publication in U.S. 
Class/Subclass 244/137.2, for “Aeronautics and Astronautics,” 
“device or arrangement wherein a living being may be taken 
aboard or removed from the aircraft,” “for aircraft structure 
designed to improve the efficiency of transporting passengers, 
absent detail or arrangement for loading, or unloading or discharge 
thereof.”321 However, despite the technical-sounding classification 
and the fact that aircraft construction and design can be productive, 
the actual language of claim 1 of the ’890 Application as published 
is that of a business method.322 Disregarding whatever may be 
disclosed or claimed elsewhere in the application; claim 1 does not 
                                                 
321
 USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT CLASSIFICATION, http://www.uspto.gov/
web/patents/classification/uspc244/defs244.htm#C244S137200 (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2013). Subclass 137.2. of class 244 appears to have only existed for 
about a decade. 
322
 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. US 2013/0068890 A1 cl. 1 (filed Sept. 
20, 2011). 
112
Cybaris®, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol5/iss2/1
[5:211 2014] PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 323 
 
 
contain any reference to the solution of a technical problem.323 
Rather, the claim is written so as to address only a business model 
applicable to an effect or result in airline operations, and to be 
preemptive of any technical apparatuses that might be used in 
service of a two-line passenger boarding business model.324 Claim 
1 of the ’890 Application highlights how a company (Boeing) 
engaged in actual industrial processes and technological 
development can still present claims in patent applications directed 
to pecuniary business models rather than to matter-of-fact 
industrial solutions to technical problems. In the Veblenian view, 
claim 1 of the ’890 application would not be patent-eligible, 
because the claim language is not tied to any particularized 
contribution to technical proficiency.  
Another example is U.S. Patent No. 7,080,019 (filed Mar. 4, 
2001) (“the ’019 Patent”), directed to a “ride share contact 
system.” Independent claim 1 recites in part:325 
1. A method for enabling contact among 
travelers with similar travel plans, comprising: 
soliciting available travel plans from a multitude of 
Posting travelers, quantitatively characterizing each 
of said available travel plans' origins and 
destinations by their numerical latitudes and 
longitudes, posting said quantitatively characterized 
available plans to a data base, . . . soliciting a 
desired travel plan from a Browsing traveler, . . . 
whereby said Browsing travelers can exercise 
                                                 
323
 Id. (“[T]he flow of the passengers passes through a number of spaces in 
the corridor in which the number of spaces is reserved for a number of crew 
members during an emergency operation in which the passengers exit the 
aircraft” seems like an attempt to distinguish cargo planes (such as military 





 U.S. Patent No. 7,080,019 col. 11–12 (filed Mar. 4, 2001). 
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explicit control over said final choice process, and 
are not constrained to accept the putative optimal 
choice of said ordering according to said rank. 
Although there is a considerable amount of verbiage in claim 1 
of the ’019 Patent, that claim is directed to managing (potential) 
customer/user expectations and making social and business 
judgments as to the types of information that such customers/users 
would want to see, rather than solving any technological hurdle 
associated with scarcity of materials, energy and/or labor.326 
Therefore, from the Veblenian perspective, claim 1 of the ’019 
Patent would seem unpatentable as being directed only to a 
nonproductive pecuniary endeavor.  
In contrast, though still in a situation somewhat comparable to 
that of the ’019 Patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,531,954 (filed May 31, 
2007) (“the ’954 Patent”) is directed to a “system and method for 
handling reservation requests with a connection admission control 
engine.” Claim 1 of the ’954 patent recites:  
1. A method for handling reservation requests, 
the method comprising: 
receiving network performance information, 
utilization information, and capacity 
information associated with a data stream or 
connections, the network performance 
information and utilization information is 
enabled to be received through one or more 
performance information packet (PIP) data 
packets and a state machine tracking the 
                                                 
326
 Id.; see also Darwin Bond-Graham, Sharing Rides, Hording Profits, 
COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/10/18/
sharing-rides-hording-profits (questioning the characterization of ride sharing 
software as “disruptive” technology and noting how ride sharing business 
models seek social ends of avoiding regulation, avoiding taxes and fees that 
support public infrastructure, and, more generally, externalizing costs onto 
predominantly low-income users). 
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utilization information and the capacity 
information, wherein the PIP data packets 
and the state machine cumulatively update 
the network performance information, 
utilization information, and capacity 
information for each node between and 
including endpoints of the data stream 
including customer equipment, wherein the 
network performance information, 
utilization information, and capacity 
information include a plurality of indicators 
for each node, and wherein each of the 
plurality of indicators are compared against 
thresholds to determine a status of each 
node; 
determining available bandwidth in response to 
the network performance information, 
utilization information, and capacity 
information that are cumulatively updated 
for the data stream or connections utilizing 
the PIP data packets and the state machine; 
responding to a plurality of reservation requests 
in response to the status of each node and 
the determined available bandwidth 
determined utilizing the PIP data packets 
and state machine; 
adjusting a frequency the one or more PIP data 
packets sent through a portion of the 
communications network in response to 
determining the portion is experiencing a 
problem; and 
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rerouting the one or more PIP data packets to 
avoid a failed portion of the communications 
network.327 
Such a claim seems patent-eligible, from the Veblenian 
perspective, because the claimed invention relates to the use of 
scarce computing (and perhaps energy) resources, as well as 
specific and detailed methodologies that are tied to a technical 
problem associated with resource scarcity (within communication 
networks).  
Furthermore, a software-based method that changes the way a 
computer operates to achieve new computing powers, such as to 
better render pixels in an image, would seem patentable. In just 
such a case, the Federal Circuit found such claims to be patent-
eligible. In Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 
the court assessed claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,341,228 (filed Dec. 
3, 1991) (“the ’228 Patent”), which recites: 
1. A method for the halftoning of color images, 
comprising the steps of utilizing, in turn, a pixel-by-
pixel comparison of each of a plurality of color 
planes of said color image against a blue noise mask 
in which the blue noise mask is comprised of a 
random non-deterministic, non-white noise single 
valued function which is designed to provide 
visually pleasing dot profiles when thresholded at 
any level of said color images, wherein a plurality 
of blue noise masks are separately utilized to 
perform said pixel-by-pixel comparison and in 
which at least one of said blue noise masks has its 
pixels shifted by at least one pixel prior to 
performing said pixel-by-pixel comparison.328 
                                                 
327
 U.S. Patent No. 8,531,954 col. 102 l. 17–51 (filed May 31, 2007). 
328
 Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). The ’228 patent was classified in U.S. class/subclass 358/534 for 
Halftone processing, “Subject matter wherein shades of various darkness 
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This seems like the correct result from a Veblenian perspective, 
because even though arguably directed to software per se or pure 
information manipulation, the claimed invention was directed to a 
technical achievement regarding a way to render digital images 
that relates to providing better substantive technical 
performance.329 Reference to blue noise masks in the claims 
conveys the essential feature of the solution to the underlying 
technical problem addressed by the invention.  
Furthermore, claims to a method for updating a web page 
would be patentable from a Veblenian perspective if directed to the 
technical mechanisms involved in web page coding and the like. 
For example, U.S. Patent No. 7,640,512 (filed Dec. 22, 2000) (the 
’512 Patent) recites: 
1. A method for updating objects contained 
within a web page, comprising:  
displaying a web page;  
creating a frame having a height of zero and a 
width of zero within the web page;  
displaying outside the frame at least one 
updateable object within the web page, 
wherein the at least one updateable object 
corresponds to an HVAC system;  
configuring the frame to periodically request 
updated data from a server, the updated 
data comprising an instruction set for 
causing the frame to update the at least 
one updateable object;  
                                                                                                             
between the darkest and lightest elements of the original object are represented 
by a pattern of dots of varying density in the image.” U.S. Patent No. 5,341,228 
col. 17 l. 55–68, (filed Dec. 3, 1991). 
329
 The Research Corp. decision seems like one of the most fertile grounds 
for finding possible agreement between the different factions on the Federal 
Circuit advancing competing theories for patent eligibility. 
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configuring the frame to request the undated data 
from the server in response to a timer 
maintained on a client reaching a threshold 
value, wherein the timer is configured to 
be initiated as a function of creation of the 
frame; and  
configuring the frame, in response to receiving 
the updated data, to cause the at least one 
updateable object to be updated, such that 
the updating of the at least one updateable 
object updates only a portion of the web 
page.330 
The invention recited in claim 1 of the ’512 patent provides 
labor and/or energy saving benefits through certain uses of 
computers, and the claim includes steps involving specific 
elements of a web page (such as a frame) that provide a solution to 
the underlying technical problem addressed by the invention. 
Therefore, it seems patent-eligible in the context of the present 
theory. 
In contrast, Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC involved claim 1 
of U.S. Patent No. 7,346,545 (filed May 29, 2001) (“the ’545 
patent”),331 which recites: 
1. A method for distribution of products over 
the Internet via a facilitator, said method comprising 
the steps of:  
a first step of receiving, from a content provider, 
media products that are covered by 
intellectual-property rights protection and 
are available for purchase, wherein each said 
                                                 
330
 In the interest of full disclosure, the author participated in the 
prosecution of the ’512 patent briefly. 
331
 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
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media product being comprised of at least 
one of text data, music data, and video data;  
a second step of selecting a sponsor message to 
be associated with the media product, said 
sponsor message being selected from a 
plurality of sponsor messages, said second 
step including accessing an activity log to 
verify that the total number of times which 
the sponsor message has been previously 
presented is less than the number of 
transaction cycles contracted by the sponsor 
of the sponsor message;  
a third step of providing the media product for 
sale at an Internet website;  
a fourth step of restricting general public access 
to said media product;  
a fifth step of offering to a consumer access to 
the media product without charge to the 
consumer on the precondition that the 
consumer views the sponsor message;  
a sixth step of receiving from the consumer a 
request to view the sponsor message, 
wherein the consumer submits said request 
in response to being offered access to the 
media product;  
a seventh step of, in response to receiving the 
request from the consumer, facilitating the 
display of a sponsor message to the 
consumer;  
an eighth step of, if the sponsor message is not an 
interactive message, allowing said consumer 
access to said media product after said step 
of facilitating the display of said sponsor 
message;  
a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is an 
interactive message, presenting at least one 
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query to the consumer and allowing said 
consumer access to said media product after 
receiving a response to said at least one 
query;  
a tenth step of recording the transaction event to 
the activity log, said tenth step including 
updating the total number of times the 
sponsor message has been presented; and  
an eleventh step of receiving payment from the 
sponsor of the sponsor message displayed. 
A method that forces a consumer to view an advertisement 
before being granted access to a video relates to advertising 
revenue streams and, secondarily, to contractual or legal rights to 
access video content (“intellectual-property rights protection”), and 
is a social function that allocates economic surpluses tied to the 
advertisement and/or video but creates no additional surplus.332 In 
regard to competitive advertising, Veblen said that “[i]t gives 
vendibility, which is useful to the seller, but has no utility to the 
last buyer.”333 Moreover, if copyright laws suddenly changed, such 
that no copyright owner could claim exclusive rights to copying or 
public display, then the “invention” of the Ultramercial patent 
immediately loses all significance. In this way, the advertising and 
video access functions are social/cultural in nature (i.e., they are 
not transcultural) and do not appear to relate to advancement of the 
useful arts. From the Veblenian perspective, the claims of the ’545 
patent should be deemed nonpatentable, contrary to the Federal 
Circuit panel’s holding. It is also rather glaringly apparent that 
claim 1 the ’545 patent does not explicitly recite any solution to an 
                                                 
332
 “The great end of consistent advertising is to establish such differential 
monopolies resting on popular conviction.” VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 55. 
“Competitive advertising is an unavoidable item in the aggregate costs of 
industry. It does not add serviceability of the output, except be it incidentally 
and unintentionally.” Id. at 59. 
333
 Id.  
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underlying technical problem.334 Rather, the recited steps discuss 
only routine activities phrased in such a way as to relate 
specifically to control of the economic market for Internet 
advertising and media delivery, without making a meaningful 
contribution to the technical knowledge within that economic 
market. The claim instead is at most directed toward a social 
problem rather than a technical problem. In short, the ’545 patent 
looks like naked rent-seeking of an invidious and pecuniary nature.  
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., the Supreme Court held that isolated segments of naturally 
occurring deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) are unpatentable products 
of nature, while synthetically created complementary DNA 
(cDNA) is patent-eligible. 335 From a Veblenian perspective, this 
appears to be the right result. Identifying naturally occurring 
substances, or portions of them, does not create any economic 
surplus. A patent claim directed to such naturally occurring 
substances has only a pecuniary character, by directing the 
allocation of monetary benefits arising out of that naturally 
occurring substance. Limiting the patent claim to merely a segment 
of the overall natural substance is akin to accepting a smaller 
patent monopoly, but still without a contribution of 
workmanship.336 Yet, in contrast, synthesizing new compounds 
that are not naturally occurring may involve workmanship, 
regardless of any moral objections that might be raised when the 
                                                 
334
 Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1355 (Lourie, J., concurring) (“While a 
computer or complex computer program, as discussed by the majority opinion, 
may be necessary to perform the method, it is not what the claim specifically 
requires.”).  
335
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
2111 (2013). 
336
 Following the author’s “Spanish method” analogy, any defense of 
patentability premised on the effort needed to isolate desired segments of 
naturally occurring materials should be no more convincing than an argument 
that the expense for a conquistador to sail across an ocean and plant a flag on 
existing territory renders such conduct “inventive.”  
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synthesis involves biologic matter. Thus, the Supreme Court 
seemed to track the Veblenian perspective in their distinction 
between the patent eligibility of synthetic cDNA and isolation of 
segments of naturally occurring DNA. 
No doubt, limitless examples could be given. In many of these 
examples, a real technical accomplishment may be present and 
could theoretically be claimed, but often patent applicants choose 
to focus instead on only pecuniary aspects, most assuredly to seek 
preemptive monopoly coverage.  
IX. THE IMPORT OF THE NEW THEORY OF PATENT ELIGIBILITY 
A. The Veblenian Viewpoint and “Progress” of the “Useful Arts” 
What is lacking in much writing on patent subject matter 
eligibility is open discussion of the desired ends of the inquiry. 
Instead, an excessive focus on the process of patentability leads to 
voluminous tracts on the tedious workings of one test versus 
another for identifying patent-eligible subject matter, all the while 
leaving unstated the social impacts and ideological bases—a 
problem very much like that found with the insistence on de-
contextualized marginal analysis in neoclassical economics. But a 
Veblenian perspective can shift the focus of this debate by 
providing a more richly nuanced critique of how self-interest 
correlates to the various incentive theories for patents, such as 
those expressed in the Patent & Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution.337  This is because Veblen was, at bottom, a 
                                                 
337
 Leo Marx has written about how Veblen’s use of the term “technology” 
might link to the efforts of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas 
Paine, and others to frame the modern concept of “progress.” Leo Marx, 
Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept, 51 TECH. & CULTURE 
561, 564–65 (2010). All found technology in the form of “advances in science 
and the mechanic arts valuable chiefly as means for arriving at social and 
political ends.” Id. at 565. Although Marx does not develop this point, Veblen’s 
usage included some recognition of the views of environmentally conscious 
thinkers like John Muir, Henry David Thoreau and others who criticized 
industrialization. E.g., Russell H. Bartley & Sylvia E. Yoneda, Thorstein Veblen 
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moralist—constructing theories that relied upon only very basic 
and elemental normative judgments, such as favoring equality over 
inequality338—and his career focused primarily upon criticisms of 
myopic economic methodologies that bracketed out all cultural 
questions in order to make certain pre-determined or inherent 
moral judgments undiscussable.   
Institutionalist economists offered explanations for distinctions 
between different economic activities that are useful in the context 
of patentable subject matter inquiries. Veblen distinguished 
business enterprise and technology in modern society with his 
dichotomy. Yet his evolutionary view looks at outcomes as if in a 
constant state of flux, with disparate forces interacting. “Culture 
advances and evolves via the cumulative and dynamic forces of 
industry and technology juxtaposed to the static forces of the 
ceremonial and the pecuniary.”339 Whether this results in 
“progress” is uncertain, though. From a Veblenian perspective, 
“financially oriented business behavior makes the social 
provisioning process more unstable and renders people’s welfare 
more vulnerable.”340 Veblen believed that “[a] civilization which is 
dominated by th[e] matter-of-fact insight [of technology and the 
                                                                                                             
on Washington Island: Traces of a Life, 7 INT’L J. POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y 589, 
602 (1994), available at 
http://www.islandheritageconservancy.com/other/Thorstein%20Veblen%20on%
20Washington%20Island.pdf. A fair reading of Veblen here would include 
recognition that he tried to separate out the respective roles of technology and 
the pecuniary, indicating that the two influenced each other, which could lead to 
positive or negative outcomes.  
338
 O’Hara, supra note 14 at 83. 
339
 Richard L. Brinkman, Culture in Neoinstitutional Economics: An 
Integration of Myrdal and Galbraith into the Veblen-Ayres Matrix, 40 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 401, 402 (1981). 
340
 JO & HENRY, supra note 52, at 2. 
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machine process] must prevail against any cultural scheme that 
lacks this element.”341 History lends support to the theory.342  
Ever since the mercantilist era, using technology 
to maximize productivity had long been a basic 
strategy of national power. This was the context in 
which Veblen warned that the problem of high 
finance was its tendency to deviate from 
technological efficiency, to form a symbiosis with 
speculative activities and defend the vested interests 
(the term he coined for rentier real estate, finance 
and monopolies).343  
 
As detailed by Alan Durham, then Treasury Secretary 
Alexander Hamilton wrote on how patents encourage industry and 
manufactures in 1790, in much the same way Veblen later wrote 
about fostering workmanship and machine knowledge to help 
create economic surplus.344 But where Veblen goes a step beyond 
                                                 
341
 Thorstein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilisation, 11 AM. 
J. SOC. (1906) reprinted in THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILISATION 
AND OTHER ESSAYS 2 (B.W. Huebsch 1919).  
342
 William T. Ganley, The Theory of Business Enterprise and Veblen’s 
Neglected Theory of Corporation Finance, 38 J. ECON. ISSUES 397, 400–01 
(2004). 
343
 Michael Hudson, The Social Economics of Thorstein Veblen, EH.NET 
(Oct. 2012), http://eh.net/book_reviews/the-social-economics-of-thorstein-
veblen; see also MICHAEL HUDSON, AMERICA'S PROTECTIONIST TAKEOFF 1815–
1914: THE NEGLECTED AMERICAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (2010). For 
an exposition on Veblen’s engineering-focused rather than economic-focused 
discussions of “efficiency,” see Janet T. Knoedler, Veblen and Technical 
Efficiency, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 1011 (1997).  
344
 Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the Information Age, 1999 BYU L. 
REV. 1419, 1454 (1999). Alexander Hamilton established the Bank of New 
York, and was a prominent banker in the American Revolutionary era. His more 
restrictive views on what types of subject matter are patent-eligible can be 
contrasted with those of some financial interests today. If a banker like 
Hamilton did not see patents encompassing business methods and financial 
124
Cybaris®, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol5/iss2/1
[5:211 2014] PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 335 
 
 
the established view (that technology and industry can advance 
general well-being of a population) was in his recognition of 
certain ways that technological gains can be thwarted.  
Veblen issued a warning of a parasitic role of finance in 
relation to engineers and real industry.345  
Written in a popular sarcastic style, [Veblen’s] 
books showed how the behavior of wealth and high 
finance was having perverse effects after World 
War I. Instead of funding economic growth, Wall 
Street was becoming the protector of privilege and 
engaging in artful deception, distorting economies 
away from passing on the fruits of technology to 
populations in the form of rising living standards 
and falling costs of living and doing business.346  
Veblen’s critical view of the evolution of capitalism into 
finance capitalism is the polar opposite of that of Joseph 
Schumpeter, who, despite sharing some theoretical ground with 
Veblen, viewed big-business capitalism as a model of efficiency.347 
“Whereas Schumpeter envisions [business enterprise and 
technology] as integrally connected and perfectly harmonious, 
Veblen sees them coming increasingly into conflict.”348 To Veblen, 
                                                                                                             
activities when the Constitution was framed, then contrary views start to seem 
out-of-step with original intent. 
345
 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (1921); cf. 
GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916 (1963); FISK, supra note 37, at 9–11, 75–172.  
346
 Hudson, supra note 343.  
347
 L.A. O’Donnell, supra note 305, at 222–23. Rudolph Hilferding, who 
coined the term “finance capitalism,” advanced views akin to Veblen’s. See 
generally RUDOLPH HILFERDING, DAS FINANZKAPITAL [FINANCE CAPITAL] 
(1910). Schumpeter shared many theoretical commonalities with Veblen, but the 
two diverged on many conclusions. 
348
 L.A. O’Donnell, supra note 305, at 199; see also JO & HENRY, supra 
note 52, at 5. 
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equality was a central concept, and he viewed business—as 
distinguished from industry—as the source of inequality.349 
“Veblen and his fellow institutionalists understood that ‘the 
market’ was distorted by special ‘free lunch’ privileges to extract 
income without really contributing to production.”350 
The word which best characterizes Veblen’s 
view of business methods is ‘sabotage.’ By it he 
means ‘a conscientious withdrawal of efficiency.’ 
To him it is so obvious as to be self-evident that 
prices cannot be maintained at a reasonable 
profitable level without the ‘habitual recourse to 
delay and obstruction of industry.’ This theme 
recurs endlessly in Veblen’s work.351  
Veblen’s views formed much of the basis for the analyses of 
sociologist Alain Touraine, who was an early commentator on the 
concept of the “post-industrial society” that is so often used in the 
context of the contemporary patentable subject matter debate.352 
                                                 
349
 TILMAN, supra note 215, at 105. Contra, e.g., Cotter, supra note 11, at 
855. There are a number of books by journalists that approach this topic—or at 
least the effects—of corporate financialization from an emotional perspective, 
relying heavily on anecdotes and case studies. E.g., JILL ANDRESKY FRASER, 
WHITE-COLLAR SWEATSHOP: THE DETERIORATION OF WORK AND ITS REWARDS 
IN CORPORATE AMERICA (2001). 
350
 Hudson, supra note 343.  
351
 O’Donnell, supra note 305, at 210; see also Wray, supra note 13, at 
619. For a contemporary version of this sort of “sabotage” by financiers and 
bankers, see, e.g., Ellen Brown, Larry Summers and the System: Making the 
World Safe for Banksters, COUNTERPUNCH (Sept. 5, 2013), http://
www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/05/making-the-world-safe-for-banksters. There 
is also something of a merger underway between the use of the World Trade 
Organization to globally impose the North Atlantic States’ version of patent 
laws and attempts to unleash the North Atlantic States’ financial products on the 
globe. See PRASHAD, supra note 79. 
352
 ALAIN TOURAINE, THE POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: TOMORROW'S 
SOCIAL HISTORY: CLASSES, CONFLICTS, AND CULTURE IN THE PROGRAMMED 
SOCIETY 140, 148–49, 152, 166–67 (Leonard F. X. Mayhew trans., Random 
House, 1971) (1969). Touraine built on a Veblenian framework, stating that 
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An example of business sabotage of industry is planned 
obsolescence, including everything from constant stylistic 
redesigns to drive conspicuous consumption, products that force 
needless wear part replacements, products that are incapable of 
repair, unsupported computer software dubbed “adandonware,” 
and more.353 The artificial electrical power brownouts/blackouts 
devised by Enron to inflate associated prices certainly provide a 
prime example.354 Another example from popular cinema that 
might illustrate this point from a different perspective is Happy 
Gilmore, in which the titular character (played by Adam Sandler) 
is a failed hockey player who revolutionizes professional golfing, 
with the antagonist, Shooter McGavin (played by Christopher 
McDonald), representing the “vested interests” continually trying, 
but failing, to sabotage Happy Gilmore’s performance in order to 
try to maintain his own public standing.355 
Veblen’s insights have clear parallels in determining under the 
Constitution what constitutes “promot[ing] the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.”356 What is “progress” in the context of the Patent 
& Copyright Clause of the Constitution if not passing along the 
                                                                                                             
when “economic growth comes to depend more on the capacity to mobilize and 
organize resources, to direct change, and to foresee and program development . . 
. . [T]he efficiency of the firm depends more and more on social and political 
determinants and on the general functioning of the economic system.” Id. at 157. 
Touraine nonetheless makes numerous criticisms of Veblen’s theories, often 
without specifically identifying Veblen by name. 
353
 See generally GILES SLADE, MADE TO BREAK: TECHNOLOGY AND 
OBSOLESCENCE IN AMERICA (2006); VANCE PACKARD, THE WASTE MAKERS 
(1960). 
354
 Tapes: Enron Plotted to Shut Down Power Plant, CNN.COM (Feb. 3, 
2005, 11:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/03/enron.tapes/; Timothy 
Egan, Tapes Show Enron Arranged Plant Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/04/national/04energy.html. 
355
 HAPPY GILMORE (Universal Pictures 1996). 
356
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Irwin, supra note 9, at 785 
(identifying egalitarian social progress in the Enlightenment vision of 
technology adopted by Founding Fathers).  
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benefits of technology to the general population in terms of rising 
standards of living?357 Veblen’s ideas on the industrial/pecuniary 
dichotomy found precedent in European Enlightenment era 
concepts that tolerated private greed only when they coincided 
with public good.358 Given that the Framers of the Constitution 
were steeped in Enlightenment-era thought,359 this is a salient point 
on understanding a possible interpretation of the limits on 
promoting progress of the useful arts. Dana Remus (née Irwin) has 
written on the need to re-craft patent eligibility standards such that 
they reclaim their normative roots and consider social benefit 
again.360 Justice Stevens reached a similar conclusion in his 
concurrence to the Bilski decision.361 Such views can be developed 
further with reference to Veblen’s theories. 
Institutionalist economics recognizes that the FIRE sector and 
business interests generally will almost always view their own 
                                                 
357
 But see Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: 
Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 755–77 
(2001). Pollack discusses a theory for the “1780s meanings of ‘progress,’” 
primarily in relation to the copyright portion of the Patent & Copyright Clause 
of the Constitution. Id. However, that analysis is limited to the word “progress” 
largely decoupled from “useful arts,” and therefore it omits nuance regarding 
how the “useful arts” differ from “science.” Moreover, it presumes that the 
Constitution is more inflexible than it need be. Nonetheless, interpreting 
“progress” to mean “spread” as Pollack does, only a small step is required to 
translate “spread” to industrialization and the increase in technological 
efficiency and dissemination of “matter-of-fact” knowledge in the sense of 
Veblen’s usage. 
358
 Reinert, supra note 18, at 61; see also, e.g., VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 
38–44. 
359
 Irwin, supra note 9, at 785–89 (identifying an Enlightenment vision of 
technology adopted by Founding Fathers when the Constitution was framed). 
360
 Id. at 815–23. 
361
 See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232 (2010) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (arguing that “restor[ing] patent law to its historical and 
constitutional moorings” by limiting the patentability of business processes will 
promote socially beneficial innovation as the Founders intended). 
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activities favorably, but also that such views must be assessed in 
relation to the greater social good. For example, in The Fisherman 
and the Rhinoceros: How International Finance Shapes Everyday 
Life, Eric Briys and François de Varenne lamented the “tyranny of 
the real economy” and trumpeted the success of Enron—prior to 
the exposure of Enron's fraudulent accounting practices.362 Their 
view, as proponents of financial interests, is that “the speculator is 
not a parasite on the real economy, but almost a saint, someone 
who helps everyone by taking on the specialized task of managing 
risks. For assuming these risks, the speculator gets the chance of 
profits.”363 Such a FIRE sector perspective is an about-face from 
that of institutionalist economists. To Veblen, the term “social” 
means collective equality.364 The award of a patent to an individual 
(or small groups of individuals or entities) on the basis of a social, 
that is, collective, phenomenon, is a harmful inequality that lessens 
social welfare and reduces economic growth. From such a point of 
view, patent claims—particularly method claims—to invidious 
business endeavors that are fundamentally social can never be 
useful or promote progress of science and the useful arts, because 
they are always stultifying or regressive with respect to collective 
                                                 
362
 ERIC BRIYS & FRANÇOIS DE VARENNE, THE FISHERMAN AND THE 
RHINOCEROS: HOW INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SHAPES EVERYDAY LIFE (2000); 
see also JAMES N. BODURTHA, JR., “UNFAIR VALUES” – ENRON'S SHELL GAME 
(2003), http://bodurtha.georgetown.edu/enron/bodurtha_enron_shell_game.pdf 
(discussing Enron’s fraudulent practices). The financial industry often trumpets 
itself, even within the realm of patent law. See, e.g., John A. Squires & Thomas 
S. Biemer, Patent Law 101: Does a Grudging Lundgren Panel Decision Mean 
that the USPTO is Finally Getting the Statutory Subject Matter Question 
Right?”, 46 IDEA 561, 563–67 (2006) (Mr. Squires wrote as the Chief 
Intellectual Property Counsel for Goldman, Sachs & Co., a leading securities 
and investment banking firm). 
363
 Justin Podur, Monstrous Gambles on the Future: The Financial 
Economy and Real Economy, COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 15, 2008), http://
www.counterpunch.org/2008/10/15/the-financial-economy-and-real-economy. 
364
 TILMAN, supra note 215, at 106. 
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equality and therefore antagonistic to “progress” and 
“usefulness.”365 
As capitalism took the fore, and the U.S. economy 
industrialized from the Nineteenth Century to the early Twentieth 
Century, the role of “creators” faded from view, and “the 
relationship between the marketers and the consumers became 
dominant.”366 If the transition to a “post-industrial” economy is 
given credence, it is possible to question the continued relevance 
of patent law to such a post-industrial economy. In the realm of 
patentable subject matter, the question is whether “creators” of 
inventive technology, as traditionally understood, risk 
disappearance altogether, increasingly replaced by the direct 
patenting of the relationships between marketers (or rentiers) and 
consumers—and whether such a shift provides any public good. 
The Veblen dichotomy bears on how such a shift impacts society 
as a whole. He provided a theoretical link between collective well-
being, equality, and a preference for workmanlike application of 
matter-of-fact technical knowledge over the pecuniary, 
unproductive application of business and financial control. 
Contemporary empirical research supports Veblen’s theory, 
indicating that increasing financialization of the U.S. economy has 
“negative effects on equality, growth and employment.”367 
Although some critics fault Veblen for failing to articulate a 
sufficiently clear standard for his dichotomy, perhaps because they 
preferred different normative conclusions, Veblen nonetheless 
provided a theoretical link between notions of progress and growth 
and the application a dichotomy of some sort. In the patent world, 
this provides a basis for discussion of constitutional limits on the 
patent statutes with regard to patent-eligible subject matter, 
particularly with regard to “business methods” and other abstract 
                                                 
365
 See generally JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? (2013) 
(providing a similar, if less philosophically clear, argument with respect to 
information and “big data” and other contemporary technology). 
366
 FISK, supra note 37, at 11. 
367
 Jacob Assa, supra note 46, at 38. 
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ideas. The most striking possibility here is the notion, derived from 
Veblen’s economics, that business method and other abstract 
patents could actually further a relative regression in general well-
being by adding patents to the usual complement of techniques of 
pecuniary sabotage and exacerbating imbalances between the FIRE 
sector and the rest of the economy. 
Here the remarkable book by Peter Drahos with John 
Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? deserves special attention.368 Although Veblen is never 
mentioned, Drahos and Braithwaite reach essentially the same 
conclusion that Veblen did in books like Absentee Ownership and 
Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America,369 that 
FIRE sector interests can overtake and disrupt the real economy to 
the detriment of general public welfare, and they tie that 
conclusion to contemporary international negotiations over 
intellectual property rights treaties and the rise renewed influence 
of feudal-like conditions. 
The present approach to patent eligibility is far more sweeping 
than more limited technical criticisms regarding financial and 
business method patenting, which often focus on the procedural 
and technical competency of the USPTO to examine such patent 
applications in the same manner as applications in other subject 
matter areas, or judicial review of such patents after issuance.370 
                                                 
368
 DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54; see also Drahos, supra 
note 54, at 209–222. 
369
 VEBLEN, supra note 78. 
370
 See, e.g., Michael Moulton, Effecting the Impossible: An Argument 
Against Tax Strategy Patents, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 631 (2008). There is no 
shortage of possible procedural and administrative or judicial competency 
arguments against expanding patent-eligible subject matter. For instance, social 
science backgrounds are not accepted to satisfy eligibility requirements for the 
patent bar. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO 
PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE 4 (2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/
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Yet Veblen’s analysis of the economic role of technology is 
premised on many of the same Enlightenment era ideals that 
originally gave rise to the Patent & Copyright Clause in the 
Constitution. Amid a confusing array of theories for patent 
eligibility, Veblen at a minimum suggests that the motives behind 
some are to recreate the near-feudal economic conditions of the 
pre-Enlightenment era,371 with a corresponding diminishment in 
public well-being. It becomes a question of underlying ideologies. 
A. Why Perspective Matters 
The policy implications of the patentable subject matter debate 
can be informed by a recognition that ideology is a driving force 
behind what are often presented as “objective” arguments.372 One 
                                                                                                             
exam/GRB_January_2014.pdf. A bachelor's degree in a recognized technical 
subject, or evidence of another degree with equivalent scientific and technical 
training, are accepted, as is evidence of practical engineering or scientific 
experience. Id. In other words, attorneys and agents practicing before the 
USPTO in patent matters cannot qualify based on experience with marketing, 
social sciences, finance, politics, or the like. The tired joke, “I have a science 
background: in political science,” comes up short. Although the matter of 
practitioner credentialing is very nearly an afterthought when considering the 
substantive question of patent subject matter eligibility, it does further 
emphasize how finance, business, and other social sciences have traditionally 
not been considered disciplines that deal with patentable subject matter. This 
underscores how much recent patent activity has shifted into new areas without 
significant historical precedent. But it is also an attack on institutional practices, 
and a very procedural one at that. Without a broader theoretical basis—and 
therefore reminiscent of the sorts of analyses Veblen derided as mere 
“taxonomy” in economics—these sorts of analyses will never provide any 
definitive resolutions. 
371
 Cf. DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54. 
372
 Judge Richard Posner has made this point before in reference to 
arguments from Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner regarding the alleged 
objectivity of the “textualist” statutory interpretation methodology. Richard A. 
Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-
garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism (book review of ANTONIN SCALIA & 
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useful insight, advanced by philosopher Slavoj Žižek and others,373 
is that “[t]he fundamental aim of ideological fantasy is to silence 
social antagonism,” and “[t]he only way of not falling into 
ideological thought is, then, to maintain the tension between 
ideology and reality, although they cannot be clearly separated 
from one another.”374 In this sense,  
it is not simply a matter of seeing which account of 
reality best matches the ‘facts’, with the one that is 
closest being the least biased and therefore the best. 
As soon as the facts are determined, we have 
already - whether we know it or not - made our 
choice; we are already within one ideological 
system or another.375 
Yet the nature of ideology is to keep its aims of rationalization 
hidden.376 As jurists and commentators weigh the various 
                                                                                                             
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
(2012)). 
373
 A “post-modern” view of patent-eligible subject matter has been 
suggested. Irwin, supra note 9, at 815–16. Post-modernism is a precursor to the 
views advanced by Žižek. The emphasis on dynamic, context-dependent 
tensions in Žižek’s philosophy has many similarities with old institutional 
economics. See HÄRING & DOUGLAS, supra note 56, at 8–11. 
374
 George I. García & Carlos Gmo., Psychoanalysis and Politics: The 
Theory of Ideology in Slavoj Žižek, 2 INT. J. ZIZEK STUD. 8–9 (Imanol 
Galfarsoro trans., 2008), available at http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/
article/viewFile/149/243. 
375
 Rex Butler, Zizek: What is a Master-Signifier, LACAN.COM, http://
www.lacan.com/zizek-signifier.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). This is 
analogous to an Albert Einstein quote: “Whether you can observe a thing or not 
depends on the theory which you use. It is the theory which decides what can be 
observed.” See ABDUS SALAM, UNIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL FORCES 99 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1990). 
376
 García & Gmo, supra note 374, at 3 (“[I]deology always implies a 
concealment: ‘to be effective, the logic of the legitimation of the relations of 
domination must remain hidden.’”); SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE FRAGILE ABSOLUTE: 
OR, WHY IS THE CHRISTIAN LEGACY WORTH FIGHTING FOR? 16 (Verso 2000) 
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proposals for patent subject matter eligibility, they do so against a 
typically unstated ideological backdrop, which too often makes the 
associated statements of “facts”—as pertaining to “purely mental 
steps,” a “transformation of matter,” a connection to a “machine,” 
or any other patentability litmus test—more of an expression of the 
unstated ideology than the reliable and objective judgments they 
are made out to be. Much of the confusion in Federal Circuit case 
law centers on this problem. 
With that said, the present theory on patent eligibility exhibits a 
stark departure from certain views on patent law gradualism—the 
notion that the scope of patent-eligible subject matter should 
slowly continue to increase. The Veblenian perspective suggests 
that patent law should not be shaped and adjusted to defend and 
accommodate vested social privileges, but should instead be more 
egalitarian and should be reevaluated over time in view of 
constantly changing circumstances.377 In contrast, Thomas Cotter 
wrote about evaluating patent subject matter eligibility from a 
“Burkean perspective,” and recognized, if only by implication, that 
evaluation of any test or tests for patent subject matter eligibility 
must be made against some sort of ideological backdrop.378 Cotter 
                                                                                                             
(“[T]he highest form of ideology lies not in getting caught in ideological 
spectrality, forgetting about its foundations in real people and their relations, but 
precisely in overlooking this Real of spectrality, and pretending to address 
directly ‘real people with their real worries’. Visitors to the London Stock 
Exchange are given a free leaflet which explains to them that the stock market is 
not about some mysterious fluctuations, but about real people and their products 
– this is ideology at its purest.”); see also Posner, supra note 367. 
377
 Contra Cotter, supra note 11, at 857 (“[T]he extent to which [Burkean] 
tradition reflects the perspectives of elites clearly presents a bone of contention 
for thinkers more inclined towards egalitarianism.”). 
378
 Id.; Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, Part 
II: Reflections on the (Counter) Revolution in Patent Law, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 365, 365–66 (“I contended that it would be inadvisable to exclude 
computer and business-related art from the scope of patentable subject matter 
altogether.”). Cotter’s “Burkean” view starts down the same direction as the 
Veblenian one, suggesting that limits on patent eligibility are appropriate, but in 
true Burkean fashion obfuscates the social context as to why that would matter. 
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endorses Irish statesman Edmund Burke as a reference point, 
whereas the present article rejects Burke and proffers Veblen (and 
institutional economics more generally) as a superior alternative. 
Burke’s philosophical outlook was, at bottom, an attempt to 
restrain emancipatory and disruptive social movements,379 and that 
included restraining entrepreneurial inventors whose inventions 
chipped away at the supremacy of an existing aristocracy, whereas 
Veblen noted the unique role of technology and industry in 
disrupting vested interests for the possible advancement of the 
“generic ends of life.”380 Veblen saw the possibility for social good 
                                                 
379
 During his lifetime, Burke was “a leader of the anti-patent campaign” in 
England. KENT, supra note 275, at 221 (citing PAUL MANTOUX, THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 336 (London 1928)). 
380
 For a general critique of Burke and his progeny, see COREY ROBIN, THE 
REACTIONARY MIND: CONSERVATISM FROM EDMUND BURKE TO SARAH PALIN 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (placing Burke on a continuum of reactionary 
thinkers seeking to protect established hierarchy against emancipatory 
movements from below). Against Robin’s analysis of Burke, it is interesting that 
Chief Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit wrote an op-ed in 2013 that seems to 
tie in closely with the fact that he offered comments to Cotter on the Burkean 
view of patent eligibility. Randall R. Rader et al., Make Patent Trolls Pay in 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html; see also Charles 
Arthud, Obama Takes Aim at ‘Patent Trolls’, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jun/05/obama-patent-
trolls (quoting J. Randall R. Rader); Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fed. Cir., The State of Patent Litigation, Address 
at the E. Dist. Tex. Judicial Conference (Sept. 27, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9008/Library/
The%20State%20of%20Patent%20Litigation%20w%20Ediscovery%20Model%
20Order.pdf). A crucial point here is that Judge Rader’s suggestion to value 
patent litigation early implies that technical (i.e., useful) aspects of a patented 
invention drive valuation. One of Veblen’s more remarkable contributions to 
this most daunting question of economics—how to assess value?—was his 
recognition that pecuniary interests can influence or outright impose valuations 
on serviceable technology, suggesting that valuation occurs in the opposite 
manner to what Rader implies. See Wray, supra note 13, at 618; Hobson, supra 
note 30. In the patent context, the Veblenian view is that the legal mechanisms 
at play in patent litigation drive valuation independent of usefulness at large of 
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in such disruption. Here, it should be noted that “[e]ver since 
antiquity, the useful arts in their various guises had been 
considered intellectually and socially inferior to the high (or fine, 
or creative, or imaginative) arts.”381 It is precisely in this context 
that Veblen, somewhat like Thomas Jefferson et al.,382 saw 
technology as a means of sociopolitical change working against 
vested interests, making the Veblenian view of technology 
potentially more consistent with the revolutionary era conception 
of promoting progress in the useful arts than a Burkean view that 
must generally be seen as seeking to protect vested interests from 
disruption.383  
Moreover, Veblen saw the pecuniary activities of business and 
finance as bearing the large share of responsibility for fluctuations 
in and de-synchronization of an economy on a macro scale, 
                                                                                                             
the claimed invention. Moreover, even though the argument by Rader et al. 
emphasizes the toll allegedly imposed on small companies, there is nothing in 
current patent laws that exempts small companies from patent infringement. 
Rightly or wrongly, the patent laws treat all parties the same regardless of size, 
ability to monitor the patent landscape, or resources to defend against frivolous 
litigation. Moreover, start-up companies are sometimes merely the playthings of 
venture capitalists and therefore still as much “vested interests” in the Veblenian 
sense as large companies. The notion that patents impose a sort of “tax” on 
productive business is in line with many of Veblen’s original criticisms of 
pecuniary activities (in which legal work was included) wastefully raising the 
general cost of doing business. It is an argument that when taken to its logical 
conclusion is one against the very existence of patents (and other intellectual 
property). At bottom, too, it is merely a generalized complaint against frivolous 
litigation, which is not unique to patent law by any means—with no clear 
mechanism in sight to quickly, reliably and fairly separate the frivolous from the 
nonfrivolous. 
381
 Marx, supra note 274, at 573. 
382
 See Irwin, supra note 9, at 789; Marx, supra note 274, at 565.  
383
 Although neither Burke nor Veblen favored patents, their rationales for 
arriving at their respective positions were polar opposites. 
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particularly in relation to economic crises that harm general 
welfare.384  
Veblen specifically focuses on the problem how 
domination and direction of industrial activities by 
financial activities result in instabilities and 
fluctuations in economy. At this point, Veblen 
asserts that fluctuations in [the] economy do not 
stem from [the] industrial sector, but from activities 
that business enterprises follow for more profit. 
Veblen defines fluctuations emerging at the level of 
financial activity not as industrial fluctuations but as 
business cycles. In this sense, Veblen indicates 
crisis and financial fluctuations in modern economy 
not as a result of [the] industrial economy but as a 
result of [the] money economy.385  
The self-interested views of the FIRE sector can be seen in a 
stark new light from this perspective. For instance, commentator 
John Duffy took quite literally the notion that “financial 
engineering” is indeed a new form of engineering, noting that 
Princeton University had created a Department of Operations 
                                                 
384
 VEBLEN, supra note 20, at 14–32; see also Gülenay Baş Dinar, Conflict 
between Industrial and Financial Activities and Instability of Capitalism in 
Veblen's Analysis presented at the Veblen, Capitalism and Possibilities for a 
Rational Economic Order Symposium, available at http://
www.veblenconference.org/en/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73:guelenay-ba-
dinar&catid=47:paper-owners&Itemid=101 (last updated June 18, 2012); Little, 
supra note 20. 
385
 Gülenay Baş Dinar, Abstract: Conflict Between Industrial and Financial 
Activities and Instability of Capitalism in Veblen's Analysis presented at the 
Veblen, Capitalism and Possibilities for a Rational Economic Order 
Symposium, available at http://www.veblenconference.org/en/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73:guelenay-ba-
dinar&catid=47:paper-owners&Itemid=101 (last updated June 18, 2012). 
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Research and Financial Engineering.386 In such a view, the scope 
of “technological arts” is flexible and should be expanded to 
include activities of the financial sector or any other sector that 
may dominate the economy in the future. Insiders in the FIRE 
sector tend to view themselves as engineers in this way too.387 
From the Veblenian perspective, that view is suspect because it is 
rooted in status and institution instead of taking a functional 
approach with respect to productive contribution.388 Princeton 
University creating such a department within their engineering 
school raises the same questions posed by the formation of 
business schools nearly a century earlier, many of which were 
created not to develop new curricula, but “(a) to engage and serve 
the local business community, and thereby attract students and 
donations, and (b) to steal away the significant paying business 
education that was already being done by many nation-wide 
nonacademic schools of commerce.”389 Duffy gives academic 
                                                 
386
 Duffy, supra note 35, at 1268–69. Duffy’s views are not uncommon 
here. For instance, the television program NOVA ran an episode on October 16, 
2013 titled “Making Stuff Faster” that blurred the lines between what might be 
called the useful arts and business management when discussing operations 
research initiatives. How to Run Faster, SCI. AM. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-to-run-faster-video. 
387
 Engineering, machinery and technology metaphors now abound in 
describing financial and business activities. See, e.g., John Cassidy, Mastering 
the Machine: How Ray Diallo Built the World’s Richest and Strangest Hedge 
Fund, THE NEW YORKER, July 25, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2011/07/25/110725fa_fact_cassidy; SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A 
NEW BREED OF MATH WIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY 
DESTROYED IT (2010); see also John A. Squires and Thomas S. Biemer, Patent 
Law 101: Does a Grudging Lundgren Panel Decision Mean That the USPTO Is 
Finally Getting The Statutory Subject Matter Question Right?, 46 IDEA 561 
(2006). However, “[t]he strategy of ‘financial engineering’ is to make capital 
gains by downsizing and breaking up companies, or to bid up their stock prices 
rather than investing in more capital or hiring more employees.”  HUDSON, 
supra note 10, at 251. 
388
 Duffy’s view does, however, resemble the “Burkean” view. See supra 
Part I. 
389
 LOCKE & SPENDER, supra note 74, at 8. 
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institutions a free pass, assuming that any of their activities must 
inherently be academic in nature due to their institutional status as 
“universities.”390 Yet the history of business schools shows a clear 
tendency towards wealth- and prestige-seeking activities among 
universities and colleges that is at odds with the somewhat naïve 
view of such schools as having purely academic motives. Veblen 
wrote an entire book on this topic, The Higher Learning in 
America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by 
Business Men.391 Moreover, even though there is now a 
professional organization—The International Association of 
Financial Engineers—that seeks to bolster the field of quantitative 
finance,392 it is difficult to see how “financial engineering” bears 
any relation to technology as it is commonly understood. The term 
“financial engineer” seems no more credible than a description of a 
homemaker as a “domestic engineer.”393 That is not meant to 
denigrate homemaking but rather emphasize that it is entirely 
different from engineering as the term is commonly understood.394 
                                                 
390
 For further criticism of Duffy’s views here, see BEN KLEMMONS, 
TECHNOLOGICAL ARTS 2 (2009) (“John Duffy proposed that we should take an 
‘I know it when I see it’ sort of approach: if it’s taught at a technical college 
then it’s a technological art.”), available at http://ben.klemens.org/blog/pdfs/
012-bilski_v_kappos.pdf. 
391
 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILISATION 
AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 29, at 186. 
392
 INT’L ASS’N FIN. ENGINEERS, http://iafe.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
393
 Kate Lorenz, Six Ways to Embellish Your Resume Without Lying, 
EXPERIENCE, http://www.experience.com/alumnus/
article?channel_id=Resumes&source_page=additional_articles&article_id=artic
le_1203709417499 (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (explaining that to “[a]void half-
truths and gross exaggerations,” job applicants are advised that “[m]ost hiring 
managers and recruitment professionals have had their share of resumes pass 
across their desks during their career. So they are usually adept at deciphering 
embellishments in a resume. They know that spending the last 10 years as a 
'domestic engineer' means you simply were home with your kids.”).  
394
 Much as noted by LEWONTIN ET AL., supra note 39, this is generally an 
attempt to acquire credibility through association with “engineering,” a 
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Economists in the tradition of Veblen view “financial engineering” 
not as a form of engineering like mechanical, chemical or electrical 
engineering, but rather as synonymous with speculation and debt 
leveraging.395 So while today’s “financial engineers” may have 
backgrounds in actual science and engineering, a distinction should 
still be drawn in the Veblenian sense regarding the unproductive 
functional nature of their current financial activities. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The present proposal offers a new perspective on patent subject 
matter eligibility, and one that is sharply divided from and 
considerably narrower than certain other frameworks. Veblen’s 
key insights into the sorts of artful deception engaged in by 
parasitic, nonproductive economic sectors roughly a century ago is 
useful for identifying how the same sophistries are being employed 
by business interests today to distort patent law through an 
expansion of patent eligibility. In an era when the gravitational pull 
of the FIRE sector and related unproductive industries in the 
economic field has perhaps even exceeded that of industry, 
Veblen’s theoretical framework offers much-needed insights as to 
how such a pecuniary/industrial imbalance in the economic field 
can influence the conception of patent-eligible subject matter in a 
way that has a negative impact on the advancement of general 
welfare. Adopting a Veblenian perspective for patent subject 
matter eligibility would preclude numerous swaths of “invention” 
currently allowed by the USPTO and acceptable under current 
judicial tests (e.g., the “coarse filter” approach). However, despite 
this retraction in the scope of patent subject matter eligibility, such 
an approach would merely restrain patenting within boundaries 
more consistent with historical practice, long-standing Supreme 
                                                                                                             
discipline widely acknowledged to serve the public interest, by actors working 
in disciplines not widely accorded the same status. 
395
 Hudson, supra note 223; cf. GALBRAITH, supra note 284, at 19. 
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Court precedent, and constitutional limits.396 More generally, the 
Veblenian perspective preserves an Enlightenment-era egalitarian 
element in patentable subject matter policy that is presently being 
eroded in an era in which the values and ideologies of feudalism 
increasingly regain traction, and also helps preserve technology’s 
positive role as a possibly disruptive social force that can—if 
conditions are right—fuel progress.397 Such limits are important 
because highly abstracted patent claims directed to invidious, 
                                                 
396
 Here it is worth noting with a careful eye the self-interest of the patent 
bar, which almost uniformly supports having more patents and patent litigation, 
leading Chief Justice John Roberts (echoed by Justice Scalia) to joke—in 
Veblenian fashion—during oral arguments for the KSR case that patent bar 
support for confusing and low thresholds on the question of nonobviousness 
“just indicates that this is profitable for the patent bar.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 04-1350), 
available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/KSR_20Transcript.pdf; see also 
Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Fed. Claims, Address at the E.D. 
Texas Judicial Conference: The State of Patent Litigation (Sept. 2011), 
transcript available at http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/
9008/Library/
The%20State%20of%20Patent%20Litigation%20w%20Ediscovery%20Model%
20Order.pdf (“From the lawyer’s perspective, I can give the state of patent 
litigation in two words: NOT ENOUGH.”). Take for instance articles in the 
trade publication INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, which features many articles 
by patent practitioners. The overwhelming majority of articles in that 
publication discussing patent-eligible subject matter, and written by practicing 
patent attorneys, advocate for expanding patent subject matter eligibility and 
criticize limits or adverse rulings by the judiciary. This follows Veblen’s 
concept of “trained incapacity,” which referred to the rather self-serving and 
often chauvinistic blind spots that professional training often imparts. VEBLEN, 
THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE STATE OF THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS 
(1914), supra note 8. It is akin to Upton Sinclair’s famous saying, “It is difficult 
to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not 
understanding it!” UPTON SINCLAIR, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND HOW I 
GOT LICKED 109 (U. Cal. Press, 1994) (1935). 
397
 See DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 198–99; HUDSON, 
supra note 10, at 156 (“If economic evolution is to reflect the inner logic and 
requirements of society’s technological capabilities, then [neofeudal] finance 
capital must be subordinated to serve the [real, productive] economy, not be 
permitted to master and stifle it.”). 
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pecuniary activities tend to marginalize and dominate over 
workmanship and technology, rendering practitioners of the 
“useful arts” decidedly subordinate. Too great a slide toward 
patents on pecuniary activities may well lead to a feudalistic, pre-
Statute of Monopolies condition in which patents simply divide up 
entitlements to economic rents. Moreover, patent claims of a 
pecuniary nature, such as those to a business model per se, bestow 
preemptive creative monopolies that can potentially discourage 
technological efforts under the oft-repeated economic incentive 
theory of patent law, whatever the empirical value of that theory, 
because claims drawn to more concrete technological activities 
will nearly always permit the possibility of alternative 
technological solutions that further contribute to collective 
knowledge and well-being. The role of technology and industry in 
society is not a sole determinant of social well-being, but the 
positive role it can play is perhaps obscured to some degree when 
an unprincipled expansion of patent-eligible subject matter to 
nontechnological activity occurs.  
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